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The American "war on drugs" has given rise to a voluminous
body of scholarly literature.'
Commentators have addressed such
important topics as the legality of particular drug enforcement
practices, 2 the effects of the drug war on families 3 and minority
5
communities, 4 the "rebellion" of skeptical judges and prosecutors,
and, more fundamentally, the relative merits of punishment,
6
treatment, and legalization.
Comparatively little work has been done, however, on what
would seem a threshold question of utmost importance: which level of
government-federal, state, or local-ought to have primacy in
making and enforcing drug control policy? Which should have the

1.

President Nixon first declared a "war on drugs" in 1969. DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA

KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL: POLITICS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF
INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981, at 60 (2002). His successors have continued to use

militaristic rhetoric in characterizing federal drug policy. See infra Parts II.B-D (describing
evolution of federal drug policy).
2.
See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 57-76, 84-93 (1998) (arguing that self-financing of drug
enforcement through asset forfeiture violates due process and separation of powers doctrines);
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 744 (2002) (arguing that use of racial profiling in drug
interdiction on the highway violates the Equal Protection Clause, but noting uncertainty
surrounding remedy); see also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (discussing negative effects of racial
profiling in drug enforcement).
3.
See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, "CollateralDamage" No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47
VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1043-45 (2002) (describing consequences of drug conviction for parents of
minor children); Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug
Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 346-88 (1996) (describing punishment of innocent
family members through application of drug asset forfeiture laws); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal
Justice and Black Families: The CollateralDamage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1005, 1015-20 (2001) (discussing effect of racially disproportionate incarceration of AfricanAmericans on African-American families).
4.

See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA

81-123 (1995) (describing and criticizing racially disparate effects of war on drugs); William J.
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1798-99 (1998) (attributing racially
disparate effects not to racism, but to class-based paternalism).
5.
See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis
of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the DistrictLevel, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477,
554 (2002) (interpreting data to indicate that "front-line actors" have used their discretion to
reduce sentences for federal drug crimes).
6.
For a sampling of the range of views in this debate, see DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE
THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS 125-78 (2002) (arguing that drug prohibition is

both unjust and fails cost-benefit analysis); WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL
POVERTY... AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 137-90 (1996)

(arguing that drug use is immoral and responding to arguments for legalization); Philip B.
Heymann, Introduction: Drug Policy with a New Focus, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY:
THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 1, 11 (Philip B. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger

eds., 2001) (arguing that drug enforcement should be continued, but tailored so as to reduce
social costs).
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authority to choose, for instance, whether punishment or treatment of
drug users will be emphasized in a particular locale? And what role
should the other levels of government play in implementing such a
choice?
Within the otherwise abundant drug policy literature,
sustained treatments of federal-state-local relations are rare and
increasingly dated. 7 More than a decade ago, two distinguished
commentators offered a critical observation that might apply equally
well today: "[L]ittle attention has been paid to level-of-government
issues in current drug policy discussions, and the allocations of
responsibilities that take place seem haphazardly determined."8 The
purpose of this Article is to address these neglected federalism issues
in drug policy. A number of recent developments lend a new urgency
to sorting out the current "haphazard" allocation of responsibilities.
Not only has the Supreme Court revived the specter of constitutional
constraints on federal regulatory power, 9 but several states have
adopted new drug laws that deviate markedly from enforcement-

7.
For the most thorough treatment of federal-state relations in drug policy, see DANIEL K.
BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING DRUGS: BEYOND LEGALIZATION 186-249 (1991).
For other notable contributions, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 158-76 (1992); Paul D. Carrington, The Twenty-First Wisdom, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333, 337-56 (1995); John G. Haaga & Peter Reuter, The Limits of the Czar's
Ukase: Drug Policy at the Local Level, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 36 (1990). All published in the
early to mid-1990s, these works are dated in several respects. They do not consider a series of
important state ballot initiatives on drug policy beginning in 1996. For an account of these
initiatives and the federal-state conflicts they have generated, see infra Part III.B.2.b. They
devote little attention to the critical role played by asset forfeiture in drug enforcement, a topic
that began to receive significant scholarly attention only in the later 1990s. See, e.g., Blumenson
& Nilsen, supra note 2. They were written before the Supreme Court revised the constitutional
framework for federalism in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Finally, they were
written before the flowering of an important body of scholarly literature criticizing the scope of
federal criminal jurisdiction. For a summary of the debate on the so-called "federalization of
criminal law," see Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the
Use of Departuresto Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 726-29
(2002). A recent contribution to the literature on federalism and drug control is David W.
Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, RationalizingDrug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 679 (2003). Professors Rasmussen and Benson, two economists, helpfully address at least
one of the gaps in the earlier literature by focusing on the role of asset forfeiture in federal-state
relations. Id. at 715-21.
8.
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 159.
9.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause authority). Demonstrating the potential significance of Lopez to
drug policy, the Ninth Circuit has preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of federal drug laws
against the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medical
purposes on the advice of a physician. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003).
The court held that the plaintiff users and growers of marijuana had demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that federal drug laws, as applied to them,
exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1229-34.
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oriented federal norms. 10
The resulting federal-state conflicts
threaten the integrity of national drug policies, generate unnecessary
public confusion, and present a risk of real injustice to individuals
caught in the middle.
Consider, for instance, the case of Ed Rosenthal. The federal
government brought marijuana cultivation charges against Rosenthal
in early 2003.11 Rosenthal was, in fact, authorized by the City of
Oakland to distribute marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant to
California state law.1 2 Rosenthal was not, however, permitted to
present this information as a defense at trial because federal lawunlike California law-does not recognize any valid medical uses of
the drug. 13 A jury convicted Rosenthal of a federal drug offense that,
with few exceptions, carries a mandatory minimum prison term of five
years. 14 Surprisingly, the district court judge imposed a sentence of
only one day based on the "unique circumstances" of the case, but an
appeal by the government is still pending.15
Whatever the outcome of Rosenthal, the case highlights
growing tensions between state and federal drug control policies.
These tensions encompass not only the "medical marijuana" debate,
but also disputes over the role of court-supervised treatment of drug
users in sentencing and the use of asset forfeiture in enforcement. In
light of these points of disagreement, Congress has begun to take an
interest in the federalism aspects of drug policy,' 6 indicating that the
time is ripe for a fresh consideration of the subject.
With this objective in mind, the present Article addresses two
related questions, one empirical and the other normative. First, the
Article considers how best to characterize the current federal role in
national drug policy. Prior commentators have emphasized federal
dominance, and have gone so far as to claim that the federal
government has a "monopoly" on drug policy.1 7 These commentators,
10. For a description of these recent state innovations, see infra Part III.B.2.
11. Dean E. Murphy, A California Cultivator of Medical MarijuanaIs Convicted on Federal
Charges,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at A12.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14.

Id.

15. Bob Egelko, U.S. Will Appeal Pot Decision; Judge Refused to Jail Marijuana Grower,
S.F. CHRON., July 8, 2003, at A14. For the judge's complete sentencing analysis, see United
States v. Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
16. For instance, the pending Truth in Trials Act would offer federal drug defendants a new
affirmative defense based on compliance with applicable state medical marijuana laws. H.R.
1717, 108th Cong. (2003). Congress has also recently considered, and rejected, a proposal to
increase funding for federal enforcement against medical marijuana distribution. See infra Part
III.B.2.b.vi.
17.

BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 6.
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however, have not taken into account several remarkable
developments over the course of the past decade, such as the success
of state-level reformers in using the ballot initiative to modify state
drug laws and the emergence of a grass-roots "drug court" movement
that has won the enthusiastic support of Washington.1 8 In light of
recent developments, the "federal monopoly" theory is no longer
viable, if indeed it ever was. Rather than acting as a dictator of state
policy, the federal government exercises, at most, a loose control over
the general direction taken by lower levels of government. The result
is a set of drug policies that do not exhibit true uniformity from state
to state, but instead display a sort of constrained diversity.
Turning from the empirical to the normative, the Article next
considers how federal-state relations ought to be structured. It will be
assumed here that a legislature could reasonably choose any of a
range of policies, from mandatory treatment for addicts to legalization
to more intensive enforcement and heavier penalties. 19 The question
here is not which substantive policy should be adopted, but who
should get to choose.
Under a leading reform proposal (the so-called "Constitutional
Alternative"), the federal government would essentially get out of the
drug policy business, leaving the basic regulatory decisions to the
states. 20 This proposal promises to enhance the accountability of state
governments, promote innovation, and bring important policy
decisions closer to the people. Yet, the Constitutional Alternative has
several important drawbacks, particularly in its effects on states and
localities that would like to continue (or even expand) the war on
drugs within their borders. 21 In particular, proponents have not fully
appreciated the importance of the federal government's broad criminal
jurisdiction as a form of in-kind aid to state and local law enforcement.
This Article suggests a different reform agenda, termed here
the "Competitive Alternative." Like the Constitutional Alternative,
18. Some of these developments have received considerable scholarly attention, such as the
drug treatment courts. See infra note 250 (discussing recent scholarship on drug courts).
Others, like the drug treatment and asset forfeiture initiatives, have received virtually no
sustained attention. This Article canvasses the full range of state drug policy innovations,
comparing and contrasting different reforms and placing them for the first time into a single,
coherent analytical framework.
19. See, e.g., Bruce Bullington, America's Drug War: Fact or Fiction?, in THE CONTROL OF
DRUGS AND DRUG USERS: REASON OR REACTION? 107, 108 (Ross Coomber ed., 1998) (discussing

arguments that drug war should be escalated); Stephen D. Easton, Everybody Knows It, But Is It
True? A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom that the War on Drugs Is Ineffective, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 132, 132 (2001-2002) ("[E]vidence suggests that escalation of the war on drugs
does, in fact, reduce the rates of drug use in America.").
20. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 194.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
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this agenda would seek to decentralize drug control policy, but would
focus not on the states, but on local units of government. Localities
that wished to continue fighting the federally led war on drugs with
federal support could continue to do so, but localities that wished to
develop and implement alternative drug control strategies would have
more freedom to go their own way.
The proposal is termed
''competitive" to emphasize a key difference from the Constitutional
Alternative: while the Constitutional Alternative would create a state
monopoly in drug policy, the Competitive Alternative would, in effect,
give local communities a choice between state and federal policies.
Put differently, state and federal approaches would compete for the
allegiance of local communities. Achieving reform along these lines
requires several distinct changes to federal law, including (1) reducing
the federal distortion of drug policy debates at the state and local
level; (2) subjecting federal drug enforcement decisions to a greater
degree of local political control; and (3) increasing the accountability of
local law enforcement to local political institutions.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys the
conceptual terrain of drug policy, summarizing four competing policy
paradigms that are embodied either in current federal law or in state
reform efforts. Part II describes the evolution of federal drug policy,
emphasizing the century-long competition between treatment- and
punishment-oriented approaches. Part III considers whether there is a
federal monopoly on drug policy: it asks, first, what tools are used by
Washington to induce state and local compliance with federal norms,
and, second, how effective are those tools in practice? Using public
choice theory, Part III also attempts to explain why the current
pattern of constrained diversity has developed. Part IV presents the
case for decentralized drug policy and critiques the Constitutional
Alternative. Part V describes the Competitive Alternative.

I. A SURVEY OF THE CONCEPTUAL TERRAIN
A. Four Leading Paradigmsof Drug Control Policy
Four competing paradigms of drug control policy have emerged
in recent years as especially influential: public-health generalism,
legalism, cost-benefit specifism, and rights-based. 22 The public-health

22. In labeling the first three paradigms, I am borrowing the terminology suggested by
Professors Zimring and Hawkins in ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 8-10. The rights-based
approach is described by Professor Husak in Douglas N. Husak, Two Rationales for Drug Policy:
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approach regards drug abuse as a disease and seeks to reduce the
social harms (overdoses, births of addicted babies, and so forth) caused
by that disease. 23 Under this paradigm, all abusable substances,
whether currently lawful (alcohol, tobacco) or not (cocaine, heroin),
should be handled in much the same manner. 24 For those who abuse
such substances, the public-health viewpoint emphasizes treatment
and eschews moralism. 25
Proponents of this approach do not
necessarily reject criminalization as one component of a broader harmreduction strategy-a strategy that would also include significant
public education and treatment components-but, by and large, they
tend to be skeptical of the effectiveness of the criminal justice system
in reducing the incidence of substance abuse. 26 The public-health
approach is embodied in the mandatory treatment laws that have
27
been adopted recently in Arizona and California.
The legalist approach, by contrast, has been the dominant
paradigm in federal drug policy. 28 This approach focuses on
the threat that illegal drugs represent to the established order and political authority
structure. In this view, it is the consumption of the prohibited substance rather than
any secondary consequences that might ensue that is the heart of the matter. The
taking of drugs prohibited by the government
is an act of rebellion, of defiance of lawful
29
authority, that threatens the social fabric.

Thus, for the legalist, the distinction between lawful and unlawful
substances carries great weight; people who consume unlawful
substances make a morally wrong decision regardless of whether any
tangible harm results.
The legalist is skeptical of treatment,
preferring law enforcement approaches that are intended to reduce
supply. 30 For purposes of public education, the message is simple and
straightforward: "illegal drugs are a bad thing and.., drug takers are
bad people. '' 31
Decriminalization is unthinkable: "The central
inflexibility is that there is no way to change the terms of the criminal
How They Shape the Content of Reform, in HOW TO LEGALIZE DRUGS 29, 38 (Jefferson M. Fish
ed., 1998).
23. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 8. For a more detailed elaboration of the publichealth paradigm, see EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 198-227

(1996).
24. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 8. For an argument that tobacco use, in fact,
constitutes our "most serious drug problem," see STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S
LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 22-32 (1993).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 12.
Id. at 12-14.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
See infra Part II.E.1.
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 8-9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13.
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law regarding drugs without admitting defeat in the power struggle
between good and evil that is the essence of this account of drug use
'32
and abuse.
Much like public-health generalism, cost-benefit specifism
rejects moral absolutism and questions the established boundaries
between licit and illicit substances. 33
Under the cost-benefit
paradigm, however, not all abusable substances are created equal. 34
Proponents of this approach "see drug policy as requiring a balance
between the costs of abuse and the likelihood of reducing them by
means of legal prohibition, and the manifold costs of enforcing those
prohibitive laws. '35 This balancing process must be made on a drugby-drug basis, with careful attention to social context. 36 Thus, while
the public-health generalist might regard treatment as the public
policy response of first resort with respect to any type of substance
abuse problem, the cost-benefit specifist might, for instance, favor
tough criminal sanctions for heroin, public education for cocaine,
decriminalization for marijuana, and treatment for all juvenile users.
The cost-benefit approach has been embodied in state laws and
proposed initiatives that would narrowly decriminalize a particular
drug or particular uses of a drug, such as the medical marijuana
laws.

37

Finally, the rights-based paradigm is premised on the existence
of a moral or legal right to recreational drug use. 38 This fundamental
right might be an adjunct of the right to privacy,3 9 or based more
broadly on each person's right to be treated by the state as a
"responsible moral agent."40 Like the public-health and cost-benefit

32. Id. at 14. While any liberalizing of drug laws is thus anathema to the legalist mindset,
if any illicit drug were ever legalized, the true legalist would presumably drop his or her
opposition to use of the drug. Thus, for instance, despite the enduring influence of legalism in
federal drug policy, see infra Part II, the nation has never come close to recriminalizing alcohol
since the end of Prohibition.
33.

34.
35.
GROSS,
36.
37.
38.

ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 13-14.

Id. at 9.
Id. For examples of attempts to develop a policy agenda along these lines, see DUKE &
supra note 24, at 279-306; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 177-92.
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 9.
See infra Part III.B.2.b.i.
For a leading statement of this position, see THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE

CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992). See also HUSAK, supra note 6, at 125-65.

39. Husak, supra note 22, at 43-45. For a judicial decision finding such a privacy-based
right to recreational drug use in the home, see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
40. Husak, supra note 22, at 46; see also DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at 151-54
(discussing "moral objections to drug prohibition"); STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON
DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 198 (1990) (urging "a new paradigm of individual

responsibility and accountability for drug taking").
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perspectives, the rights-based perspective calls into question the
existing legal framework of drug control at the federal level, but on
different grounds. It rejects the purported moral neutrality of the
public-health and cost-benefit perspectives, and finds hidden (and
perhaps dubious) moral judgments in their counting and weighing of
social harms.4 1 Proponents tend to favor legalization, but are not
necessarily opposed to all drug regulation. After all, in our legal
system, we are accustomed to the notion of state infringement on
fundamental rights, so long as the infringement is sufficiently limited
in scope and justified by a compelling state interest. 42 A broad
criminal prohibition on drug use, however, is unlikely to be justifiable
from the rights-based point of view. 43 Of the four paradigms, this
approach has been the least influential in making policy in recent
years, although federal officials have persistently seen a hidden
44
rights-based agenda in state-level reform efforts.
B. A Note on Terminology
As should be clear by now, participants in drug policy debates
disagree on even the most fundamental premises of the debate. While
a legalist, for instance, might assume that the appropriate target of a
"drug" policy is limited to illicit substances, a public-health generalist
would want to include alcohol and tobacco in the discussion. While a
public-health generalist might view addiction as the fundamental
harm to be addressed by drug policy, a critic from the legalist or
rights-based perspectives might question whether there is even such a
phenomenon as "drug addiction," at least insofar as the term connotes
45
a diminished degree of moral responsibility.
Resolving such disputes lies beyond the scope of this Article,
but their existence cannot be disregarded. Among other things, the
current state of the drug policy debate requires that anyone writing in
the field make some particular effort to define the terms used. 46 Thus,
for clarity's sake, a few definitions follow:

41. Husak, supra note 22, at 34-37.
42. Id. at 51.
43. Id. at 52.
44. Infra Part III.B.2.b.v.
45. See, e.g., MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 11 (1998) (criticizing proponents of the medical
model for offering false characterization of addicts as lacking any control over their behavior); see
also SZASZ, supranote 38, at ix-x (arguing against legitimacy of terms "addict," "drug abuse," and
"drug abuse treatment").
46. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 31-35 (defining "drug," "drug addiction,"
"drug abuse," and "drug problem").
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Drugs will be used here to connote psychoactive substances the
possession of which is currently illegal under federal law (with limited
exceptions for medical and scientific use).
Drug abuse refers to types or patterns of drug use that carry
substantial risks of harm to the user or to others (e.g., risks of
overdosing, risks of exposing a fetus to dangerous drugs, risks of
developing drug dependency).
Drug addict refers to a chronic, heavy user of drugs. The term
does not make a judgment as to whether such a person suffers from a
disease or a moral defect, or has a demonstrable form of mental or
physical dependence on drugs.
Drug enforcement refers to the apprehension, prosecution, and
punishment of those who use, possess, produce, or distribute drugs.
Drug policy refers broadly to the full set of governmental
decisions (both legislative and executive) dealing with the regulation
of drugs, including not only penal laws, but also resource allocation
decisions (e.g., how much money will go to enforcement and how much
to treatment).
Legalization refers to legalization of the use, possession
manufacture, and distribution of drugs; note, however, that a
legalization policy may include significant taxation and regulation of
drugs, much as alcohol and tobacco, though legalized, are subject to
taxation and regulation.
Decriminalizationrefers to a policy that preserves the illegal
status of drugs, but reduces penalties for simple possession to a
misdemeanor level or less.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL DRUG POLICY
Since its origins nearly a century ago, federal drug policy has
emphasized enforcement and reflected strong legalist tendencies. Yet,
also from the beginning, influential voices have characterized drug
abuse as a medical problem that is suitable for treatment, either to
supplement or supplant criminal justice responses. Thus, the history
of federal drug policy has been marked by a series of successive
enforcement and treatment initiatives, some originating from within
the federal policymaking establishment and some from states and
local communities.
In detailing these dynamics, this Part will lay a necessary
foundation for the subsequent analysis of federalism issues in drug
policy. Understanding the traditional federal drug control agenda
provides a baseline from which we can assess the federal government's
capacity to impose its preferences on lower levels of government.
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Additionally, this Part will demonstrate that, despite the claims of the
federal monopoly theory, there is a long history of state and local
innovation in drug policy.
A. 1914-1968: The Other Prohibition
Like the nation's well-known, unsuccessful experiment with
alcohol prohibition, federal antidrug policies emerged from the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century.
After a few
preliminary statutes of more modest scope, 47 in 1914 Congress enacted
its most ambitious early drug law, the Harrison Act, which banned the
distribution of opiates (including morphine and heroin) and cocaine
outside medical channels. 48 This law followed earlier state and local
efforts to regulate such drugs, 49 and represented, in part, an effort by
the medical profession to gain greater control over the distribution of
pharmaceuticals at a time when opiate-based patent medicines were
50
widely available without prescription.
Although medical professionals supported passage of the
Harrison Act, conflicts soon developed between drug enforcement
agents and many of the doctors who treated drug addicts. 51 The
47. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 required disclosure of the narcotics commonly used
in patent medicines at the time, while the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909 banned
importation of opium for smoking purposes. CAROLINE JEAN ACKER, CREATING THE AMERICAN
JUNKIE: ADDICTION RESEARCH IN THE CLASSIC ERA OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 13 (2002).

48.

ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 57. The text of the Harrison Act is reprinted in

DRUGS IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 253-55 (David F. Musto ed., 2002) [hereinafter

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].

For a history of narcotics use and regulation in the United States

prior to the Harrison Act, see DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL 1-24 (expanded ed. 1987).

49. ACKER, supra note 47, at 33. Pennsylvania, for instance, enacted an antimorphine law
as early as 1860. MUSTO, supra note 48, at 91. State laws, however, varied considerably. A
leading expert on drug policy at the time put the matter this way:
There are few if any subjects regarding which legislation is in a more chaotic condition
than the laws designed to minimize the drug-habit evil ....
In many of the states
anti-narcotic laws are so comprehensive that practically every retail druggist would
be subject to fine or imprisonment were an attempt made to enforce the legislation
ostensibly in force, while in other states the laws are so burdened with exceptions and
provisos as practically to nullify every effort to control the traffic in narcotic drugs.
Id. at 96 (quoting Martin Wilbert).
50. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 57. Thus, for instance, the legislation received
the support of the American Medical Association. ACKER, supra note 47, at 36. Congressional
hearings on the bill, however, focused on foreign policy considerations; the Departments of State
and War lobbied heavily in support of the law in order to bring the United States into line with
broader international efforts to regulate the opium trade. Id. at 33-34. For a full account of the
foreign policy considerations and diplomatic maneuvering that underlay the Harrison Act, see
MUSTO, supra note 48, at 24-65.
51. The medical community was itself deeply divided over the extent to which drug abuse
was a genuine medical problem. For instance, in a 1918 survey of health officials, 425 reported
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Treasury Department, charged with enforcing the Harrison Act,
concluded that physicians could not legally employ maintenance
therapies as part of a treatment regimen. 52 The Department equated
maintenance, which involves the continued administration of drugs in
order to help addicts avoid withdrawal symptoms, with drug
trafficking, and began to prosecute physicians employing maintenance
therapies for Harrison Act violations. 53 While some lower courts
initially rejected the Department's broad interpretation of the Act, 54
the Supreme Court endorsed the prohibition on maintenance in
1919. 55 Subsequent federal prosecutions resulted in the incarceration
of some physicians and the closure of all public drug treatment clinics
established by states and cities. 56 Consequently, community-based
treatment options for addicts essentially, dried up during the interwar
57
years.
Some federal officials, however, retained an interest in other
forms of treatment, in part to deal with the large proportion of federal
prison inmates who were addicts. 58
Growing sensitivity to the
that physicians viewed addiction as a disease, while 542 stated that addiction was instead
viewed as a vice. ACKER, supra note 47, at 38.
52. Id. at 34.
53. Id. at 34-35. Maintenance was specifically approved and regulated under the laws of
various jurisdictions at the time. For an account of the history of such regulatory programs in
Jacksonville, Florida, and the state of Tennessee, see MUSTO, supra note 48, at 97-102. For an
argument that the Treasury Department, in attacking such regulatory schemes, misconstrued
Congress's intent in passing the Harrison Act, see DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at 85. Duke
and Gross contend that the Harrison Act was not intended to be a prohibition law but, rather, a
law providing for the "orderly marketing" of regulated opiates. Id. (quoting Edward Brecher).
54. MUSTO, supra note 48, at 124-26.
In particular, federal courts doubted the
constitutional authority for the federal government to regulate the medical profession. Id. at
125. The Supreme Court was itself initially skeptical of the government's broad interpretation of
the Harrison Act. See United States v. Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1916) (holding that Harrison
Act indictment was properly quashed when indictment charged drug user with unlawful
possession of opiates; Harrison Act applied only to producers, importers, and distributors of
regulated substances).
55. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 97-100 (1919). In a separate case decided the same
day, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Harrison Act. United States v. Doremus, 249
U.S. 86, 94-95 (1919).
56. ACKER, supra note 47, at 34-36. Professor Musto notes that the crackdown on narcotics
began at about the same time as the Red Scare of 1919; he places the crackdown within the
context of an "intensely fearful period in American history." MUSTO, supra note 48, at 132-34.
For an account of the federal crackdown on state-sanctioned maintenance in New York City, see
id. at 140-41, 156-59. For a listing of known public narcotic clinics in the 1919-1920 time period,
see id. at 151-52.
57. ACKER, supra note 47, at 7. At the same time that the American government was
moving decisively against maintenance, the British government took precisely the opposite
stance, with some apparent success in reducing addiction rates and the incidence of related
public health problems. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 164-65. The British subsequently
reversed course in the late 1960s. Id. at 166.
58. ACKER, supra note 47, at 156.
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problem culminated in passage of the Porter Act of 1929, which
authorized the creation of two new federal narcotics hospitals. 59 These
facilities, which were intended to serve simultaneously as prisons and
hospitals, housed federal prisoners and probationers, as well as
voluntary patients.6 0
Upon admission, patient-inmates received
individualized medical assessments and treatment plans reflecting the
latest developments in addiction research. 6 1
The narcotics hospitals offer an intriguing precedent for the
sort of coerced treatment that is now exemplified by drug courts. 62
Indeed, hospital officials sought legal authority to retain even the
voluntary patients against their will until treatment was complete,
but they were rebuffed by the courts. 63 Despite the hospitals' initial
confidence in the efficacy of their treatment methods, relapse and
recidivism proved to be the norm. 64 Officials increasingly came to
view addiction as a pathological condition that could not be cured. 65
As an historian of the narcotics hospitals explains, "In the absence of
new ideas regarding treatment, the institution became more
custodial ....Within a few years of its opening, [its] character as a
prison dominated its hospital functions." 66
Meanwhile, despite the national abandonment of alcohol
prohibition, Congress not only maintained, but actually expanded the
drug prohibition laws with passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of
1937.67 As with opiates, the federal government did not develop an
interest in marijuana regulation until after earlier efforts at the state
and local level. Reacting to lurid stories associating marijuana with
violence and sex crimes, El Paso, Texas adopted the nation's first
marijuana ban in 1914.68 Twenty-nine states followed suit over the
next 17 years, and one (Louisiana) formally petitioned the federal
government for a nationwide ban. 69 The federal law enforcement

59. Id. at 77.
60. Id. at 156.
61. Id. at 167-68.
62. For a more complete discussion of the contemporary drug courts, see infra Part
III.B.2.a.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
note 48,
430-32.

ACKER, supra note 47, at 175.

Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
For an account of the development and passage of the legislation, see MUSTO, supra
at 224-28. The text of the law is reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at

68. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN
BLACK MARKET 19-20 (2003).

69.

Id. at 20.

2004]

FEDERALISM AND DRUG CONTROL

797

establishment reacted coolly to the proposal at first, but, for reasons
that have been the subject of some debate, later lobbied vigorously and
70
successfully for federal legislation.
Overall, the period from the 1930s to the 1960s was marked
both by a pronounced emphasis on criminal punishment as the
preferred response to drug use 71 and by relatively low levels of middleclass drug use, especially outside of urban areas. 72 Proposals for more
treatment-oriented drug policies were met with "vitriolic" attacks from
73
federal officials.
B. 1969-1980: Making War on Drugs
Despite the enactment of important criminalization statutes in
1914 and 1937, drug enforcement generally had limited political
salience (and budgetary resources) before the 1960s, when drug use
first became prevalent among middle-class young people. 74 Reacting
to this development, Richard Nixon elevated the status of drug abuse
as a national political issue in 1968, arguing on the campaign trail
that drugs were "decimating a generation of Americans." 75 Building
on this rhetoric, in 1969, shortly after taking office, Nixon declared a
national "war on drugs."76 His administration launched high-profile
70. Id. For a summary and assessment of the debate, see DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at
91-93. Some scholars, for instance, have suggested a desire by federal narcotics officials to
increase their budgets. See id. at 91 (discussing "bureaucratic aggrandizement" theory set forth
in HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963)).
71. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at x-xi. The high point for this punitive tendency
may have occurred in the 1950s, when Congress enacted mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses and even authorized capital punishment for the sale of heroin to minors. MUSTO, supra
note 48, at 231. The principal statutes of that era, the 1951 Boggs Act and the Narcotic Control
Act of 1956, are reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 276-81.
72. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at xxii, 2.
73. Id. at 4-6. For an account of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' harassment campaign
directed against the noted treatment advocate Alfred Lindesmith during this time period, see
generally John F. Galliher et al., Lindesmith v. Anslinger: An Early Government Victory in the
Failed War on Drugs, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1998).
74. See MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing public perceptions of drug
issue in 1950s and 1960s); see also ACKER, supra note 47, at 216 (noting "upsurge of drug use by
white middle-class youth in the 1960's and 1970's"); DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at 100 (citing
surveys indicating that, by 1979, 68.2 percent of eighteen-to-twenty-five-year-olds admitted to at
least one use of marijuana or hashish). Professor Musto dates the emergence of drug use as a
national policy issue back to at least 1965. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at 2. For
instance, the number of articles about illicit drugs in the New York Times grew from 56 in 1963,
to 109 in 1964, and then to 200 in 1965. Id. at 3.
75. TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND
ORDER 110 (2001). Nixon was in part concerned about the prospect of heroin-addicted Vietnam
veterans returning home. ACKER, supra note 47, at 217.
76. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at 60. Professor Demleitner has thoughtfully
critiqued the "war" metaphor, noting the problems of defining the "enemy" and determining what
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enforcement initiatives, particularly targeting the heroin trade, 77 and
increased federal antidrug expenditures from $86 million in 1969 to
nearly $800 million in 1974.78 His administration also oversaw the
creation of the federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") in
1973.79
Despite Nixon's strong rhetoric and emphasis on law
enforcement, the legalist paradigm did not necessarily dominate
federal drug policy in the 1970s. The nation's most notoriously strict
drug laws, which included long mandatory minimum sentences for
drug offenders, were not adopted by Congress, but by the state of New
York.80 Moreover, inspired by the success of pioneering treatment
programs in New York City and Illinois, the Nixon Administration
supported major drug treatment initiatives, including methadone
maintenance programs for heroin addicts.8 1 With financial assistance
from a Nixon-created agency, the National Institute on Drug Abuse,
many cities witnessed the return of the sorts of community-based drug
treatment clinics that the federal government had stamped out in the
1920s.8 2
Federal support of treatment continued through the

it really means to "win" or 'lose" a war on drugs. Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1028-31. She
further suggests that the war on drugs has become the template for an equally "amorphous and
ambiguous" war on terrorism. Id.
77. GEST, supra note 75, at 110.
78. SAM STALEY, DRUG POLICY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN CITIES 188 (1992).
79. GEST, supra note 75, at 111. The DEA is the federal government's chief drug "police"
force, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") also plays an important role,
particularly with respect to drug dealing by gangs and other organized crime groups. WISOTSKY,
supra note 40, at 66-67.
80. GEST, supra note 75, at 111. The minimum penalties ranged from one year to life,
depending on the offense. Id. at 199. The so-called "Rockefeller Drug Laws," which took effect in
1973, proved to be more than New York's criminal justice system could handle and were
substantially repealed in 1976. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 152-54 (1996). Still,
New York's drug laws continue to be among the toughest in the nation and have recently become
the target of concerted-albeit as yet unsuccessful-reform efforts by Governor Pataki. JAMES
WILSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGES OF REPLACING PRISON WITH DRUG
TREATMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW YORK STATE'S EXTENDED WILLARD PROGRAM 2 (2003).
81. ACKER, supra note 47, at 217-18; MASSING, supra note 45, at 98, 102-03. Nixon,
however, was adamantly opposed to decriminalization of marijuana. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 48, at 460.
82. ACKER, supra note 47, at 218. In this regard, the Nixon Administration's efforts
represented the culmination of a resurgence in interest in treatment among federal policymakers
that began in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1,
at 7. For instance, in 1963, the presidential Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse
(the "Prettyman Commission") promoted rehabilitation of abusers along with increased law
enforcement, making several specific treatment-related recommendations. Id. at 7-8.
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administration of Jimmy Carter, who also publicly endorsed the
83
decriminalization of marijuana.
C. 1981-2000: Escalatingthe War-The Triumph of Enforcement
Soaring drug use by middle class teenagers prompted a
backlash by angry parents.8 4 A grassroots "parents' movement" in the
85
late 1970s exerted pressure on Washington for tougher policies.
These efforts ultimately led to an unprecedented escalation of the war
on drugs in the 1980s. During this time period, as drug control
became entrenched as a preeminent domestic policy issue, federal
interest in treatment and receptivity to the public health paradigm
diminished considerably.
Ronald Reagan, who emphasized the drug issue during the
1980 election,8 6 received the enthusiastic support of the parents'
88
movement.8 7 Once in office, he declared a renewed "war on drugs."
The federal antidrug budget accordingly grew to nearly $6 billion by
1987.89 The Reagan Administration's position on drug policy received
its most familiar articulation in First Lady Nancy Reagan's "just say
no" campaign of the mid-1980s 90 -a blunt articulation of the legalist
view that drug use is a morally wrong choice, not a manifestation of a
disease. 91 With the emphasis on law enforcement, antidrug publicity,
and new international interdiction programs, treatment received little
92
consistent support from Washington.
The defining moment in the federal war on drugs may have
93
come with enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.

83. GEST, supra note 75, at 111. Carter justified this position based on the relatively low
"medical damage" caused by marijuana, the levels of use of the drug, and the inability to control
its production. MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supranote 1, at 205-06.
84. SCHLOSSER, supra note 68, at 23-25.
85.

MASSING, supra note 45, at 143-54; SCHLOSSER, supra note 68, at 23-25.

Among other

things, the parents' movement rejected the Carter Administration's leanings towards a costbenefit specificity paradigm, the "overly sophisticated hairsplitting about the relative safety of
this or that drug." MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 1, at 230.
86.

GEST, supra note 75, at 113.

87.

SCHLOSSER, supra note 68, at 24.

88.

GEST, supra note 75, at 129.

89. Id. at 115.
90. Id. at 114.
91. For a discussion of the legalist view, see supra Part I.A.
92. GEST, supra note 75, at 115-16; see also ACKER, supra note 47, at 218 (noting that the
Reagan Administration reduced federal funding of treatment at the same time that it intensified
enforcement against drug users and traffickers); MASSING, supra note 45, at 161 ("In real terms,
federal spending on treatment was less than one-fourth what it had been in 1974.").
93. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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Responding to the public furor over the cocaine-related death of
college basketball star Len Bias, Congress adopted new mandatory
minimum sentences of five and ten years for dealing crack cocaine
(also known as "cocaine base"), depending on the quantity of crack
involved. 94 The law resulted in substantially greater penalties for
crack offenses than for powder cocaine offenses.
For instance,
convictions involving 50 grams of crack result in the same ten-year
minimum as convictions involving 5000 grams of powder cocaine, 95 a
ratio that has led commentators to refer to the crack provisions as the
100:1 law. 96 A 1988 amendment made crack penalties even tougher,
broadening the applicability of the five-year minimum from trafficking
97
to mere possession.
These crack penalties are difficult to justify under any
paradigm other than legalism. 98 The mandatory minimum sentences
impose substantial costs, not just on the convicted offenders, but also
on society more generally in the form of incarceration costs, the
fragmentation of families and communities, the difficulty of
reintegrating long-time inmates back into the community, and
demoralization of the judiciary. 9 9 Demonstrable benefits are few. 10 0
94. GEST, supra note 75, at 119-21. These penalty provisions are codified at 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). The 1986 law was not Washington's first attempt to deal with drug
abuse through harsh sentencing policies; the Boggs Act of 1951, reflecting prevailing pessimism
about treatment after the failure of the narcotics hospitals, also imposed mandatory minimum
sentences on some drug traffickers. ACKER, supra note 47, at 182; see also supra note 71
(discussing mandatory minimum statutes in 1950s).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
96. See, e.g., GEST, supra note 75, at 126.
97. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
98. As two commentators have observed, "The minimum time served for a federal conviction
for distributing 50 grams of crack cocaine (less than one-millionth of annual United States
consumption) is 10 years, which is also about the average time served for murder or nonnegligent manslaughter." Jonathan P. Caulkins & Philip B. Heymann, How Should Low-Level
Drug DealersBe Punished?,in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL
DEPENDENCE 206, 209 (Philip B. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001).
99. For a summary of the criticisms of the 100:1 ratio, see William Spade, Jr., Beyond the
100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1275-84
(1996). For a recent survey of the literature on the collateral costs of imprisonment generally,
see John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children,
Communities, and Prisoners, in PRISONS 121, 123-31 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds.,
1999). The negative effects of imprisonment on both the short-term and long-term employment
prospects of inmates have been well documented. Id. at 136-37. For instance, one study
indicates that half of state inmates were employed prior to incarceration, but only about one-fifth
obtain work while on parole after incarceration. Id. at 137 (citing JOHN IRWIN & JAMES AUSTIN,
IT'S ABOUT TIME (1994)). Other studies suggest that incarceration primarily impacts low-income
minority communities. See id. at 135. For such communities, the removal of large numbers of
working-age males to prison may cause substantial social and economic instability, including
"churning' in local labor markets that may make the communities unattractive to business. Id.
The effects of incarceration on families are less well documented, see id. at 144, although theory
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Yet, the penalties have been retained because any decrease in
sentences would, in the words of a Senate Republican leader, "send[ ]
the wrong signal to young people" 10 1-hearkening back to what
Professors Zimring and Hawkins referred to as the "central
inflexibility" of the legalist paradigm. 102 The boundaries between licit
and illicit substances, once demarcated, must be vigorously enforced,
and those who choose to step on the wrong side of that border merit
strict punishment.
By some measures, the war on drugs reached its peak in the
mid- to late-1980s.10 3 Drugs remained salient on the national political
stage throughout the 1990s, 104 however, and the federal antidrug
budget continued its growth to nearly $20 billion by 1998-more than
200 times greater than when Richard Nixon began his campaign
1 05
against drugs.
With the change from a Republican to a Democratic
Administration in 1993, reform proponents saw an opportunity for
new directions in drug policy, but, after launching a half-hearted and
unsuccessful treatment-oriented initiative, the Clinton Administration
returned to the dominant policies of the 1980s.10 6 The Administration
did support a modest reduction in crack penalties, but also proposed
countervailing increases in the penalties for powder cocaine.10 7 A
Republican-dominated Congress nonetheless rejected the Clinton
proposal out of a desire to hold the line on crack sentences. 108 New
laws reflecting the legalist perspective included the 1998 Drug Free
Student Loans Act, which denies aid to college students who have so
suggests a variety of potential costs, particularly as to the children of incarcerated parents, see
id. at 123-29.
100. For a critical review of the American experience with mandatory minimums, see TONRY,
supra note 80, at 134-59. Professor Tonry concludes, "Evaluated in terms of their stated
substantive objectives, mandatory penalties do not work." Id. at 135.
101. GEST, supra note 75, at 127 (quoting Senator Spencer Abraham).
102. See supratext accompanying note 32.
103. DAVID W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A DRUG WAR:

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONS 6-7 (1994). For an attempt to explain the end of the drug
war's expansion in the early 1990s, see id. at 146-49.
104. See GEST, supra note 75, at 124-26 (describing political skirmishes between the Clinton
Administration and congressional Republicans over whether the Administration was sufficiently
tough on drugs).
105. Id. at 115; STALEY, supranote 78, at 188.
106. MASSING, supra note 45, at 216-20. One commentator argues that Clinton's first term
represented a more significant break from prior policies, but that his second term brought a
return to the war on drugs. Easton, supra note 19, at 138 ("[P]erhaps the most accurate
description of the second Clinton term is that it stopped the de-escalation of the Clinton first
term, without fully re-escalating the drug war.").
107. GEST, supra note 75, at 127.
108. Id.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:3:783

much as a misdemeanor conviction "under any Federal or State law
involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance." 10 9
D. FederalPolicy in the Twenty-First Century
In February 2003, the Bush Administration promulgated the
latest version of the National Drug Control Strategy, a comprehensive,
congressionally mandated statement of the federal government's drug
policies and plans. 110 Taking the Strategy at face value, a reader
might conclude that Washington has moved a considerable distance
away from the staunch legalism of the 1980s and towards the publichealth paradigm. The Strategy identifies "healing America's drug
users" as one of its three "national priorities." To that end, it discusses
at length the "key lessons" offered by the "public health model.""' 1 The
Strategy takes pains to contradict characterizations of federal drug
policy as "punitive," and purports to demonstrate that America, in
contrast to decriminalizing European nations, has the "genuine public
health approach."'1 2 The Strategy touts President Bush's proposal to
increase federal funding for treatment by $600 million over the next
three years."13
Enforcement receives comparatively muted
1 14
treatment.
Despite the Strategy's emphasis on the public-health model, in
most respects federal drug policy has remained very much on the
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2000). For a description and critique of the law, see Eric
Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became
a War on Education, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 61, 68-71 (2002). For an argument that the law
has been implemented in a manner that goes beyond what the original drafters had in mind, see
Demleitner, supranote 3, at 1040.
110. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (2003) [hereinafter DRUG
STRATEGY].

111. Id. at 17-18.
112. See id. at 40-41.
113. Id. at 16. The Strategy also urges treatment and counseling for students identified as
drug users through random testing programs. Id. at 12-13. In all, the Administration requested
more than $3.2 billion from Congress for treatment, as compared to only about $2.9 billion for
domestic drug law enforcement. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY FY
2004 BUDGET SUMMARY 7 (2003). Cynics might note that the Strategy would make federal
treatment dollars available to faith-based organizations, DRUG STATEGY, supra note 110, at 20;
Administration support for treatment may have less to do with drug policy per se than with a
broader Administration agenda of increasing public financial support for such organizations.
114. In addressing law enforcement issues, the Strategy discusses new initiatives designed to
promote interagency cooperation and more focused targeting of specific aspects of the drug
trafficking business, DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 26-30, but says nothing about broader
law enforcement objectives, such as more arrests, more convictions, and longer sentences. The
Strategy covers prevention and treatment prior to enforcement and interdiction, and one is left
with the impression that the former sections were imbued with considerably more ambition than
the latter.
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legalist course set in the 1980s. The federal drug control budget,
115
including the law enforcement component, continues to grow.
Federal mandatory minimum sentences remain in place. After a brief
downward trend in the early 1990s, the annual number of arrests for
drug violations has increased, ultimately setting a record in 2001 (the
most recent year for which data is available). 11 6
Indeed, upon closer inspection, the Strategy itself seems far
less committed to the public-health model than it might appear at
first blush. First, the Strategy does not encompass alcohol or tobacco;
instead, it targets only illicit substances." 7 Second, the Strategy
defines its goals exclusively in terms of reduced drug usage," 8 without
regard to more conventional public-health objectives such as reducing
the number of drug overdose deaths and babies born addicted to
drugs. 1 9 The Strategy's purpose thus seems to be reduction of drug
115. Id. at 5. After steady increases since FY 1996, the President did request a slightly
reduced enforcement budget for FY 2003, but then requested another increase for FY 2004. Id.
116. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY DATA SUPPLEMENT 47 (2003)
[hereinafter DATA SUPPLEMENT]. Drug arrests have also been increasing as a percentage of all
arrests, growing from 7.1 percent in 1991 to 11.5 percent in 2001. Id. The estimated number of
federal prisoners incarcerated for drug crimes grew from 25,300 in 1989 to a record 73,389 in
2001. Id. at 48. It is unclear what effect the "war on terror" will have on the war on drugs; data
on arrests in 2002 and 2003 may provide some insight when they become available. The F.B.I. is
moving 400 agents from drug cases to terrorism, Eric Lichtblau, White House Report Stings Drug
Agency on Abilities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A16, which seems likely have some effect on the
intensity of federal drug enforcement.
117. See DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 4. As Professors Zimring and Hawkins noted
with respect to an earlier version of the Strategy, this focus on illicit drugs alone constitutes a
tell-tale sign of legalism. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 15. In the same vein, it is
perhaps notable that the Strategy speaks positively of Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign.
DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 10.
118. See DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 4.
119. Professors Zimring and Hawkins make a similar point about an earlier version of the
Strategy. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 15. This aspect of the Strategy exemplifies a
particular variant of the public health paradigm that might be termed the "epidemic model." As
the Strategy puts it:
Medical research has established a clear fact about drug use: once started, it can
develop into a devastating disease of the brain, with consequences that are anything
but enticing. No young person watching an addict stumbling on the street looks at the
loss of human potential and decides to seek the same end.
And yet the disease spreads. It spreads because the vectors of contagion are not
addicts in the street but users who do not yet show the consequences of their drug
habit. Last year, some 16 million Americans used an illegal drug on at least a
monthly basis, while 6.1 million Americans were in need of treatment. The rest, still
in the "honeymoon" phase of their drug-using careers, are "carriers" who transmit the
disease to others who see only the surface of the fraud. Treatment practitioners
report that new users in particular are prone to encouraging their peers to join them
in their new behavior.
DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 17. In the epidemic model, the "disease" of drug abuse
possesses three particularly salient characteristics: (1) it is highly contagious; (2) it initially
takes a mild form, then progresses into the "devastating disease of the brain," id. at 17; and (3)
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use per se (the legalist goal), rather than reduction of the harms
resulting from drug use (the public-health goal). Third, as a model for
treatment, the Strategy touts drug courts as "one of the most
promising innovations in recent memory." 120 "Drug courts," observes
the Strategy, "use the coercive authority of a judge to require
abstinence and alter behavior through a combination of graduated
sanctions, mandatory drug testing, case management, supervised
treatment, and aftercare programs." 12 1 Drug courts will be discussed
in more detail below, 122 but it should be clear already that they have a
"treatment-as-punishment" character that makes them palatable to
123
the legalist mindset.
E. Lessons
1. Federal Preferences
Surveying nearly a century of federal drug policy, two
overlapping characteristics emerge as dominant: (1) the centrality of
legalism in shaping the objectives of drug policy; and (2) the reliance
on enforcement as the dominant tool in achieving those objectives.
Once criminalized, none of the major psychoactive drugs has ever been
decriminalized at the federal level. Federal enforcement budgets have
climbed steadily since 1969, as have drug-related arrest and
incarceration rates. Since the 1980s, Congress has enacted a series of
mandatory minimum penalties for drug crimes that stand out as
among the toughest in the western world. 124

its most dangerous carriers are those who do not yet exhibit visible symptoms. The particular
characteristics of the drug epidemic may justify many of the policies that would also be
associated with the legalist paradigm: aggressive identification and isolation of users ("carriers"),
id. at 17; moral condemnation of users who do not voluntarily come forward for treatment before
"infecting" others; and coerced treatment for those who would not otherwise undergo treatment.
120. DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 23.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
123. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 7, at 17.
124. See, e.g., Caulkins & Heymann, supra note 98, at 210 ('The expert consensus is that the
United States today is highly punitive toward drug sellers when compared to other Western
industrialized countries ... or to ourselves 15 years ago .... "). Why federal drug policy displays
such harshness is a question that largely lies beyond the scope of this Article. Some of the
public-choice dynamics are suggested below in Part 11I.C.1, which attempts to explain why the
federal government was responsive to the demands of some states for a national drug
prohibition. But federal policies have also been influenced by many other considerations,
including the dynamics of national party politics and the sway of a burgeoning "[n]arco[e]nforcement [clomplex." BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 23, at 102. For a nuanced account of
these considerations, see id. at 102-50. Similarly curious is why federal policies treat some
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To be sure, the federal government has from time to time
dallied with treatment and the public-health paradigm. The best
examples include the Porter Act of 1929 and the Nixon-era National
Institute for Drug Abuse. If its rhetoric is to be believed, the current
National Drug Control Strategy may even suggest that a new period of
interest in treatment has begun. Notwithstanding such dalliances,
however, treatment has at no time replaced enforcement as the
dominant focus of federal policy; at most, treatment and enforcement
have coexisted as equal points of emphasis for brief periods of time. In
preference for
short, there is no reason to doubt a continued federal
12 5
future.
foreseeable
the
in
enforcement and legalism
2. Federal-State Relations
Over the course of the past century, important policy
innovations have come from the federal, state, and local levels of
government; policymaking has not been a one-way street from the
center to the periphery. The criminalization of both opiates and
marijuana was pioneered at the state and local level decades before
the Harrison and the Marijuana Tax Acts. Treatment initiatives in

psychoactive drugs (opiates, cocaine, marijuana) harshly and others (alcohol, nicotine, caffeine)
not. Courtwright argues that the changing needs of a "rationalized, bureaucratized, and
mechanized" social environment contributed to the worldwide shift from taxation to prohibition
of psychoactive substances in the twentieth century, but that alcohol and tobacco were largely
insulated from these pressures, due, in part, to their particularly widespread use and to the size
and importance of the industries that produced them. DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES OF
HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 178, 190-92 (2001).

125. These federal tendencies have been the subject of considerable criticism, much of it
claiming that federal policies do not "work." The criticism typically goes something like this.
There is no evidence that federal interdiction and enforcement measures have resulted in any
meaningful reduction in the supply of drugs in this country. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at
200-30 (arguing that "[t]he [d]rug [wiar [c]annot [s]ucceed"); Michael Levine, Fight Back: A
Solution Between Prohibitionand Legalization, in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO

DRUG POLICIES IN THE 21st CENTURY 91, 95-97 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2000) (arguing that current
levels of enforcement resources cannot effectively reduce drug supplies); Timothy Lynch, Tabula
Rasa for Drug Policy, in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO DRUG POLICIES IN THE
21st CENTURY, supra, at 3, 7 (citing conclusion of the Office of National Drug Control Policy).

Driving the drug business underground has enriched criminal organizations and promoted gang
violence. Lynch, supra, at 8. The war on drugs has not only resulted in the waste of billions of
taxpayer dollars, but has also encouraged the development of ever more aggressive policing
practices that erode civil liberties. See id. The concentration of law enforcement resources on
drugs has diverted scarce resources from more pressing issues, such as violent crime. Id. at 9.
Finally, the costs of the war on drugs have been borne disproportionately by racial minorities.
See, e.g., DUKE & GROSS, supra note 24, at 168-71 (discussing loss of civil liberties in minority
communities and disproportionately high rates of incarceration of black males); Laurence A.
Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 222
(2002) (discussing data on racial disparity in targets of narcotics search warrants in San Diego
County).
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the 1970s were inspired by innovative programs adopted in Illinois
and New York City. Mandatory minimums in the 1980s were
foreshadowed by the earlier Rockefeller drug laws in New York State.
The historical record, in short, suggests a dynamic form of federalism
in which the states have led as well as followed.
At the same time, Washington has been receptive to state
innovation, but generally only enforcement-oriented innovation. Most
dramatic was the federal government's rejection of treatment in the
1920s, as prosecutors stamped out the community-based drug
treatment clinics set up by state and local agencies. More generally,
criminalization and mandatory minimums have had a more durable
influence on federal policy than, say, methadone maintenance. This
pattern may be repeating itself now as the federal government widens
its support of drug courts, a particularly enforcement-friendly
approach to treatment, while attempting to prevent state adoption of
less enforcement-oriented innovations. 126 The historical record thus
suggests that the federal-state dynamic tends, over the long run, to
dovetail with the federal preferences for enforcement and legalism.
III. Is THERE A FEDERAL MONOPOLY ON DRUG POLICY?
Whatever the historical record may reflect about state
innovation prior to the escalation of the drug war in the 1980s,
commentators have suggested that current federal policy stifles
further innovation. Thus, some have referred to a federal "monopoly"
over drug policy. 127 More bluntly, another commentator asserts, "In
the fight against drugs ... the federal government is effectively the
only government." 128 The federal government does indeed possess an
impressive array of tools to influence policymaking at lower levels of
129
government.
At the same time, recent evidence demonstrates that
innovation and diversity may still be found at the state level. Rather
than a federal monopoly, national drug policy is more suggestive of a
ubiquitous mode of ordering federal-state relations: cooperative
federalism. Under this model, as commonly implemented in other
policy fields ranging from welfare to education to the environment, the
federal government first establishes broad regulatory objectives and
then utilizes grants and other incentives in an effort to encourage (but
126. See infra Parts III.B.2.a, b.vi.
127. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 6.
128. Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1192 (1995).
129. See infra Part III.A.2.
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does not, strictly speaking, require) state cooperation in achieving
those objectives. 130
The state3 maintain formal policymaking
autonomy; thus, while states may face significant pressures to
conform to federal preferences, there is always the possibility that
some will choose to deviate.
This Part describes the current state of federal-state-local
relations as follows. First, this Part describes the various tools of
federal influence. Second, this Part surveys the recent record of state
innovation, demonstrating clear deviation from the legalist paradigm.
While the federal government has opposed such developments, it has
chosen not to use its most powerful tool (preemption) to prevent
innovation, 13' indicating at least a grudging acceptance of policy
diversity. Third, this Part contends that federal-state relations in this
area exemplify cooperative federalism. Indeed, the state of federalstate relations is precisely what public choice theory would predict for
drug policy. Finally, this Part identifies and explains one particularly
noteworthy aspect of federalism in drug policy: federal reliance on "inkind" aid, instead of outright grants, in order to induce state
cooperation.
A. Federal Tools of Influence
1. What Exactly Does Washington Want?
Assuming, as argued above,' 32 that the federal government
prefers legalist and enforcement-oriented approaches to drug policy,
what would the federal government want state and local governments
to do to help implement these preferences? Washington's agenda
would presumably focus on two distinct aspects of drug policy:
substantive penal laws and drug enforcement effort. Below the
federal level, these two aspects of policymaking are typically handled
by different units of government. 3 3 Penal laws are made at the
statewide level, most often the state legislatures, but sometimes
through other mechanisms, such as the ballot initiative.' 34 Federal

130. Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 558 (2000).
131. See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2000) (indicating that Congress does not intend "occupy the field"
with Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
132. See supra Part II.E.1.
133. For a discussion of the conventional allocation of law enforcement responsibilities
among federal, state, and local governments, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 7, at 160-62.
134. See id. at 160. For a discussion of the state ballot initiative mechanism, see infra Part
III.B.2.b.
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attempts to influence the content of penal laws must therefore target
state political and lawmaking functions.
Enforcement effort-how many resources are devoted to the
apprehension and prosecution of drug offenders-is determined in a
far more diffuse manner. The state legislature, through mechanisms
such as budget making, exercises some control over enforcement
intensity, as does the state-level law enforcement bureaucracy. 35 Yet,
the vast majority of police resources in this country-more than threequarters-are employed not by the states, but by local units of
government, principally counties and municipalities. 136 The character
of enforcement efforts, unlike penal laws, are therefore determined
primarily at the local level, requiring the federal government to target
3 7
a second distinct set of institutions.
What, then, does Washington want? In essence, Washington
wants states to retain (and perhaps enhance) criminal penalties for
drug offenses, and Washington wants local law enforcement
bureaucracies to prioritize drug enforcement when making resource
allocation decisions. Both objectives must be kept in mind when
assessing the efficacy of the federal tools of influence.
2. How Does Washington Try To Get What It Wants?
a. The Bully Pulpit
The federal government has uniquely powerful ways of selling
its drug policy preferences to the American people. This is, in part, a
function of the visibility and prestige of the President (and,
significantly in this context, the First Lady). Thus, for instance,
Nancy Reagan's bluntly legalist "just say no" campaign of the 1980s is
credited with shifting young people's attitudes towards drugs. 138 In
addition to the President and First Lady, however, the federal
government also advances its agenda through the nation's single most
visible drug control official, the "drug czar," who coordinates the
nation's drug control efforts from a cabinet-level position. 39 Among
135. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that about 15 percent of police
officers nationally are state police).
136. Id.
137. More than 90 percent of local police departments regularly provide drug enforcement.
MATTHEW J. HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2000, at 11 (2003).
138. See GEST, supra note 75, at 116; DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 10.

139. GEST, supra note 75, at 47, 124-25. Formally, the drug czar is head of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP'). DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 534.
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other things, the drug czar controls an enormous media budget (the
Administration requested $170 million for fiscal year 2004), much of
which is used for national advertising in support of the federal drug
control agenda. 140 Underscoring its legalist orientation, the current
federal media campaign particularly targets the use of marijuana (as
opposed to harder drugs),14 1 while another recent campaign linked
142
drug use to terrorism.
The federal "bully pulpit" has at least a three-fold significance
in furthering federal control over drug policy. First, to the extent that
the bully pulpit increases public support for the legalist paradigm, it
serves to discourage, or to contribute to the defeat of, state-level
legislative proposals reflecting alternative paradigms. Indeed, few
state-level reformers will be able to match the media budget of the
drug czar. Second, as the bully pulpit continually emphasizes the
urgency of the drug problem, it builds public support for significant
14 3
allocations of resources to drug enforcement at the local level.
Third, the visibility of federal anti-drug efforts may contribute
to a public belief that the responsibility for drug policy lies with the
federal government, not with state or local governments.
State
144
legislators and other officials can "pass the buck" to Washington.
Diminished accountability reduces the pressure on policymakers to
innovate or otherwise accommodate public interest in alternative drug
policy paradigms. One state judge puts it this way:

WThe incursion of the national government subverts the authority of and the regard for
the local and state governments, making it increasingly difficult for those governments
to effectively and imaginatively respond to the needs of their constituents. A political
culture that comes to regard the federal government as its guardian relegates the local
and state governments to secondary status. The premise-articulated or not-is that
these lesser governments are not capable of handling important matters. Public
confidence and commitment are diminished. Ultimately, federalization obscures the
boundaries of political responsibility and accountability, undermines the confidence
constituents have in their officials, and erodes the authority of the local and state
institutions. 145

140. See DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 8.
141. Id.
142. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Did the War on Drugs Die with the Birth of the War on
Terrorism?: A Closer Look at Civil Forfeiture and Racial Profiling After 9/11, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 147, 147 (2001-2002).
143. For a similar point, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 168 (arguing that "crisis
appeals by the U.S. president and the drug czar to the general public to regard drugs as a
problem" can be seen as a stratagem to maintain state and local funding levels for drug
enforcement).
144. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 197.

145. Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 838
(2000).
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This tendency may also help to ensure that the federally preferred
legalist approaches continue to predominate at the lower levels of
government.
b. Direct Enforcement
The federal government also advances its policy agenda by
directly enforcing (i.e., through its own agents) the federal drug laws.
Direct enforcement is arguably the least important, albeit perhaps the
most visible, mechanism of federal policy control. Due to resource
constraints, the federal government can only investigate, prosecute,
and incarcerate a small percentage of drug offenders. In 2000, for
instance, state institutions held more than 250,000 prisoners
convicted of drug crimes, while federal institutions held just over
73,000.146 To be sure, federal enforcement resources have been
growing rapidly, leading to a more than doubling of the number of
federally incarcerated drug offenders between 1990 and 2000.147 Yet,
the true significance of direct enforcement as a tool of federal control
rests not simply in the volume of cases prosecuted, but in the way that
the limited federal enforcement resources are targeted.
First, the federal government has targeted conduct that is
permissible under state law, with the objective of preventing states
from implementing policies that contravene federal preferences. An
early precedent was the federal prosecution of public treatment clinics

146. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2001, at 13-14 (2002).

147. Id. at 14. The expansion of the federal government's enforcement efforts against even
low-level drug offenders should be viewed in the context of a general broadening of federal effort
against routine, traditionally local criminal activity.
This trend, referred to as the
"federalization of criminal law," has been the subject of a growing body of academic literature,
mostly rather critical. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW (1998); Sara Sun Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalizationof Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Dennis E. Curtis, The Effect of
Federalization on the Defense Function, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85 (1996);
Ehrlich, supra note 145; Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The FederalRole in Dealing With
Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 103 (1996); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1127 (1997); Michael A. Simons, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A
Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 907-19 (2000); Franklin E.
Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (1996). For relatively more sanguine views of recent
federalization trends, see generally Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretion
and the FederalizationDebate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (1995); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles
of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1995); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The
Underfederalizationof Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 247 (1997).
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in the 1920s. 148 A contemporary example is the prosecution of medical
149
marijuana cases, such as the Rosenthal case.
In the same vein, when a state does criminalize conduct that is
prohibited under federal law, but imposes more lenient penalties,
federal agents overcome this lenience by prosecuting drug offenders in
federal court. Indeed, federal prosecutors have systematically done so
at various times in New York City and Washington, D.C.1 50 Moreover,
under prevailing interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause, when
there is a state prosecution, federal agents can wait to see if the
sentence imposed in state court is satisfactorily punitive before
deciding whether to bring federal charges for the same conduct. 151 In
short, federal officials often focus their resources on those sorts of
cases in those particular locales that would likely produce little or no
punishment in state court, thereby bringing those locales into greater
alignment with the more punitive federal preferences. Though federal
enforcement resources are limited, federal control is advanced by
strategically targeting the most significant deviations from federal
norms.
Second, federal enforcement resources are leveraged through
cooperation with state and local law enforcement agencies. 52 While
the nature of these cooperative arrangements is detailed below,15 3 the
basic functioning of the "cooperation multiplier" bears particular note
in this context. In general, one of the great weaknesses of federal law
enforcement lies in the lack of personnel at the street level; federal
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
150. See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 733 (New York City); Garry Sturgess, Judges Rap Stephens
on Drug Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 7; Tracy Thompson, Stop Complaining, Stephens
Tells Judges; Federal Jurists Bristle When U.S. Attorney Suggests They Don't Work Very Hard,
WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at B1.
151. See Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive
Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2-7 (1992) (discussing
historical development of successive prosecutions doctrine). Schlosser provides an example:
In 1985 Donald Clark... was arrested for growing marijuana, convicted under state
law, and sentenced to probation. Five years later, the local U.S. attorney decided that
Clark had not been punished enough. Clark was indicted under federal law for
exactly the same crime, found guilty, and sentenced to life in prison without parole.
SCHLOSSER, supra note 68, at 54.
152. As Professor Richman observes:
The federal resources devoted to street crime, drug crimes, and even organized crime
and corruption may themselves be limited, but they can be strategically invested-in
such expensive tools as electronic surveillance, witness protection, and prosecutorial
support for investigations-because federal agencies are largely excused from the
political obligation to patrol an expansive beat in these areas.
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion,46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 783 (1999).
153. See infra Part III.A.2.d.
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agents do not, as a rule, walk a beat. 154 Instead, federal agencies like
the FBI and DEA traditionally specialize in the most technically
sophisticated law enforcement techniques, such as electronic
surveillance, sting operations, and following a convoluted money
trail. 155 Cooperative arrangements with local police help federal
agencies compensate for their traditional limitations, effectively
providing the federal government with a street-level presence.
Important leads uncovered by state and local agents can be relayed to
federal agents for joint or federal-only investigation. Drug offenders
nabbed by state and local agents can be referred to federal
prosecutors. In sum, the federal government gets to have it both
ways: federal law enforcement agencies remain small, elite, and
specialized, and federal prosecutors are referred a more than ample
supply of drug cases.
Third, given an ample supply of referrals but significant
budgetary limitations their offices, federal prosecutors can selectively
prosecute only those cases that maximize the impact of federal law.
This may mean, as noted above, prosecution of cases in which state
law deviates most from federal, such as the medicinal marijuana
cases. Additionally, federal prosecutors may try to take only the
highest-profile cases. State prosecutors have long been suspicious of
federal prosecutorial tendencies in this direction, 156 and recent
empirical work supports these suspicions. 157 A comparison of state
and federal prison inmates convicted of drug crimes finds that the
federal inmates tend to have more "human capital": they are older,
more successful in the aboveground economy, and are more likely to
have the resources required to hire a private attorney. 158
This
evidence is consistent with the view that federal prosecutors target
high-profile cases.1 59

154. See Daniel C. Richman, "ProjectExile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIz. L. REv. 369, 403 (2001) ("At the end of the day, federal enforcers are well
aware that only local authorities can provide the corner-by-corner informational network needed
to pursue the kinds of crime for which local police have always been responsible.").
155. For a general discussion of the comparative advantages of state and local law
enforcement agencies, see Heymann & Moore, supra note 147, at 108.
156. See GEST, supra note 75, at 49.
157. See Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the
Federalizationof Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 269-73 (2000).
158. See id. at 288.
159. See id. Why federal prosecutors choose to target "high-human-capital" defendants is
uncertain; explanations may include a greater tendency of such defendants' criminal activities to
be multijurisdictional in nature, as well as the self-interested professional advancement
objectives of individual federal prosecutors. Id.
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Federal emphasis on high-profile drug cases likely magnifies
the bully-pulpit phenomenon discussed above. 160 Media attention
provides a public forum for the articulation and judicial validation of
federal drug policy preferences.
High-profile federal cases also
reinforce the view that the federal government is responsible for
handling drug issues, thereby diminishing state and local
accountability.
Fourth, federal preferences for tougher drug penalties are even
felt in cases prosecuted in state court. Most criminal cases, wherever
prosecuted, are resolved by way of plea bargaining, not trial. 16 1 In
order to gain more leverage in plea bargaining, state prosecutors may
use the threat of referral to federal authorities for prosecution under
harsher federal law. To the extent that such threats may be credibly
made (which probably varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction), the
"market rate" for bargained drug pleas in state court should rise
considerably. 162
A defendant who refuses to comply with prosecutorial
expectations may suffer draconian consequences. Thus, for instance,
in a Pennsylvania case, a drug defendant rejected a state plea offer
requiring a four-year prison term. 163 Following his plea rejection,
federal prosecutors agreed to prosecute him in federal court, where he
ultimately received a life sentence. 164 Such cases serve as an example
to other state defendants and thus help to extend the influence of
federal law.
c. Targeted and ConditionalMonetary Grants
The federal government also "purchases" some measure of
control over state and local drug policy through conditional monetary

160. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
161. For instance, more than 96 percent of federal cases were resolved by way of a guilty plea
in 2000. Bowman & Heise, supra note 5, at 514.
162. As one long-time defense lawyer observes, "Criminal defendants and their lawyers often
are faced with the potential for dual [state-federal] prosecutions or federal prosecution. They
must always '[bargain] in the shadow of the law.' Moreover, once threatened with actual federal
prosecution, defendants face prosecutors who possess awesome power." Curtis, supra note 147,
at 89 (quoting Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)); see United States v. Beede, 974 F.2d 948, 951-52
(8th Cir. 1992) (discussing defendant's claim that he was subjected to federal prosecution as
retribution for refusing state plea offer); United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076, 1080 n.6
(D. Utah 1990) (discussing evidence that state prosecutors used threats of federal prosecution
during plea negotiations), affd, 963 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1992).
163. Beale, supra note 147, at 1000-01.
164. Curtis, supra note 147, at 96 (citing Jim Smith, Petty Pusher Goes Out Big Time: U.S.
Verdict Means Life Term for Dealer, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 17, 1992, at Local 7).
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grants. In 1986, Congress created the most important grant program,
the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement
Assistance Program (named after a deceased New York City police
officer). 165 The Byrne Program intends
to assist States and units of local government in carrying out specific programs which
offer a high probability of improving the functioning of the criminal justice system, with
special emphasis on a nationwide and multilevel drug control strategy by developing
programs and projects to assist multijurisdictional and multi-State organizations in the
166
drug control problem and to support nationaldrug control priorities.

Congress thus made clear its desire to use the Byrne Program to
advance the federal agenda. Indeed, Congress further specified that
grants made to state and local governments under the Byrne Program
were "for the purpose of enforcing State and local laws that establish
offenses similar to offenses established in the Controlled Substances
Act,"'16 7 thereby giving states an incentive to establish, retain, and
enforce such offenses.
As other commentators have noted, the Byrne grants,
amounting to $580 million in fiscal year 2002,168 "have altered the law
enforcement landscape in numerous ways.' 69 One of the most
important recipients of grants has been multi-jurisdictional task
forces. 170 As discussed in more detail below,1 7' such task forces have
played a crucial role in the enlistment of state and local law
enforcement resources in the federal war on drugs.
In addition to the Byrne Program, Congress and the
Department of Justice have also adopted more narrowly targeted
measures in order to induce state and local compliance with the
federal drug control agenda. For instance, states now lose 10 percent
of their federal highway funds if they do not enact and enforce a law
providing for the suspension or revocation of the drivers' licenses of
convicted drug offenders.' 72
Likewise, federal funds have been
165. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 42. This program replaced more open-ended
federal block grants previously given to states by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, which is now defunct. Id.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 3751(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 3751(b).
168. This total includes $94 million for discretionary grants and $486 million for formula
grants. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM BRIEF:
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 2-3

(2002) [hereinafter BYRNE BRIEF].
169. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 43.
170. Id.
171. See infra Part III.A.2.d.ii.
172. 23 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a similar
condition for federal highway funds in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Grant
conditions have proven effective in inducing changes to state law in a variety of contexts. For
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conditioned on state adoption of comprehensive drug testing within
the state's criminal justice system. 173 Also, as discussed in more detail
the
below, Congress has successfully used grants to promote
174
development of drug courts by state and local judicial officials.
d. Co-opting State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies
The federal government could not wage its war on drugs at
current levels of intensity without substantial cooperation from state
and local law enforcement. 175 State and local law enforcement,
however, are agents of the state or local government, not the federal
government. How then are they enlisted in support of the federal
176 two
agenda? In addition to the grant programs discussed above,
federal practices, in particular, ensure that drug enforcement remains
a high priority of state and local agencies and that state and local
agencies contribute information and resources to federal agencies: the
"equitable sharing" of forfeited property and the formation of multijurisdictional drug task forces ("MJDTFs").
i. Forfeiture and Equitable Sharing
Forfeiture laws, one of the more controversial features of
federal drug policy, permit federal agents to seize not only illegal
drugs, but also the proceeds of drug transactions and any property
used to facilitate the commission of drug offenses. 177 Congress enacted
these laws in order to strike at the "economic roots" of the drug
business by depriving producers and traffickers of money, equipment,
and other necessary forms of capital.'7 8 Prosecutors may effect a
seizure through civil proceedings, which generally makes forfeiture
easy and attractive since prosecutors need not obtain a criminal
conviction and are not otherwise subject to the constitutional

instance, many states adopted "truth-in-sentencing" reforms in the 1990s at least in part as a
result of a conditional federal grant program requiring such reforms. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING: AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL GRANTS INFLUENCED LAWS IN SOME

STATES (1998), reprinted in 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 163, 163-64 (1998).
173. GEST, supranote 75, at 257-58; Guerra, supra note 128, at 1189.
174. See infra Part III.B.2.a; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3797(a) (2000) (authorizing drug court
grants). The President has requested $68 million for the drug courts program in fiscal year
2003.
175. See supraPart III.A.2.b.
176. See supraPart III.A.2.c.
177. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 881 (2000). For a history of forfeiture law, see JIMMY GURULIt &
SANDRA GUERRA, THE LAW OF ASSET FORFEITURE §§ 1-1 to -4 (1998).

178. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 44.
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constraints of a criminal proceeding.17 9 A vast range of property has
been subject to forfeiture, including "cash, bank accounts, jewelry,
cars, boats, airplanes, businesses, houses, and land." 180 In fiscal year
2002, net deposits into the federal forfeiture fund exceeded $453
million.181
While modern drug forfeiture law dates back to 1970, law
enforcement did not begin to make widespread use of its new
authority until Congress enacted two critical amendments in the
1980s. First, Congress authorized federal agencies to retain forfeiture
proceeds, rather than depositing them into the government's general
fund, 1 2 which increased the institutional incentives of law
enforcement to pursue forfeiture. Second, Congress authorized federal
agencies to share proceeds with state and local agencies based on state
and local contributions to the forfeiture effort. 183 This "equitable
sharing" program includes a "federal adoption" component, whereby
state and local authorities may turn seized assets over to federal
agents for forfeiture proceedings under federal law and then receive
back as much as 80 percent of the seized assets' value. 18 4 In fiscal
year 2002, the federal government paid more than $188 million to
state and local agencies through the equitable sharing program. 18 5
Coupled with grant aid, the total amount of money transferred to state
and local law enforcement since 1988 has been conservatively
estimated at $3 billion, and may well be much higher. 186
As a result of equitable sharing, drug enforcement has become
a money-making endeavor for many state and local law enforcement
agencies. This advances federal control of drug policy in several
respects. First, like the Byrne Program, equitable sharing helps to
underwrite enforcement-oriented drug policies at the state and local
level. Consider, for instance, a state legislature deciding whether to
spend a marginal dollar on drug treatment or enforcement: to the
extent that the enforcement option may generate net proceeds for the
state, enforcement may appear far more attractive than treatment.
Similarly, a local police department deciding whether to allocate a

179. GURUL9 & GUERRA, supra note 177, § 1-5, at 21.

180. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 45.
181. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 ASSET FORFEITURE FUND REPORTS (2002)

[hereinafter
2002
ASSET
FORFEITURE],
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/atp/02fundreportl
22002affr/reportl.htm.
182. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2000).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(III); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2000).
184. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 51.
185. 2002 ASSET FORFEITURE FUND REPORTS, supra note 181.
186. Thompson, supra note 142, at 148.
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marginal officer between a drug enforcement unit and a property
crimes unit might be inclined to select drug enforcement in light of the
18 7
prospect of obtaining additional federal disbursements.
Second, the program provides a substantial financial incentive
for state and local law enforcement to participate in multijurisdictional task forces under federal leadership and otherwise to
share information and resources with federal law enforcement-all in
18 8
order to maximize the state and local equitable share.
Third, equitable sharing helps to ensure that state and local
law enforcement will lobby state legislatures vigorously to retain
enforcement-oriented drug policies.18 9 Decriminalization, for instance,
might spell disaster for a police unit that relies on drug enforcement
for its funding. As other commentators have put it, in cash-strapped
times, equitable sharing may mean "the difference between a
paycheck and pink slip" for some officers. 190 Given its financial stake

187. Indeed, going down to the level of enforcement decisions by individual officers, as a
result of equitable sharing there are important incentives in many jurisdictions for officers to
focus their efforts on drug investigations. Not only are the jobs of some officers dependent on
equitable sharing, but, in a few jurisdictions, performance evaluations are based on asset
seizures. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 65. And at least one city (Helper, Utah)
gives officers an individual share of seized assets. Id. For an argument that, in light of such
considerations, forfeiture laws have created conflicts of interest for law enforcement agencies
that are of constitutional magnitude, see id. at 66.
In an attempt to quantify the responsiveness of law enforcement agencies to the incentives
created by forfeiture laws, Professors Rasmussen and Benson compared the rate of drug arrests
in states that have favorable forfeiture laws with those that do not. RASMUSSEN & BENSON,
supra note 103, at 140. In states without favorable forfeiture laws, state and local agents must
rely on federal adoption and thereby lose at least 20 percent of the forfeiture proceeds to the
federal government. Rasmussen and Benson found that the enhanced financial incentives for
drug enforcement in the states with more favorable forfeiture laws was associated with an
increase in the ratio of drug arrests to total arrests of between 35 and 50 percent. Id.
188. While this incentive is lessened in states that have their own forfeiture laws, state
forfeiture laws are often less favorable to law enforcement than federal. For instance, state laws
generally require that forfeiture proceeds be used, at least in part, for purposes other than law
enforcement. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 52. In short, proceeding under state law will
often be less profitable for a state agency than proceeding under federal law, even taking into
account the subtraction of a federal share. Id. Indeed, the Department of Justice attempts to
ensure this competitive advantage by providing larger shares to agencies that could have
forfeited property under state law but chose federal adoption instead. Id. at 54.
Incentives might also be diminished if state and local budget-setting authorities reduced law
enforcement funding from general revenue based on the availability of equitable sharing income,
effectively reallocating shared income to non-law-enforcement purposes. At least one study,
however, suggests that such reallocation does not occur. See RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note
103, at 138 (providing analysis of Florida data).
189. Among other things, the prospective loss of forfeiture revenue makes it less attractive
than might be expected for cash-strapped states to legalize and tax drugs.
190. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 65. Underscoring this view of the motives of
law enforcement agents, a former DEA officer recalls,
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in current drug policy, it should be no surprise that law enforcement
has proven to be a potent lobbying force in resisting changes to drug
laws. 19 1
ii. Multi-jurisdictional Drug Task Forces
While equitable sharing provides an incentive for state and
local law enforcement to cooperate with federal law enforcement,
MJDTF programs offer a formal, systematic structure for that
cooperation. The DEA began to promote MJDTFs in the 1970s, but
these task forces did not become widespread until the expansion of the
government's asset forfeiture powers in the 1980s. 192 Most MJDTFs
are set up under the auspices of the Byrne program, "but once created
they may achieve an independent life of their own." 193 As critics have
noted, if forfeiture proceeds are great enough, Byrne money can be
phased out, and "the task force may become a self-financing, self194
perpetuating, and independent entity."
The two chief MJDTF programs are the DEA State and Local
Task Forces (DEA-SL Task Forces) and the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs). 195 More than 100 MJDTFs
have been set up in forty states under the DEA-SL program. 196 The
OCDETF program, which targets high-level drug traffickers, has
supported the creation of MJDTFs in thirteen cities. 197 A third
program, administered by the drug czar, funds federal-state-local
collaborative efforts in so-called High Intensity Drug Trafficking

DEA agents would joke whenever mainstream media would headline some new
statistic showing that we were winning: "Please! Not yet," someone would cry. "I've
got a mortgage to pay"....

The point is that none of these bureaucracies even consider the possibility of
successfully completing their goals. On the contrary they all vie with each other for
bigger cases, better headlines, and more media exposure, which translate to a bigger
cut of the budget, more money, more authority, and more power.
Levine, supra note 125, at 98. In all, drug asset forfeiture proceeds for local police departments
amounted to $703 per officer in 1999. HICKMAN & REAVES, supra note 137, at 12.
191. See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 80-81. Law enforcement, for instance,
successfully lobbied for repeal of a law enacted by Congress in 1988 that required equitable
sharing disbursements to be made in accordance with state laws earmarking some forfeited
assets for non-law-enforcement purposes. See id. at 107-08.
192. Guerra, supranote 128, at 1183.
193. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 2, at 94.
194. Id.
For an argument that the independence of forfeiture-funded MJDTFs raises
concerns under the Nondelegation Doctrine, see id. at 91-92.
195. GURUL & GUERRA, supra note 177, § 2-2, at 26.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 27.
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Areas (HIDTAs). 198 Tellingly, nearly the entire United States is now
encompassed by at least one of the fifteen designated HIDTAs. 199 In
all, more than 20 percent of local police agencies participate in at least
one MJDTF, including more than 80 percent of police departments in
cities with a population of at least 100,000.200
While Byrne grants and equitable sharing have played a
central role in the creation and maintenance of MJDTFs, state and
local participation is motivated by more than just money. State and
local agents, for instance, may welcome improved access to specialized
federal law enforcement resources. They may also desire easier access
to federal law and federal courts, which tend to be less hospitable to
criminal defendants than their state counterparts. 20'
They may
benefit from "on-the-job training in advanced investigative
techniques" during service on an MJDTF, which makes them "more
valuable assets to their home departments. ''20 2 Finally, they may
appreciate the enhanced status that is said to come from working on
20 3
equal terms with federal agents.
Whatever the motivation for participation, MJDTFs help to
advance the federal drug agenda. MJDTFs channel drug offenders
into federal courts, where they will be subject to strict federal drug
laws. More generally, MJDTFs draw state and local resources into the

198. Id. at 28.
199. Id. In addition to such centrally administered MJDTFs, numerous other task forces
have been developed at a local level, usually directed by an individual United States Attorney's
Office. Guerra, supra note 128, at 1184; see also GURUL9 & GUERRA, supra note 177, § 2-2, at 28
(describing U.S. Attorney office programs to promote intergovernmental cooperation).
200. Hickman & Reaves, supra note 137, at 12.
201. For a survey of the various disadvantages to federal defendants, see Clymer, supra note
147, at 668-75. When designated under federal law, state and local agents participating in a
task force are given the authority to conduct searches and seizures and to make arrests pursuant
to federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a) (2000).
202. See William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police, in
MODERN POLICING, 15 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 231, 254 (Michael Tonry &

Norval Morris eds., 1992). The federal government has also long promoted cooperative
relationships by offering formal training to local law enforcement.
The provision of federal training to local police on a tuition-free basis (not the
universal practice but a common one) always has been a significant element in the
federal side's courtship of local police support and cooperation, and this inducement to
interaction assumes a larger importance in recessionary times, when advanced
training is often one of the first items to be jettisoned from local budgets.
Id. at 288.
203. Id. at 254-55; Guerra, supra note 128, at 1185-86. In considering incentives for federalstate cooperation, Geller and Morris also note that some traditional impediments to cooperation
(e.g., FBI responsibility for investigating local police corruption and local recalcitrance in
enforcing civil rights laws in the civil rights era) have dissipated in recent years. Geller &
Morris, supra note 202, at 262-64.
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federal war on drugs, 20 4 but have little ongoing accountability to state
and local electorates. 205 Indeed, federal officials often make the final
decisions about priorities and policies. 206
e. Summary
The federal government exercises influence over state and local
policymaking through a complicated and diffuse set of tools. These
tools seem particularly designed to advance the federal agenda by: (1)
building public support for drug criminalization and enforcement; (2)
signaling federal leadership on drug policy, thereby diminishing the
accountability of state and local officials; and (3) providing aid,
financial and otherwise, to local law enforcement agencies for drug
enforcement purposes, thereby encouraging local drug enforcement
activities and building a politically powerful constituency for profederal policies.
B. State Innovation and Diversity
This Section presents the evidence that state innovation and
diversity continue to flourish, notwithstanding the federal tools of
influence described in the previous Section. Continued diversity does
not, however, mean that federal influence is wholly ineffective:
diversity, in fact, might be considerably more pronounced in the
absence of federal influence-a point that will be developed more in
the next Section. Diversity is demonstrated in two ways: (1) by
persistent and dramatic variations in state sentencing laws; and (2) by
the recent experiments with more fundamental reforms, largely as a
result of successful ballot initiative campaigns. 20 7
204. DEA-led task forces have been said to "represent the high-water mark thus far in
American history in genuine, federal-local police teamwork." Geller & Morris, supra note 202, at
304.
205. MJDTFs have been subject to persistent charges of abuse of power. Indeed, in highly
publicized incidents, dozens of people arrested by MJDTF officers have been released in recent
years in response to evidence of dishonest police practices and racism. See, e.g., Ross E. Milloy,
Arrests by a Drug Task Force in Texas Come Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at A14; Simon
Romero & Adam Liptak, Texas Court Acts to Clear 38 in Town-Splitting Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2003, at Al.
206. Guerra, supra note 128, at 1183-84.
207. This Section focuses on diversity in state laws. Diversity in drug enforcement effort is
harder to demonstrate, but is suggested statistically and anecdotally. For instance, among forty
large urban counties analyzed in a recent Department of Justice study, the number of drug
defendants as a percentage of total felony defendants ranged from 14 percent (Westchester
County, New York) to 65 percent (Cook County, Illinois). UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2000, at 40

(2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdlucOO.pdf.

In all, five counties were above 45
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1. Penalty Variation
Most states have adopted a version of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, which was first promulgated in 1970 both to bring
greater uniformity among the states and to complement federal drug
policies. 208 Yet, within just a few years, states began to adopt
dramatically different penalty schemes for drug offenses. On the one
hand, the 1973 Rockefeller drug laws in New York included harsh
20 9
mandatory minimums that shocked even prosecutors and the police.
On the other hand, between 1973 and 1978, eleven states
decriminalized marijuana possession, typically providing only a
2 10
maximum $100 fine for a first offense.
While only one state (Nevada) has decriminalized since 1978,211
and one state (Alaska) has actually recriminalized, 2 12 drug-sentencing
laws continue to vary enormously from state to state. As one
commentator has observed with respect to marijuana laws:
In New York State possessing slightly less than an ounce of marijuana brings a $100
fine, if it's a first offense. In Louisiana possessing the same amount of pot could lead to
a prison sentence of twenty years. In Montana selling a pound of marijuana, first
offense, could lead to a life sentence, whereas in New Mexico selling 10,000 pounds of
pot, first offense, could be punished with a prison term of no more than three years.
If you are caught with three ounces of marijuana in Union City, Ohio, you will
probably be fined $100. But if you're caught in the town of the same name literally
across the road in Indiana, you could face six months to three years in prison .... 213
...

2 14
Similar variations are also evident with respect to other drugs.
Indeed, such variations should hardly be surprising, given the

percent, while seven were below 25 percent. Id. Such data suggests that different local law
enforcement agencies are differently prioritizing drug enforcement relative to other crime
categories. Of course, the data is only suggestive, not conclusive; the different levels of drug
enforcement may be driven by different underlying rates of drug crime. Yet, anecdotal evidence
lends support to the hypothesis of diversity in enforcement effort. For instance, in the city of
Milwaukee, marijuana possession cases have been routinely referred for criminal prosecution,
while, traditionally, police in some suburban communities have only issued municipal citations
for the same conduct. Felicia Thomas-Lynn, County Crime Charging Policies Leveled Out,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 13, 2003, at lB.
208. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 264-65.
209. GEST, supra note 75, at 199.
210. Albert DiChiara & John F. Galliher, Dissonance and Contradictionsin the Origins of
MarihuanaDecriminalizations,28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 41, 48 (1994).
211. Tom Gorman, Nevada Gambling on Cannabis;Legalizing Marijuana on State Ballot,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2002, at 2A.

212. DiChiara & Galliher, supra note 210, at 42.
213. SCHLOSSER, supra note 68, at 26-27.
214. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 7, at 749 (comparing cocaine laws in Oklahoma and
California). For a comprehensive survey of state drug penalties, see THE GALE GROUP,
NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 163-200 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 4th ed. 2003). While current
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2. Alternative Paradigms
With the possible exception of marijuana decriminalization
(which essentially ended a quarter-century ago), the diversity in drug
penal laws discussed above may matter little to federal policy. From
the legalist perspective, it may matter less how long the prison terms
are for drug offenses than that there are prison terms available;
through providing for prison sentences, the law embodies a serious
regard for the boundaries between the licit and illicit. To the extent
that state penal laws are too lax, drug offenders may simply be
referred for federal prosecution under the harsher federal laws. The
only real threat from this perspective would be legalization or
decriminalization, which would make it far more complicated
politically and legally for local law enforcement to cooperate with
federal drug enforcement efforts.
Viewed this way, meaningful state innovation ended-at least
temporarily-in 1978, when new decriminalization laws were snuffed
out by the burgeoning parents' movement. 2 16 It is thus perhaps
understandable that, by the early 1990s, commentators could refer to
a federal monopoly in drug policy. 217
Yet, beginning in the mid-1990s, states began to adopt a series
of reforms that deviated markedly from federal norms, reflecting the
influence of the public-health and cost-benefit paradigms. These
reforms were made possible by a "chink" in the armor of federal
influence: the ballot initiative, which permits political outsiders to
make law, provided they have sufficient financial resources. 21 8 The
budgetary pressures have led to a wave of state penal reform since 2001, reforms vary
considerably from state to state, perhaps exacerbating preexisting disparities. For a concise table
summarizing recent reforms, see Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis
Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?,15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 41, 45
(2002).
215. Professors Rossi and Berk, for instance, conducted a survey in which respondents from
around the country were asked to sentence a variety of hypothetical crimes. They concluded:
"[T]here are strong and consistent regional differences. Residents of the New England states
were the most lenient in sentencing. In contrast, residents of the two South Central regions...
gave almost consistently longer sentences to offenders of all kinds." PETER H. RossI & RICHARD
A. BERK, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING FEDERAL

CRIMES 5 (1995), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/nss/jp-exsum.htm.
216. See supra Part II.C.
217. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 6.
218. For a more complete description of the ballot initiative, see Michael M. O'Hear,
Statutory Interpretationand Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 285-88 (2003).
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federal agenda has fared well in state legislatures, likely reflecting
legislative solicitude for the interests of the local law enforcement
establishment. 219 The federal agenda has not fared so well in the
ballot initiative process, however, in which support of the local law
enforcement establishment seems to carry less weight than a large
220
campaign war chest.
Before reaching the ballot initiatives, however, this Section will
first consider the curious story of the drug court movement,
representing a contrasting model of innovation. As the drug courts
have evolved, it has become apparent that they are compatible with
federal policies.
Nonetheless, they represent a public-healthinfluenced innovation that became established in many local
jurisdictions without federal support. In that sense, the drug courts
tend to undermine the persuasiveness of the federal monopoly theory.
a. Insider Reform: The Drug Treatment Courts
As the war on drugs gathered force in the 1970s, some
jurisdictions began to experiment with specialized drug courts in order
to process the burgeoning volume of drug cases more efficiently. 22 1
Early drug courts developed expedited case management procedures
but did not fundamentally alter the traditional criminal court
functions of adjudicating guilt and imposing sentences in an
adversarial proceeding. 222 As the drug war intensified in the 1980s,
case management pressures continued to grow, setting the stage for a
more substantial reform, the treatment-oriented drug court.
Miami pioneered the drug treatment court concept in 1989.223
The experiment was an attempt to cope with growing pressures on the
criminal justice system in Dade County, which between 1985 and 1989
witnessed a 45-percent increase in adult arrests and a 93-percent
increase in drug possession arrests-a growth in business that
threatened a crisis in Dade County's already overcrowded correctional
facilities. 224 A long-time observer describes the "sense of futility and
desperation among criminal justice leaders" that developed in the
1980s:

219. See supraPart III.A.2.d.i.
220. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
221. New York City developed the nation's first specialized drug courts in the early 1970s.
Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1460 (2000).
222. Id.
223. John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in THE EARLY
DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 19, 19 (W. Clinton Terry, III ed., 1999).
224. Id. at 21.
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The various Dade County police agencies were devoting more resources to investigation
of drug crimes and generating more arrests .... Yet, the availability of drugs,
particularly cocaine and crack cocaine, seemed unrelenting ....As quickly as the State
Attorney could prosecute, the cases kept2 2coming,
and the overcrowded jails and prisons
5
had to release offenders at a rapid pace.

Finally, the local judiciary initiated a study of alternative approaches
to drug case management. 226 With the participation of prosecutors
and public defenders, the judges developed a new plan emphasizing
drug treatment under court supervision, 227 thereby melding the 1970sera concept of the specialized drug court with the ideal of outpatient,
community-based drug treatment.
A scholar of the Miami drug court describes key features of the
court as follows:
First, and most significant, is the role of the drug court judge. In the Miami model, the
judge presides over many brief hearings in which he or she engages in conversation
directly with the defendant/participant, without the intervening or translating role of
counsel as a mouthpiece. The judge-to-defendant exchanges may involve a defendant's
entry into the [drug treatment] program, in-court reports on a defendant's progress,
graduation of defendants from the program, or a variety of sanctioning decisions
involving defendants who have absconded or been rearrested for new offenses.
Defendants who have opted to enter the program are instructed by the judge to appear
in court periodically for reviews of their progress in treatment. On the basis of input
from the treatment agency ... the judge hears reports of the defendant's progress,
discusses his/her status in treatment with the defendant, and offers encouragement if
appropriate.... The judge ... is also called on to impose sanctions or otherwise
encourage compliance with program requirements when the defendant has shown a poor
record of performance ....On occasion, the judge will order the defendant confined for
two weeks in jail ("motivational jail')... and will reassess the defendant's participation
after that period of confinement. The judge may also transfer the cases of some
defendants out of drug court to be tried in the normal fashion by other Circuit Court
228
felony judges.

In short, drug court offers both a carrot and a stick to motivate
participation in drug treatment: participants remain in the
community and avoid criminal justice sanction, but noncompliance
with the treatment regimen may result in the imposition of graduated
sanctions, up to and including transfer back into the traditional
criminal justice system.
Early results were encouraging.
On average, defendants
remained in the twelve-month treatment program for about nine
229
Most
months, with 60 percent achieving a favorable outcome.
defendants avoided incarceration, although about 37 percent

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 36.
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experienced some "motivational jail. ' 230 Drug court participants had
lower rates of, and longer times before, rearrest than other drug
offenders. 23 ' In all, there was at least some basis to conclude that the
Miami experiment was rehabilitating some drug addicts without
sacrificing public safety or adding to prison overcrowding.
The federal government reacted coolly to the Miami
experiment, refusing a request for financial assistance with little
discussion. 232 Nonetheless, a handful of other cities quickly adopted
drug treatment courts of their own. 233 Virtually none received federal
assistance. 234
By the mid-1990s, however, federal policies had
changed considerably.
Beginning in 1994, Congress specifically
authorized the Attorney General to make grants to state and local
governments to set up and operate drug treatment courts. 235 The
Department of Justice has since awarded tens of millions of dollars
under this authority, 236 with its budgetary request amounting to $68
million for fiscal year 2004.237 With federal support, what began as a
small grassroots movement has blossomed into a national
phenomenon of considerable size. As of May 2003, local jurisdictions
had set up more than 1000 drug courts across the country, with more
than 400 additional drug courts in the planning stage. 2 38 The vast
239
majority have received federal grants.
Federal money, however, comes at some cost, as grants are
subject to a multitude of conditions. In order to qualify for aid, a drug
court program must provide for the following:
* Exclusion of defendants with a prior conviction for a violent
24 0
crime;
230. Id. at 37.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 23.
233. Some of the early drug treatment courts followed the Miami model quite closely, while
others deviated in significant ways. See id. at 38-39 (discussing structure of early drug courts).
For a detailed description of early drug courts in Oakland; Broward County, Florida; Portland,
Oregon; and Maricopa County, Arizona, see THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN
JUDICIAL INNOVATION, supra note 223, at 43-165.

234. Goldkamp, supra note 223, at 40.
235. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
5001(a)(3) (1994).
236. See Hoffman, supra note 221, at 1463-64 (noting that more than $47 million was
awarded through fiscal year 1997 alone).
237. DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 16.
238. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DRUG CT.
CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECH. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY STATE
AND COUNTY 55 (2003), http://www.american.edu/spa/justice/publications/drgchart2k.pdf.

239. For a complete listing of which courts have received grants when, see id.
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 3797u(a)(1) (2000) (excluding "violent offenders"); id. § 3797u-2(a)
(defining "violent offender").
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Prosecutorial participation; 241
242
Mandatory drug testing for participants;
243
Mandatory substance abuse treatment;
Sanctioning (up to and including incarceration) of participants
244
who "fail[ ] to show satisfactory progress";
" Payment by the offender, "to the extent practicable," of
restitution and treatment expenses; 245 and
" Payment from nonfederal sources of at least 25 percent of the
246
costs of the drug court.
The federal government has thus co-opted the drug court movement,
using federal money as a tool to ensure that the movement develops in
a manner consistent with the federal drug policy agenda. Federally
funded drug courts cannot deviate too markedly from punitive,
enforcement-oriented
approaches:
defendants are
subject to
testing; 247
drug
frequent
and
sanctions
mandatory economic
defendants who fail to meet treatment expectations face incarceration;
and prosecutors are assured an integral role in the development and
operation of the program. Additionally, criminal history restrictions
limit the number of offenders eligible for drug court programs, while
matching funding requirements encourage continued state and local
financial contributions to drug enforcement. None of this is to suggest
that the federally approved drug court model lacks merit. Rather, the
point is that local jurisdictions face significant financial disincentives
248
to experiment with alternative models.
The development of the drug courts echoes the history of the
federal narcotics hospitals. 249 Both reforms responded to institutional
pressures within the criminal justice system. Both attempted to blend
treatment with punishment. In time, the punishment aspect of the
narcotics hospitals came to dominate the treatment aspect. The drug
courts, consciously or not, may be moving in the same direction.
"
"
*
"

241. Id. § 3797u(a)(2); id. § 3797u-3(d)(1).
242. Id. § 3797u(a)(3)(A).
243. Id. § 3797u(a)(3)(B).
244. Id. § 3797u(a)(3)(C).
245. Id. § 3797u(a)(3)(E)-(F).
246. Id. § 3797u-5(a).
247. Regular urine testing is time consuming and invasive, typically requiring close
monitoring by a probation officer in order to prevent tampering. Lara A. Bazelon, Testing
Testing, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/August 2003, at 45, 45. Urine testing has been replaced in many
jurisdictions by the less invasive sweat patch, but the accuracy of the patch has been questioned
in court and in the press, raising doubts about the future of the technology. Id. at 49.
248. Judge Hoffman makes a similar point. See Hoffman, supra note 221, at 1528-29 ("Drug
courts provide the federal government with an attractive vehicle through which to interfere
unduly with the traditional role of state and local governments in dealing with crime.").
249. For a description of the narcotics hospitals, see supraPart II.A.
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Indeed, despite federal support and rapid growth, drug
treatment courts have become rather controversial. 250 Critics contend
that "coerced" drug treatment is no more successful than voluntary
treatment, 251 or that any additional benefits are outweighed by the
costs. 252 In particular, there is evidence that drug courts actually
increase incarceration rates for drug offenders through the so-called
"net-widening effect." Judge Morris B. Hoffman of Denver, one of the
nation's most prolific and eloquent drug court critics, describes this
effect as follows:
In Denver, the number of drug cases nearly tripled two years after the implementation
of drug court.

250. For a recent collection of articles reflecting a range of empirical and theoretical
viewpoints on drug courts, see DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (James L. Nolan ed.,
2002). A recent law review symposium issues helpfully places the drug court controversy within
a wider movement towards "problem solving courts." Symposium, Problem Solving Courts: From
Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1755 (2002). The
National Drug Court Institute publishes a comprehensive bibliography of drug court resources.
THE NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., DRUG COURT PUBLICATIONS RESOURCE GUIDE (4th ed. 2002).
251. Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 172, 173 (2001-2002). Drug court proponents vigorously contest this claim.
One recent evaluation of the empirical data concludes:
The literature on treatment effectiveness consistently shows that an addict who
completes a treatment program-any program-either stops or markedly reduces his
use of drugs after discharge. The problem is that only a small number of participants
finish their programs .... Clearly, the biggest challenge to any treatment program is
keeping patients in it.
... [P]atients who enter treatment involuntarily, under court order, fare as well as,
and sometimes even better than, those who enroll voluntarily ....
Not surprisingly,
those under legal supervision stay longer than their voluntary counterparts.
Early data on more than 80 drug courts show an average retention rate (defined as
the sum of all participants who either have completed or are still in drug-court
programs) of 71 percent. Even the lowest rate of 31 percent greatly exceeds the
average one-year retention rate of about 10-15 percent for noncriminal addicts in
public-sector treatment programs.
Sally L. Satel, Is Drug Addiction a Brain Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE
STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE 118, 135-37 (Philip B. Heymann & William N.
Brownsberger eds., 2001).
252. For a discussion of the costs, including increased burdens on the court system and
conflicts between and within different branches of government, see Hoffman, supra note 221, at
1499-1533. Critics have also raised ethical concerns about the role of defense lawyers in drug
treatment courts. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37 (20002001); see also Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1216 (1998) ("[The] minimum requirements for responsible
defense practice in drug treatment courts are unlikely to be met on a consistent basis."). For a
defense of drug courts, see William G. Meyer & A. William Ritter, Drug Courts Work, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP 179 (2001-2002).
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It is clear that the very presence of drug courts is causing police to make arrests in, and
prosecutors to file, the kinds of ten- and twenty-dollar hand-to-hand drug cases that the
system simply would not have bothered with before. Because drug courts are about
treatment and not adjudication, the arrest and prosecutorial functions have become
methods to troll for reluctant patients, unrestrained by practical law enforcement or
prosecutorial concerns.

Quite apart from the operational problems this massive net-widening has caused,
perhaps its most disturbing impact is that drug courts are sending many more drug
defendants to prison than traditional courts ever did.... [I]n a period of two and one
half years, the number of drug defendants sent to prison out of Denver more than
doubled.
The apparent paradox of more drug defendants going to prison out of courts specifically
designed to save taxpayers lots of money by treating drug users instead of imprisoning
them is not surprising at all. It is a direct and predictable consequence of massive netwidening coupled with dismal treatment results. Although in theory drug courts should
reduce the numbers of prison sentences-by successfully treating some defendants-this
theory assumes, quite incorrectly, that treatment will be moderately successful and that
drug court dollars will be used to treat defendants already in the system rather than to
253
triple the size of the intake.

In short, whether intended or not, instituting a drug treatment court
may have real-world effects similar to those created by simply
increasing enforcement intensity under the old legalist paradigm.
b. OutsiderReform
Drug treatment courts represent "insider reform," an
experiment adopted by officials within the criminal justice system and
intended to deal with institutional problems like caseload pressures
and prison overcrowding. Outsiders have initiated competing reform
movements. They have relied primarily on the ballot initiative, which
allows voters in twenty-one states, as well as the District of Columbia,
to enact statutes directly. 254 This Section describes the four principal
types of drug reform that have been sought through the initiative
process: legalization of medical uses of marijuana, mandates for
treatment of drug users in lieu of incarceration, forfeiture reform, and

253. Hoffman, supra note 251, at 174.
254. For a state-by-state summary of the varying initiative rules, see DAVID D. SCHMIDT,
CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION 295-311 (1989). Initiative proponents
must typically collect tens or hundreds of thousands of signatures on a petition in order to place
an initiative proposal on the ballot. Id. at 296-97. Then, the voters may decide by majority vote
whether to accept or reject the proposal. Some states also permit voters to amend the state
constitution through the initiative process. For a listing of these states, as well as the
requirements for constitutional amendments in each, see id. at 296-97.
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legalization or decriminalization of nonmedical uses of marijuana. 2 55
Lastly, this Section considers the federal responses to outsider reform.
i. Medical Marijuana
Marijuana has long been used for medicinal, as well as
recreational, purposes. 256 Marijuana's federal classification as a
Schedule I drug, however, precludes medicinal uses, 257 prompting a
long-running debate over marijuana's therapeutic benefits. In a
much-cited 1999 study by the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), initiated
at the behest of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, researchers
concluded, "Scientific data indicate the potential therapeutic value of
[drugs that include chemical compounds associated with marijuana]
for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and appetite
stimulation." 258 Thus, the IOM report noted, such drugs might be
"moderately well suited for particular conditions, such as
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting and AIDS wasting."259 At
the same time, the IOM report cautioned that smoked marijuana is a
"crude ... delivery system that also delivers harmful substances," and
that "in most cases there are more effective medications" available. 260
The report also noted other risks associated with marijuana use,
including withdrawal effects and the possibility that marijuana acts
as a "gateway drug" to even more harmful substances. 26 1
Whatever the scientific merits, voters in eight states and the
District of Columbia have approved ballot initiatives over the past
seven years providing for medical uses of marijuana in contravention

255. While beginning as "outsider reform," some state legislatures have begun to take an
interest in some of these reform proposals. For instance, the Kansas legislature recently adopted
a mandatory treatment law for nonviolent offenders. Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States
Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at Al, A16. Other states have adopted
more modest programs that are also intended to divert greater numbers of drug offenders into
treatment. See, e.g., WILSON ET AL., supra note 80, at 4-6 (describing diversion program in New
York). Other states have recently scaled back mandatory minimum prison terms and expanded
early release options. See, e.g., Butterfield, supra (describing reforms in Washington, Michigan,
and elsewhere); Michael Lawlor, Reforming Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Connecticut, 15
FED. SENTENCING REP. 10 (2002) (describing reforms in Connecticut).

256. For a concise history of medicinal uses of marijuana, see Marcia Tiersky, Comment,
Medical Marijuana:Puttingthe Power Where It Belongs, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548-52 (1999).
257. Id. at 549-50.
258. Janet E. Joy et al., Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base (1999),
reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 542, 550.
259. Id. at 544.
260. Id. at 544-45.
261. Id. at 547.
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of federal law. 262 The first two such campaigns, in Arizona and
263
California in 1996, set the pattern for later initiatives.
Arizona's Proposition 200 permitted the use of Schedule I
controlled substances by seriously or terminally ill patients pursuant
to a doctor's prescription. 264 In order to provide a prescription, a
doctor was required to document a scientific basis for the drug's
therapeutic value and to obtain a written second opinion from another
doctor. 265 Wealthy businessmen, including John Sperling and George
Soros, bankrolled the campaign for Proposition 200.266 Backed by
nearly $2 million in donations, initiative proponents advertised
heavily in support of the measure, while opponents raised a mere
$32,000.267 Proposition 200 ultimately won passage by a nearly two268
to-one margin.
California's Proposition 215 applies only to marijuana, not to
all Schedule I substances, but is otherwise somewhat less restrictive
than Proposition 200.269 The California law protects from prosecution
any patient or "primary caregiver" who possesses or cultivates
marijuana "upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a
physician." 270
Once again, proponents were well financed and

262. Alistair E. Newbern, Comment, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of StateLegalized Medical Marijuana Use After United States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1575, 1577
(2000). States adopting medical marijuana initiatives include Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11-71-090
(Michie 2002); California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2004); Colorado,
COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 2383-B (West 2004);
Nevada, NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 38; Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 475.309 (2003); and Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.005 (West Supp. 2004).
263. For a description of the content and politics of Proposition 200, see O'Hear, supra note
218, at 291-94. For a description of the campaign for Proposition 215, California's medical
marijuana initiative, see Michael Vitiello, Proposition215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the
Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 713-17 (1998).
For a
comparison of the medical marijuana laws adopted in Nevada, California, and Oregon, see Scott
McKenna, Medical Marijuanain the Silver State, NEV. LAw., Aug. 2002, at 6, 36-37.
264. Proposition 200, Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996, § 6
[hereinafter Proposition 200], available at http://www.sosaz.com/election/1996/General/
1996BallotPropsText.htm.
265. Id. § 7.
266. O'Hear, supra note 218, at 293.
267. Id.
268. Id. Arizona voters subsequently amended the law so that it would not take effect until
the federal government rescheduled marijuana or otherwise authorized medical uses of the drug.
Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana,ProsecutorialDiscretion and
the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 710 n.70 (2000).
269. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1991).
270. Id. § 11362.5(d).
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advertised heavily. 271
272
percent of the vote.

Proposition 215 ultimately passed with 56

ii. Mandatory Treatment
Medical marijuana reform embodies the cost-benefit specificity
paradigm, carving out a specific type of use of a specific drug for
unique regulatory treatment. By contrast, the mandatory treatment
initiatives embody public-health generalism: the use of any illicit drug
triggers the same response (court-supervised treatment). In this
sense, the mandatory treatment initiatives share the same general
thrust as the drug court movement. The initiatives, however, deviate
from the drug court model in one crucial respect: they either eliminate
or dramatically curtail the ability of judges to incarcerate participants
or return eligible defendants to the conventional criminal prosecution
track. Because the sanctioning power of supervising judges is so
limited, the initiatives represent a less coercive, more voluntary
approach to treatment.
Arizona's Proposition 200, besides legalizing medical uses of
marijuana, also incorporated mandatory treatment provisions.
Specifically, the law mandates that "any person who is convicted of
the personal possession or use of a controlled substance" be placed on
probation and required to undergo drug treatment under court
supervision. 273 As originally enacted, Proposition 200 further specified
that, if a defendant violated any of the conditions of probation, the
274
court could impose additional conditions "short of incarceration."
Thus, the defendant could undergo treatment secure in the knowledge
that he or she would not suffer the ultimate sanction of
275
incarceration.
California's Proposition 36, adopted by the voters in 2000,
Like the Arizona law,
operates similarly to Proposition 200.
271. Vitiello, supra note 263, at 715-17.
272. Campaign for New Drug Policies, 17 Statewide Votes for Drug Policy Reform,
http://www.drugreform.org/docs/17votes.pdf (last visited May 19, 2004).
273. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901.01(A), (D) (West 2003). The operative provisions of
Proposition 200 will be cited herein as they have been codified. The initiative excludes several
categories of defendants from mandatory treatment, including: (1) any defendant convicted of the
trafficking offenses of possession for "sale, production, manufacturing, or transportation for sale";
(2) any defendant with one prior conviction (or indictment) for a violent crime; and (3) any
defendant with two prior convictions for personal possession or use. Id. § 13-901.01(B)-(C), (G).
274. After a subsequent initiative campaign in 2002, judges are now authorized to
incarcerate recalcitrant defendants under certain limited circumstances. O'Hear, supra note
218, at 294.
275. The defendant pays for his or her own treatment, but only to the extent of his or her
financial ability. § 13-901.01(D).

832

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57:3:783

Proposition 36 mandates probation and treatment in lieu of
incarceration for eligible drug defendants. 276 But, unlike Proposition
200, Proposition 36 provides for revocation of probation, albeit through
a somewhat complicated process. 277 A defendant who commits one
drug-related probation violation may have his or her probation
revoked (and hence face incarceration) only if the state proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant "poses a danger to
the safety of others."27 8 Revocation becomes progressively easier with
successive violations. 279 Thus, treatment under Proposition 36 has a
somewhat more coercive face to it than it does under Proposition 200,
but is still much less coercive than the drug court model.
Like the campaign for Proposition 200 in Arizona, the
campaign for Proposition 36 in California was marked by a significant
disparity in the financial resources of supporters and opponents.
Proposition 36 supporters raised more than $3,000,000, while
opponents had less than one-tenth that amount. 280
Prominent
financial supporters included Soros, Sperling, and insurance executive
Peter Lewis. 281
The state prison guards' union headed the
opposition, 282 which also included Governor Gray Davis and most
judges, law enforcement officials, and health care groups in the
state. 283
Voters adopted the initiative by a wide margin, as
276. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210. 1(a) (West 1982). With a few minor exceptions, the eligibility
criteria generally parallel those in Proposition 200. O'Hear, supra note 218, at 294-95.
Proposition 36 contains analogous provisions for parolees, generally prohibiting revocation of
parole for the first-time violation of a drug-related condition. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3063.1(a).
277. Id. § 1210.1(e).
278. Id. § 1210.1(e)(3)(A).
279. Id. § 1210.1(e)(3)(B)-(C).
280. Timm Herdt, Prop. 36 Supporters Want "War on Drugs" Out of Court, VENTURA COUNTY
STAR, Oct. 16, 2000, at A6. Despite this financial surplus, only 20 percent of voters had heard of
the initiative just one month before the election. Lynda Gledhill, Most Unaware of 2 Initiatives;
Campaign,Drug Measures Not Well Known, Field Poll Finds, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14, 2000, at A23.
281. Bill Ainsworth, Meddling Tycoons or Visionary Activists: 3 Push Drug Initiative,
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 9, 2000, at *2-3. The trio was brought together by Ethan
Nadelmann, director of the Lindesmith Center (now the Campaign for New Drug Policies), who
eventually became the primary advisor for the Proposition 36 campaign. William Booth, The
Ballot Battle; Drug War Is in Fight of Its Life; Wealthy Trio Takes Aim with CaliforniaInitiative
to End Penaltiesfor Users, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2000, at A24. According to Nadelmann, none of
the men support drug legalization, but, rather, they simply agree that the drug war has been a
disaster. Id.
282. Peter Schrag, Time for a New Approach to Drug Offenses: Prop. 36: Even if Ballot
Initiative Isn't the Answer, Both Sides Agree the Existing System Is Flawed, VENTURA COUNTY
STAR, Sept. 17, 2000, at B1l.
283. Jim Herron Zamora, State Officials Clash Over Prop. 36; City Politicos Back Effort to
Push Rehab Instead of Jail for Drug Offenses, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 6, 2000, at A-7; Proposition
36: Calif. Chooses Drug Treatment Over Prison, AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov. 10, 2000, at *1. For an
attempt to explain the opposition of judges to Proposition 36 on the basis of their desire to
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Proposition 36 captured 61 percent of the vote in the 2000 general
28 4
election.
The proponents of mandatory treatment tried again in 2002,
managing to place an initiative on the ballot in Ohio, but they lost in
the general election. 28 5 Voters in the District of Columbia, however,
adopted a similar initiative. 28 6 As these campaigns play out, initiative
opponents persistently contend that a successful drug treatment
program requires both carrots and sticks. Without a meaningful
threat of incarceration, they argue, the initiatives merely deliver
"revolving-door" treatment. 28 7 Critics also question the initiative
supporters' true motives, suggesting that they are not interested in
treatment, but eventual legalization of drugs. 28 8 In short, they claim
preserve discretion in sentencing (particularly their discretion to incarcerate), see Alex
Ricciardulli, Getting to the Roots of Judges' Opposition to Drug Treatment Initiatives, 25
WHITTIER L. REV. 309, 396-402 (2003).
284. Anna Gorman, The State; Judges Extend Drug Rehab for Felons; Courts; Appellate
Justices Rule That Proposition 36 May Apply to Those Who Have Been Out of Prison Less Than
Five Years, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at 8.
285. O'Hear, supra note 218, at 285 n.24. For a comparison of the Ohio initiative with other
mandatory treatment initiatives, see Michael M. O'Hear, When Voters Choose the Sentence: The
Drug Policy Initiatives in Arizona, California, Ohio, and Michigan, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP.
337, 337-39 (2002). Both sides attributed the loss in Ohio to the costs of publicly funding
treatment. Alan Johnson, Tafts Celebrate State Issue I Defeat, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 6,
2002, at IC, 2002 WL 102248927. Though outspent, as elsewhere, initiative opponents in Ohio
did manage to raise $1 million and received the support of state and local law enforcement. Id.
286. O'Hear, supranote 218, at 284.
287. James Milliken, Editorial, Proposition36 Would Sabotage the State's Drug Courts, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 14, 2000, at B-13:1:7, B-9:2; O'Hear, supra note 285, at 340. Dean
Leipold has recently suggested a more subtle, yet equally provocative, critique:
Proposition 36, like the criminal law regime, fails to "sort" those whom the law can
deter-the casual user who enjoys the intoxication, or those heading for addiction but
still able to control their behavior-from those who truly are addicted and are willing
to take even unreasonable risks. The result may be the same as what occurred
following the passage of the Harrison Act-the medical system lacks the ability to
handle everyone and, as a result, is overwhelmed.
Put less charitably, now even casual users and those who would like to experiment
face substantially less risk of being caught-the police are unlikely to focus much
enforcement effort on rounding up people for medical treatment-and less severe
consequences if they are. By the same token, by the time Proposition 36's jail
provision kicks in, on the defendant's third conviction, there is an increased chance
that the person arrested is addicted, and thus has a reduced chance of being deterred
by prison.
Proposition 36's general approach of using both criminal and medical resources to
attack the drug problem is attractive, but it is worth considering whether the ordering
of sanctions is backwards.
Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and the Puzzle of Deterrence,6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
111, 126-127 (2002).
288. No on 36; Drug Courts Are Working, Why Scrap System?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct.
17, 2000, at B-8. Critics of treatment initiatives typically state a preference for the drug court
model. O'Hear, supra note 285, at 340. Proponents respond that drug courts are underfunded
and reach only a small percentage of drug offenders. Id. The initiatives are touted as a way to
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that the initiatives further a rights-based agenda disguised as a
public-health approach.
iii. Forfeiture Reform
A third set of outsider reforms targets asset forfeiture rules
and law enforcement practices. As discussed above, asset forfeiture
provides a significant incentive for state and local governments both to
allocate substantial resources to drug enforcement and to cooperate
with federal agencies. 28 9 The forfeiture initiatives, adopted by voters
in Oregon and Utah in 2000, dramatically reduce these incentives.
Oregon's Measure 3, the Property Protection Act of 2000,
framed as an amendment to the state constitution, 290 discourages
forfeiture by making it more difficult to accomplish under state law
(e.g., by requiring that the owner of the property first be convicted
criminally 291) and by preventing state and local law enforcement
agencies from profiting financially from forfeiture. 292 Additionally,
Measure 3 prevents state and local agencies from working in concert
with federal agencies to circumvent the law by prohibiting the

make "every courtroom in [the state] capable of being a drug court." O'Hear, supra note 285, at
340. Proponents also question whether the threat of incarceration actually makes a treatment
program more effective, noting that early data from Arizona suggests that treatment
participants have complied with program requirements at rates that are comparable to those in
drug courts. Id.
289. See supra Part III.A.2.d.i.
290. In 2003, an intermediate court of appeals in Oregon held that Measure 3 was
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with state procedural requirements for amendment
of the state constitution. Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 72 P.3d 967, 982-83
(Or. Ct. App. 2003). In January 2004, the Supreme Court of Oregon agreed to hear the case.
Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 84 P.3d 1080 (Or. 2004). The matter is still
pending.
291. More specifically, no judgment of forfeiture may be entered "unless [1] the owner of the
property is convicted of a crime in Oregon or another jurisdiction and [2] the property is found by
clear and convincing evidence to have been instrumental in committing or facilitating the crime
or to be proceeds of that crime." OR. CONST. art. XV, § 10(3). Measure 3 further incorporates a
demanding proportionality requirement: the value of the property forfeited must be
"substantially proportional to the specific conduct for which the owner of the property has been
convicted." OR. CONST. art. XV, § 10(3). Measure 3 also protects the interests of third parties in
forfeited property; their interests are not forfeited "unless [1] The forfeiting agency proves by
clear and convincing evidence that the person took the property or the interest with the intent to
defeat the forfeiture; or [2] A conviction ... is later obtained against the [third party]." OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 10(4).
292. Specifically, Measure 3 prohibits law enforcement use of the proceeds from the sale of
forfeited property: after the satisfaction of liens and security interests in the property and the
reimbursement of the forfeiting agency's costs, proceeds must be used for drug treatment. OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 10(7). For an argument in favor of this sort of restructuring of forfeiture laws,
see Eric Blumenson, Recovering From Drugs and the Drug War: An Achievable Public Health
Alternative, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 225 (2002).
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transfer of forfeiture proceeds to the federal government "unless a
state court has affirmatively found that: (a) [t]he activity giving rise to
the forfeiture is interstate in nature and sufficiently complex to justify
the transfer; (b) [t]he seized property may only be forfeited under
federal law; or (c) [p]ursuing forfeiture under state law would unduly
293
burden the state forfeiting agencies."
Utah's Initiative B, the Utah Property Protection Act, shares
many of the objectives of Measure 3, but is structured somewhat
differently. A prior criminal conviction remains unnecessary, but the
new law requires that the elements of forfeiture be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. 294 Property owners are given the right to a
jury trial in forfeiture proceedings, as well as access to appointed
counsel. 295 An innocent owner's interest in property may not be
forfeited, and the state has the burden of proving that a person is not
an innocent owner by clear and convincing evidence. 296 Initiative B
also contains restrictions on the transfer and use of seized assets that
are substantially similar to the restrictions in Measure 3.297
Proponents of the initiatives focused on apparent abuses of the
forfeiture process, highlighting cases in which seemingly innocent
owners lost their property to overzealous law enforcement ("the
government shouldn't get a dime, unless it can prove the crime"), as
well as the conflicts of interest that arise when police get to keep the
proceeds ("imagine if IRS auditors were paid a commission for every
deduction they threw out"). 298 Opponents, including many local law
enforcement officials, argued that the initiatives would undermine the
effectiveness of drug enforcement and starve drug task forces of
needed funds. 299 Yet, both initiatives were passed with more than
300
two-thirds of the vote.
293. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 10(9).

294. UTAH CODE ANN. § 24-1-4(6)(c) (2003). Like Measure 3, Initiative B also contains a
heightened proportionality requirement (the state has the burden of proving that the forfeiture is
"substantially proportional"). Id. § 24-1-14.
295. Id. §§ 24-1-4(6)(d), 24-1-9. Property owners may also obtain pretrial release of property
in hardship cases, as when the owner needs the property in order to retain counsel. Id. § 24-1-7.
296. Id. § 24-1-6. A prevailing owner is entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees and
costs. Id. § 24-1-11.
297. Id. § 24-1-15, 24-1-16. A federal district court upheld these latter provisions against
various constitutional challenges by local law enforcement officials in Kennard v.Leavitt, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Utah 2002).
298. The arguments in favor of Measure 3, as printed in the official state ballot pamphlet,
are available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/guide/mea/m3/3fa.htm.
299. The arguments against Measure 3, as printed in the official state ballot pamphlet, are
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/guide/meam3/3op.htm.
300. Campaign for New Drug Policies, supra note 272. A similar initiative in Massachusetts,
however, was defeated in the 2000 election. Blumenson, supra note 292, at 230. Professor
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Where adopted, the forfeiture initiatives have had a striking
effect on state law enforcement practices. Indeed, in Utah, forfeiture
proceedings under state law have largely ceased since passage of
Initiative B, 301 underscoring the responsiveness of law enforcement to
forfeiture incentives.
iv. Marijuana Decriminalization and Legalization
In contrast to the victories of the foregoing reform efforts, and
despite success in getting onto state ballots, liberalizing initiatives for
nonmedical marijuana use have been repeatedly and decisively
defeated. Initiatives in Alaska, Nevada, Arizona, and South Dakota
failed to gain more than 43 percent of the vote. 30 2 While each
initiative was structured differently, the Nevada campaign is
303
illustrative.
Nevada's Ballot Question 9 in 2002 would have legalized
possession of three ounces or less of marijuana by adults over the age
of 21, and would have required that the legislature enact laws to
provide for the legal distribution of marijuana (subject to regulation,

Blumenson believes that the Massachusetts initiative failed because of its mandatory drug
treatment provisions. Id.
301. Jennifer Dobner, Asset-ForfeiturePlan "Is Dead," DESERET NEWS, Feb. 16, 2003, at B1.
Forfeiture reform has also had important effects in Oregon. See, e.g., Gillian Flaccus, Oregon
County Becomes Haven for Drug Crimes; Traffickers Use Major Roads that Cross the Region, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 13, 2003, at A4 (discussing shrinking budgets for state and local drug
enforcement in wake of forfeiture reform).
302. Alaska's Ballot Measure 5 won 40.88 percent of the vote in 2000. Alaska Division of
Elections, Election Summary Report 5 (2000), http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect00/
00genr/datalresults.htm. Nevada's Ballot Question 9 won 39.13 percent of the vote in 2002.
Nevada Secretary of State, Election Summary 8 (2002), http://www.sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/
2002GenerallElectionSummary.htm. Arizona's Proposition 203 won 42.7 percent of the vote in
2002.
Ariz. Secretary of State, 2002 General Election Unofficial Results (2002),
http://www.sosaz.com/results/2002/general/BM203.htm. South Dakota's Initiated Measure 1 won
37.97 percent of the vote in 2002. South Dakota Secretary of State, Initiated Measure 1 (2002),
http://www.state.sd.us/sos/2002/02init1.htm.
303. Alaska'a Ballot Measure 5 provided not only for full-blown legalization of marijuana,
but also amnesty and possibly restitution for people formerly prosecuted under the state's
marijuana laws. For a copy of the initiative text, see Alaska Division of Elections, 2000 General
Election
Ballot Measures
14 (2000), http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/oep2000
/bmOO.htm. Arizona's Proposition 203 would have decriminalized possession of two ounces or
less of marijuana, provided for state distribution of marijuana for medical purposes, modified
drug sentencing laws, and made drug-related forfeitures more difficult under state law. For a
copy of the initiative text, see Arizona Secretary of State, 2002 Ballot Propositions (2002),
http://www.sosaz.comlelection/2002/Info/pubpamphlet/englishlprop2O3.htm.
South Dakota's
Initiated Measure 1, the most narrowly targeted of the decriminalization measures, sought to
legalize "industrial hemp" with a THC content of 1 percent or less. For a copy of the initiative
text, see South Dakota Secretary of State, 2002 Ballot Question Texts (2002),
http://www.state.sd.us/sos/2002/2002bq.htm.
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taxation, and various other limitations). 30 4 Proponents argued that
the measure would generate "substantial tax revenues" and induce
law enforcement "to focus resources on more serious crimes. '30 5
Opponents contended that marijuana was a "gateway drug" to more
harmful substances, and that passage of the measure would lead to
more substance abuse and addiction in the state. 30 6 Opponents
further argued, "[T]he tourism industry will be negatively impacted,
as Nevada will become the nation's marketplace for drug sale and
usage."30 7
Finally, opponents pointed to the federal marijuana
prohibition, and contended that, as a result, "effective regulation will
30 8
be impossible to enact and enforce."
The Nevada campaign was largely financed by Soros and
Sperling, and, following the general pattern for the recent drug reform
initiatives, proponents raised far more money for their campaign than
opponents. 30 9 Yet, this initiative was soundly defeated. Proponents
blamed the defeat on campaigning by the federal drug czar, 310
although medical marijuana initiatives had previously been adopted
in the face of vocal federal opposition. 311 Others attributed the defeat
to the opposition of local law enforcement and the death of a
prominent journalist in a drug-related accident just a few months
312
before Election Day.
v. Direct Democracy and Public Opinion
Despite the failures with nonmedical marijuana, reformers
have won at least 17 statewide initiative campaigns since 1996. While
each initiative has been unique, the campaigns, both wins and losses,
have followed a similar pattern: federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials have been aligned together against a
sophisticated, well-funded campaign in support of the initiative.
Indeed, initiative opponents have been repeatedly outspent by wide
304. For a copy of the initiative text, see Nevada Secretary of State, Ballot Question # 9, § 1
(2002), http://www.sos.state.nv.us/nvelection20O2_bqfbq9.htm
[hereinafter Nevada Ballot
Pamphlet].
305. Id. § 2.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Donna Leinwand, Super-Rich Trio Put Cash into Marijuana Initiatives, USA TODAY,
Nov. 5, 2002, at A8.
310. Adam Satariano, Federal Tactics Behind Defeats, Groups Assert, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Nov. 7, 2002, at 3B.
311. See infra Part III.B.2.b.vi.
312. Ed Vogel, Legalizing Marijuana:Backers Blame Election Loss on Fear,LAS VEGAS REV.J., Nov. 9, 2002, at lB.
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margins, raising charges that wealthy backers are abusing the
initiative process. Thus, the National Drug Strategy characterizes the
success of the initiatives as follows:
[M]isinformation has taken on the force of law in states where legalization groups have
pushed through a series of state referenda to legalize "medical" marijuana. Legalization
lobbyists have portrayed their agenda as a representation of popular will, as though
parents and communities were seeking to bring more drugs into their schools and
homes. Operating with the benefit of slick ad campaigns, with virtually no opposition,
and making outlandish claims that deceive well-meaning citizens, campaign proponents
313
have tallied up an impressive string of victories.

This abuse theory, if true, might have important implications
for the normative issues addressed in the next Part. 314
More
specifically, if heavy spending can fool the electorate into voting for
ballot initiatives that actually contradict true public preferences, then
direct democracy would appear to be a particularly poor way of
making drug policy. The availability of the initiative at the state-but
not the federal-level might then constitute a good reason to minimize
state policymaking authority. (This assumes, perhaps contrary to
experience, that Congress itself exhibits a high degree of
responsiveness to public preferences in drug policy. 315)
While money has been shown to play an important role in the
initiative process, 316 the significance of the spending gaps in the drug
reform context has been greatly overstated.
In general,
disproportionate spending is more effective in opposition to an
initiative than in support.3 17 Moreover, in the drug reform context,
the amount spent by proponents should not be weighed merely against
the campaign budgets of opponents. Instead, some weight must also
be given to the national advertising and other support that has been
provided for decades by the federal government in advancing the
313. DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 9.
314. Alternatively, one might view the Administration's "explanation" of the successful
initiative campaigns as another instance of its Manichean legalist viewpoint: any relaxation of
drug laws amounts to a capitulation to the forces of legalization.
315. For a compelling illustration of conventional lawmaking gone awry in this area, see
GEST, supra note 75, at 120 (discussing lack of deliberation in Congress prior to enactment of
crack mandatory minimums).
Professor Stuntz has identified particular "pathologies" of
criminal lawmaking in the legislature, which may undermine the trustworthiness of Congress's
punitive drug laws as a reflection of actual public preferences. See William J. Stuntz, The
PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001) (identifying dynamic
that "always pushes towards broader liability rules, and towards harsher sentences as well").
Thus, for some years now, public opinion has been shifting towards treatment and greater
tolerance, see supra Part III.B.2.a, but without a corresponding shift in the content of federal
drug laws.
316. For a discussion of the literature, see O'Hear, supra note 218, at 287-88.
317. Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 22
(1997).
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legalist paradigm. Proponents must arguably outspend opponents by
a wide margin just to level the playing field.
This analysis finds support in the actual record of the drug
reform initiatives. Disproportionate spending has not guaranteed
victory, and, in particular, the public has consistently drawn the line
at decriminalizing or legalizing nonmedical marijuana. Moreover, it is
important to note that the initiatives themselves vary in important
respects, not only across the four broad categories (medical marijuana,
nonmedical marijuana, asset forfeiture, and mandatory treatment),
but also within the categories (e.g., the Arizona and California
initiatives dealing with medical marijuana and mandatory treatment
differ in a number of important respects). 318 This diversity among
initiatives suggests that the reformers themselves do not believe that
they can "sell" a single preferred reform model to the voters, but,
rather, need to tailor a reform package to the particular needs and
preferences of each individual state. Finally, the initiatives, once
adopted, have generally remained in place notwithstanding continued
efforts to secure a repeal. 319 In short, the evidence is far from
compelling that the successful drug reform initiatives have been
adopted contrary to true public preferences.
vi. Federal Opposition and Acquiescence
These drug reform initiatives represent rejections of the federal
policy preferences. Thus, it should come as no surprise that, in
contrast to the federal conversion on drug courts, Washington has
maintained its opposition to the various outsider reform efforts.
Indeed, Washington has made no particular distinction among the
different types of initiatives, labeling them collectively as "selfindulgent social engineering" and characterizing them as part of a
320
covert campaign for full legalization.
Federal opposition to the initiatives has been expressed most
visibly in the efforts to stamp out the distribution of medical
marijuana in California. The DEA denied a formal petition made in
the wake of the medical marijuana initiatives to move marijuana from
Schedule I to Schedule II, which would permit medical uses. 321

318. For a comparison of these laws, see supra Parts III.B.2.B.i-ii.
319. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 218, at 294 (describing continued skirmishing in Arizona
over Proposition 200 since its passage in 1996).
320. DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 110, at 10 (discussing failed initiatives in Ohio (mandatory
treatment), Nevada (marijuana legalization), Arizona (marijuana decriminalization and
forfeiture reform), and South Dakota (industrial hemp legalization)).
321. Notice of Denial of Petition, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,038 (April 18, 2001).

840

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57:3:783

Federal prosecutors have undertaken civil and criminal enforcement
actions (including the Rosenthal prosecution) in order to stop
marijuana distribution authorized under state law. 322 The federal
government also determined that it would revoke the license to
prescribe controlled substances of any physician who recommended
323
the use of marijuana.
Moreover, even before their enactment, federal officials
attempted to defeat the initiatives by actively campaigning against
them. While federal campaigning against drug reform has recently
become the focus of controversy, federal efforts in this area date back
to the first successful initiatives in 1996.324 In 2002, drug czar John
Walters campaigned against all five drug reform initiatives, ranging
from marijuana legalization (Nevada) to marijuana decriminalization
(Arizona) to mandatory treatment (Ohio). 325 Walters' campaigning
activities survived subsequent legal challenges under state campaign
finance laws and the federal Hatch Act, which regulates political
activities by federal employees. 326
DEA Administrator Asa
327
Hutchinson also campaigned in Ohio against the Ohio initiative.
Federal opposition to the treatment initiatives, in particular,
contrasts tellingly with federal enthusiasm (and financial support) for
drug courts, despite important similarities between the two projects.

322. Rosenthal is not the only example of such enforcement efforts. Federal agents have
raided medical marijuana distribution organizations in West Hollywood, San Francisco,
Oakland, and Sebastapol. Charlie LeDuff & Adam Liptak, Defiant California City Hands Out
Marijuana,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A22. Also, the United States brought a successful civil
suit to shut down the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, which was organized to distribute
marijuana under Proposition 215. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S.
483, 486-87 (2001). The Cooperative attempted to invoke a necessity defense in the litigation,
based on the purportedly medical uses of the marijuana at issue, but was rebuffed by the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 499. In other states, though, federal authorities have apparently
allowed medical marijuana programs to be implemented without such interference. McKenna,
supra note 263, at 36-37 (discussing Oregon and Nevada experiences). Explanations for the
federal focus on California range from the large scale of California cultivation operations to the
unique national visibility of the state. LeDuff & Liptak, supra, at A16.
323. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has invalidated
this policy on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 639.
324. See, e.g., Thomas A. Constantine, Drug Enforcement Administration Makes
Announcement, Bus. WIRE, October 17, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories; see
also BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 48, at 534.
325. Ohio Voters Soundly Reject Drug Reform Ballot Initiative, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
WKLY., Nov. 11, 2002, at 1.
326. ONDCPReauthorizationBecomes Lightning Rod for Controversy: Committee Bill Would
Ban Use of Campaign Funds to Fight Ballot Initiatives, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY.,
June 9, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter ONDCPReauthorization].
327. Alan Johnson, FederalDrug Official Against Amendment, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 3,
2002, 2002 WL 100600266.

2004]

FEDERALISM AND DRUG CONTROL

At least two considerations likely play a role in this federal policy.
First, the central difference between the treatment initiatives and the
drug courts is precisely the sort of characteristic that would matter a
great deal under the legalist perspective: the availability of severe
criminal sanctions in drug court reinforces the legalist belief that drug
use is a morally wrong choice (not the symptom of a disease) and that
drug use should accordingly be subject to stern moral condemnation.
Second, the drug court movement is insider reform-a product of the
political establishment of many local jurisdictions-and is therefore
well positioned to win favor with the federal drug enforcement
establishment.
While federal opposition to the initiatives has been vocal,
Washington has, in another sense, largely acquiesced to the reforms
once adopted (excepting the vigorous federal efforts against medical
marijuana in California). The federal government could override state
drug reform by increasing its own drug enforcement resources so as to
offset new gaps in state and local enforcement. At the extreme,
federal enforcement might replace state and local enforcement
328
altogether. But Washington has not moved in this direction.
Indeed, as recently as June 2003, Congress specifically rejected a
proposal to increase federal enforcement resources in the medical
marijuana states so as to close the loophole in state and local
enforcement. 32 9 Except in California, it does not appear that medical
marijuana has become a priority for federal enforcers.33 0 In effect,
despite its rhetoric, Washington generally allows the policy
experiments to proceed.
3. Summary: A Pattern of Constrained Diversity
State-to-state drug policy does not display the level of
uniformity suggested by the federal monopoly theory. States can, and
do, adopt policies over federal opposition that deviate significantly
from federal norms. The federal government has not allocated nearly
the enforcement resources necessary to render these policy deviations

328. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 165 ("It therefore is best to characterize the
policy position of the national government in drug control as one of contingent supremacy, with
the primary contingency being the willingness to commit independent federal resources.").
329. ONDCPReauthorization, supranote 326, at 3. Congress likewise rejected a proposal to
allow the drug czar to use money from his anti-drug advertising budget to buy ads opposing drug
reform initiatives. Id. at 2. The drug czar may still campaign in person, but he cannot use the
advertising budget to support his efforts.
330. See McKenna, supra note 263, at 36.
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irrelevant.
National drug policy, in short, is characterized by
33 1
meaningful diversity.
At the same time, there is good reason to believe that, on the
whole, state policies cluster more closely around federal norms than
332
would be the case in the absence of federal inducements to conform.
If this proposition is true, then the policy diversity that does exist
might best be characterized as a "constrained diversity." What is the
evidence of constraint? First, consider historical trends in marijuana
regulation. In the 1970s, when decriminalization was taken seriously
as a policy option by federal officials (and even publicly endorsed by
President Carter), eleven states did, in fact, decriminalize. Since the
1980s, when legalism triumphed in Washington and federal policy
turned decisively against marijuana, only one state has decriminalized
and another has actually recriminalized. 333 These developments
occurred despite the absence of any clear consensus that
34
decriminalization was a failure in the states that adopted itA
Second, American drug policy does not display the degree of
diversity generally found in the western world. 33 5 The Netherlands,
for instance, recently legalized marijuana, while Portugal recently
eliminated jail time for possession of small amounts of all illegal
drugs.3 3 6 Even within North America, the Canadian government has
announced plans to decriminalize possession of small amounts of

331. Similar patterns of state innovation and diversity have been observed in other fields
marked by cooperative federalism. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558 (2001) ("[The federal
government has implemented relatively few environmental initiatives. Instead, innovative
approaches have come primarily from the state level, with a number of states taking actions that
go well beyond federal requirements.").
332. See supraPart III.A.2.
333. In their analysis of the history of marijuana decriminalization, DiChiara and Galliher
also emphasize the importance of the federal role. DiChiara & Galliher, supra note 210, at 66.
334. For instance, there are similar patterns of frequency in marijuana use in states that
decriminalized as in states that did not. Id. at 68.
335. For a recent survey of policy developments in Europe, see UNITED STATES DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG INTELLIGENCE BRIEF: THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPEAN DRUG

POLICY (2002), http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/O2023/O2023p.html.
The limited diversity of
American drug policy might be contrasted with the wide diversity in American gun control
policy. For a survey of state and local gun laws, see JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK?
32-34 (2002). For instance, while handgun possession is banned outright in some jurisdictions,
handguns may be purchased without so much as a permit or license in others. Id. at 32-33.
Indeed, despite the permissive reputation of the United States as to gun ownership, there are
some United States jurisdictions (like the District of Columbia) that are stricter than almost any
European state. Id. at 35.
336. Warren Hoge, Britain to Stop Arresting Most Private Users of Marijuana,N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2002, at A3.
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marijuana 337 and to provide medical marijuana directly to patients
with prescriptions for the drug. 338 (This is not to say, of course, that
the United States ought to adopt any of these policies, but merely to
observe that the range of politically viable policy options seems
339
comparatively cramped in this country. )
Third, the most significant state deviations from federal policy
in recent years have emerged from the initiative process. This fact
may suggest that the federal government has been more successful in
controlling state political establishments than in controlling public
opinion. Yet, the initiative is only available in a little more than 40
percent of the states. 340 One might conclude that if more states had
the initiative process (or if the federal government were less effective
in obtaining the cooperation of state legislatures), there would be
greater degrees of deviation from federal norms.
Fourth, the principal players in the reform movements
themselves seem to regard the federal tools as effective.
Drug
34
1
reformers attribute initiative losses to federal interference,
and
claim that they must outspend initiative opponents by large margins
to counteract the effects of federal anti-drug propaganda. 342 For its
part, the federal government would presumably not wield its tools of
influence if they were viewed as ineffective in influencing public
attitudes towards reform.
C. The CooperativeFederalismModel
While not well appreciated in the drug policy literature, the
structure of federal-state relations in this area (and the resulting
pattern of constrained diversity) roughly parallels the arrangements
in many other policy areas, from education to welfare to the
environment.
These arrangements, referred to as "cooperative
federalism," involve a combination of federal policy mandates and
inducements (such as conditional grants) that require or provide

337. Clifford Krauss, Canada Introduces Measure Adjusting Penalties for Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A7.
338. Clifford Krauss, Canada to Offer Marijuana to Medical Patients, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2003, at A4. Canada has also approved on a trial basis a "safe injection site" in Vancouver. Id.
339. These international policy experiments contrast markedly with the dismal showing of
nonmedical marijuana legalization and decriminalization efforts in this country. See supra Part
III.B.2.iv.
340. See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of 'PopularIntent" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 113-14 (1995) (noting that only 21 states have an initiative
process).
341. Satariano, supra note 310.
342. Leinwand, supra note 309.
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strong financial incentives for states to implement the federal
policy. 34 3 Public choice theorists have explained the emergence of
cooperative federalism as a product of political-support-maximizing
decisions by politicians at all levels. 344 This Section will use such
models of cooperative federalism as a way to explain federal-state
relations in drug policy.
1. Why Not Full Federal Control over Drug Policy?
The public choice account of cooperative federalism starts with
an hypothetical interest group that desires a particular governmental
program, but is able to secure that program in only some states, not in
all states or at the federal level. 345 States that enact the desired
program soon join with the interest group to demand national
enactment. 346 This occurs because the enacting states will hope to
shift some of the expense of the program, to which they are already
committed, to the federal level. 347 Enacting states may also be
concerned about their ability to maintain the integrity of the program
if neighboring states do not have the same commitments. 348 At the

343. Greve, supra note 130, at 558. In addition to conditional grants, the other commonly
noted inducement is conditional preemption. "Under this system, Congress enacts a general
regulatory scheme, delegating the implementation to the states on the condition that the states
submit an acceptable implementation plan to the federal government." Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 866 (1998). While conditional preemption has played
an important role in other policy areas, like the environment, it has not been employed in drug
policy. For a history of cooperative federalism, see Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 65, 65-69 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
344. Professors Bratton and McCahery succinctly describe the basis thrust of public choice
theory as follows:
The theory asserts that actors rationally employ the government and form groups to
influence, or "capture" it. As risk averse lawmakers respond to the dominant voices,
legislation reflects the demand patterns of these interest groups. This private rentseeking activity prompts competition among government actors (who occupy a
monopolist's position respecting scarce public goods) to become rent distributors and
receive interest group favors.
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 214 (1997). For similar
accounts of the model, see Ronald McKinnon & Thomas Nechyba, Competition in Federal
Systems: The Role of Political and Financial Constraints, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE
STATES BE TRUSTED? 3, 28-34 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997); Jonathan R.
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a
Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 269-74 (1990).
345. The description here is derived from Greve, supranote 130, at 594-98.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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federal level, enactment in some states increases the attractiveness of
the program, in part because the federal government now has the
opportunity to leverage state resources in rolling out a national
program. 349 Federal legislators can accommodate the interest group
(and hence gain its political support) without the need to pay the full
350
cost of the program.
A cooperative federalism arrangement, in which the costs are
shared between the federal government and the states, thus holds
considerable appeal for both the original enacting states (which get
federal money and protection from competition from nonenacting
states) and the federal legislators (who get to claim credit for
addressing the underlying problem, but can do so on the cheap).
States that resisted the program initially will, by and large, go along
with it after federal enactment because of the promise of federal aid,
but they will demand some residual policymaking autonomy so that
state legislators may also claim some political credit for the program's
successes. Thus, a program lacking sufficient support to be fully
adopted nationally may become a quasi-national program when
implementation costs are split between the federal and state levels
and politicians at both levels can claim credit for addressing a social
351
problem.
Consider how this model might explain the evolution of federal
drug policy. Some states began regulating opiates and marijuana long
before the federal government did. 352
States with stringent

349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Phrased thus, there seems to be a certain alchemy in all of this-costs are divided and
political credit is multiplied-that depends on voters' inability to understand clearly who is
responsible for what in a cooperative federalism scheme. Professor Hills, however, offers a more
sanguine account of cooperative federalism, suggesting that intergovernmental transfers of
money and authority occur in a competitive "market" that leads to the least expensive
implementation of federal policies. Hills, supra note 343, at 872, 876-77. He does, however,
acknowledge that agency costs-here, the unresponsiveness of state and local policymakers to
constituents' preferences-may interfere with the efficiency of the market. Id. at 886-87. The
next Subsection of this Article suggests that such unresponsiveness-specifically, by local law
enforcement-may undermine the suitability of current arrangements.
352. See supra Part II.A. The public choice model suggests that governments regulate to win
the political support of interest groups. Historically, parents groups have been a particularly
important interest group seeking tough drug laws. See, e.g., supra Part II.C (discussing parents'
movement in 1970s). Courtwright offers a nice public choice account of why middle-class parents
support the war on drugs, recasting their issue advocacy as a kind of rent-seeking behavior:
[M]iddle-class parents [are] politically important constituents who are concerned with
the danger to their children posed by cannabis and other illicit drugs. Drug
prohibitions may produce heavy social costs, but they do so only in the aggregate. The
heaviest burdens fall on poor communities where the users, dealers, and police street
sweeps are concentrated. Affluent and suburban voters see aggressive enforcement as
protecting their own families. In supporting form sanctions against trafficking and
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regulations, however, found the integrity of their programs
undermined by the easy availability of drugs in neighboring states
with more lenient regulations, 35 3 so the stricter states requested that
the federal government adopt a nationwide ban. 354 The federal
government did so, but neither preempted state law nor dedicated the
level of resources necessary for comprehensive federal enforcement,
implicitly relying on state and local law enforcement to carry most of
the load. 355 Gradually, as the war on drugs heated up in the 1970s
and 1980s, the cooperative arrangements grew more complicated and
more explicit, as the federal government developed law enforcement
assistance grants, multi-jurisdictional drug task forces, and equitable
356
sharing of forfeited assets.
The scenario currently looks something like this: local law
enforcement supplies a lion's share of the personnel and street-level
intelligence necessary in order to implement federal drug policies. In
return for this contribution, the federal government supplies cash and
specialized law enforcement services, and makes available federal
prosecutors, courts, and prisons for the most difficult, important, or
high-profile cases. The costs of the federal war on drugs, in short, are
split. The federal contribution is designed to make pro-enforcement
policies at the local level more cost-effective, and hence more
357
attractive to policymakers.
To put the arrangement in different terms, we might imagine
that Congress has a choice among four options for drug policy: (1) do
nothing, leaving the issue entirely for the states (no money/no control);
(2) provide the states with unconditional grants to deal with the drug
problem, allowing the states to make drug policy free from constraints
(some money/no control); (3) provide the states with conditional
funding that steers the states towards federally favored policies (some
money/some control); or (4) take full responsibility for making and
implementing drug policy (all money/all control). 35 The first option
use they consider themselves to be acquiring a kind of insurance, the costs of which
are absorbed by people who shouldn't be behaving like that anyway.
COURTWRIGHT, supra note 124, at 202.

353. See, e.g., supra note 49; infra note 444.
354. See, e.g., BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 23, at 80 (discussing pressure by state governors
and local police departments for federal marijuana ban).
355. See GEST, supra note 75, at 109-10.
356. See supra Parts III.A.2.c-d.
357. Professors Zimring and Hawkins estimate that the federal government pays somewhere
between 35 and 50 percent of the total costs of the war on drugs. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra
note 7, at 167.
358. In theory, other policy options are available that would offer the federal government
control without cost, but such options may run afoul of the anticommandeering rule, which, as a
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(no money/no control) holds little appeal because federal legislators
would lose the opportunity to gain political credit for responding to the
drug issue. The fourth option (all money/all control) likewise holds
little appeal because of the enormous expense of creating a federal
police force that could enforce drug laws effectively down to the street
level.
Rather than creating a redundant police infrastructure,
Congress will find it far less expensive to leverage existing local law
enforcement capabilities.
Congress will thus be drawn to the intermediate policies that
allow it to claim political credit for responding to the drug problem
without bearing the full cost of enforcement. But how much control
will Congress exercise? On the one hand, more control means greater
opportunities to adopt policies that maximize political support;
commentators thus note that, in practice, "federal funding inevitably
leads to federal control."359 On the other hand, some degree of state
autonomy may well be the political price of a national drug policy;
state legislators, after all, will want to be able to make policy choices
360
that maximize their political support too.
Consider, for instance, a hypothetical proposal in Congress that
would condition all federal drug enforcement grants on state adoption
of a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for crack possession.
Faced with this condition, a state might choose to walk away from the
federal money because (1) the mandatory minimum might result in
361
significant incremental costs to the state's court and prison systems,
or (2) the state's voters are strongly opposed to such harsh treatment
of drug users. 362

matter of constitutional law, prohibits the federal government from taking control of local law
enforcement. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that legislation
requiring states and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective
handgun purchases violates the constitution).
359. McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 344, at 32.
360. See Hills, supra note 343, at 872 ("If Congress is willing to pay the price-in federal
money or implementing discretion-demanded by each state, then Congress can use each state's
regulatory machinery to implement federal law; if not, then Congress must rely on purely federal
methods of implementation.").
361. Such costs may represent a considerable burden. Thus, for instance, New York softened
its Rockefeller drug laws shortly after adoption because of the burdens that were being imposed
on the state criminal justice system. See supra note 80.
362. Professor Klein has made a similar point:
When the state and the federal governments share the same view on the norm
underlying a criminal prohibition subject to concurrent jurisdiction, though they may
disagree as to the details, the punishment, or the means best suited to implement the
norm, the states should be relatively easy to bribe with conditional grants of funding.
On the other hand, where a state has strongly expressed an independent norm, it may
choose to forgo federal money rather than capitulate.

848

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:3:783

In order to keep states on board with the new condition,
Congress would likely have to increase the amount of the grant
considerably. Despite its own preference for mandatory minimumsthe political-support-maximizing policy on a national level-Congress
might well conclude that the benefits of the new grant condition are
not worth the costs. After all, as long as the mandatory minimums
are in place at the federal level, federal prosecutors, working with
local law enforcement, can ensure that they are applied in the most
363
suitable cases.
In short, there should be little surprise that our national drug
policy displays a pattern of constrained diversity, which represents a
balancing of the federal desires for control (and hence political
support) and for engagement of state and local law enforcement in the
war on drugs (and hence minimization of costs to the federal budget).
2. Why Not Simply Conditional Grants?
At a general level, federal-state relations in drug policy look
quite similar to many other instances of cooperative federalism, but,
at a more specific level, cooperative federalism in this context has
taken on some unusual features. In particular, federal aid is not
simply in the form of cash grants doled out by centralized
bureaucracies in Washington, D.C.; instead it is more in the form of
in-kind aid, chiefly delivered on a local level by the ninety-four
different United States Attorneys' Offices.3 64 Federal prosecutors in
these offices hold the keys to the local federal courthouse. As such,
they not only provide local law enforcement with access to federal
prisons and the stricter federal sentencing laws, but they also play a
lead role in asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and organizing and
coordinating the MJDTFs. 365 These sorts of in-kind assistance
provided by the local United States Attorney may, in fact, be far more
important in promoting the participation of local law enforcement in
the war on drugs than the Byrne Grants (representing the more
36 6
conventional tool of cooperative federalism).
Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1551
(2002). I suggest here, though, that the state may have an "independent norm" with respect to
the punishment, too, at least as to punishments as extreme and as controversial as crack
mandatory minimum.
363. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
364. See supra Parts III.A.2.b, d.
365. See supra Parts III.A.2.b, d.
366. Additional in-kind assistance is provided by federal laws that deny federal rights and
benefits to drug offenders; these laws magnify the punitive and deterrent effects of a drug
conviction. Examples of such "invisible punishment" include deportation, denial of food stamps
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Viewed through the lens of cooperative federalism, there is
something odd about the degree to which the federal government uses
in-kind aid, which requires it to maintain its own parallel drug
enforcement infrastructure alongside state and local enforcement
bodies.
To draw an analogy with another area of cooperative
federalism, it would be as if the federal government attempted to
contribute to national educational goals by running its own school
system. This Section will suggest two distinct, but not inconsistent,
explanations for the reliance on in-kind assistance in drug policy:
reduction of agency costs and liberation of local law enforcement from
367
state control.
a. Reduction of Agency Costs
The purpose of federal drug enforcement assistance is to
increase the overall level of enforcement effort by local agencies, but it
is costly for the federal government to ensure that an infusion of
federal assistance has the desired effect. For instance, as Professors
Zimring and Hawkins have observed, "If states and localities are
satisfied with prior levels of effort, they can disinvest their own money
in order to balance the larger federal spending." 36
In a grant
program, the federal government might minimize such concerns by
attaching rigorous conditions to the grant, requiring detailed
reporting by the recipient, and assigning bureaucrats to monitor
recipient performance. But such measures may be both financially and
369
politically costly.
From the standpoint of minimizing these agency costs while
maximizing state and local enforcement effort, in-kind aid offers at
least three important advantages over grant aid. First, in-kind aid is
provided by federal law enforcement officials in the field who work

and other forms of federally funded public assistance, loss of public housing, denial of access to
student loans, loss of parental rights, and loss of driver's license. Jeremy Travis, Invisible
Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 23-24 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds.,

2002).
For an argument that such collateral consequences undermine the successful
reintegration of the drug offender into society, see Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1047-48.
367. Professor Richman has similarly observed that federal enforcement against street
crimes ought to be thought of as in-kind aid, which he contends works chiefly to the benefit of
state and local law enforcement. Richman, supra note 152, at 786-87.
368. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 7, at 167.
369. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State
and Local Officials From State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1226 (1999) ("It is a
familiar point that state and local officials frequently act as faithless agents of the federal
government, violating conditions attached to federal funds whenever the federal government
fails to monitor their compliance.").
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directly with the local recipients, and are better positioned than
bureaucrats in Washington to ensure that aid is used in a way that
increases overall enforcement effort. The federal government already
has an elite, decentralized law enforcement bureaucracy (the United
States Attorneys' Offices) on the ground ready to perform this
monitoring task.
Second, aid is distributed in many discrete units, rather than
in the form of, say, a single check. If state and local policymakers
were inclined to offset increased federal aid through decreases in their
expenditures, they would need to know something about the
magnitude of the federal aid. While this measurement is easy when a
single check is delivered through a grant program, measurement may
be much more difficult when it comes in a host of other forms: federal
prosecution of cases referred from the local police, contribution of DEA
undercover expertise to an MJDTF, distribution of forfeited assets,
and so forth.
Third, in-kind aid is not as fungible as cash. Recipients may
easily convert cash to their own purposes; a federal grant to a local
agency, for instance, may be dissipated on perks for its employees and
These risks are reduced through reporting
patronage hiring.
requirements and careful monitoring, but such measures, again, are
costly. If federal agencies are assumed to be more ethical or efficient,
then it might appear safer on the whole to give the money to federal
agencies, who then provide specific services to local agencies.
b. Liberation of Local Law Enforcement
The agency costs rationale assumes that the federal
government is attempting to further its drug policy agenda in the
most cost-effective fashion. Alternatively (or in addition), the federal
reliance on in-kind assistance may reflect a desire to liberate local law
enforcement from state control. Absent a federal role, the scale and
effectiveness of local law enforcement would be subject to various
State institutions, not localities,
state-determined constraints.
determine substantive criminal law, rules of criminal procedure,
sentencing law, and the number of prison beds available for serious
offenders. States provide financial support for local courts, local jails,
local prosecutors, and local police. Local law enforcement relies on
state agencies for various specialized law enforcement services,
ranging from the maintenance of criminal records to sophisticated
forensic techniques.
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Federal assistance frees local law enforcement from complete
dependence on the state. 370 If a state's penal laws are too lenient,
cases may be referred for federal prosecution. 371 Indeed, just the
threat of federal prosecution may give local prosecutors enough
leverage to compensate for the shortcomings of state law. If state
prisons are overcrowded, federal prosecution, which will lead to
incarceration in a federal prison, offers a solution. If the state
legislature cuts payments to local government, equitable sharing may
make up the difference.
If a state drug enforcement agency is
underfunded or concentrates resources in jurisdictions that have more
clout in the state legislature, the federal DEA is there to help.
If the objective is to liberate local law enforcement, in-kind aid
is preferable to grant aid for at least two reasons. First, as discussed
above, in-kind aid flies under the radar screen of externAl budgetmakers, who are thus less likely to respond to in-kind federal aid by
making corresponding budget cuts.3 7 2 Second, federal in-kind aid
supplies benefits to local law enforcement that no amount of money
can buy: access to a potentially more favorable system of laws, courts,
and prisons.3 73 As one local police officer put it in explaining how his
agency chooses to take a case to federal or state prosecutors: "[I]t's like
buying a car: we're going to the place where we feel we can get the
374
best deal. We shop around."
Why might the federal government want to liberate local law
enforcement from state constraints? First, the federal government
may be pursuing a policy of maximizing decentralization, enhancing
local autonomy to encourage localized decision making in determining
the level of enforcement in their community. As will be discussed
further below, there are many good reasons to move policy decisions
375
from the state to the locality.
Second, federal policy may be designed to minimize legislative
control over law enforcement bureaucracies.
Federal in-kind
assistance allows the unelected leaders of these agencies to
circumvent policy decisions made by the elected state legislators.
When state laws on defendants' rights, maximum sentences, and the

370. This is an instance of what Professor Hills calls "dissecting the state," i.e., the use of
federal regulatory or spending power to "unpack[ I the black box of the 'the state' to liberate
certain state or local institutions from the control of state laws." Id. at 1203.
371. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
372. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
373. See supra Part III.A.1.
374. Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalizationof Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 930 (1998).
375. See infra Part V.B.
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like are inconvenient or unpalatable for the police, federal court
beckons. 3 76 Likewise, federal aid flying below the radar screen may
undermine the state legislature's decisions about the level of effort
that ought to be expended on drug enforcement. In general, the local
police become less accountable to legislatures and elected executive
officers, and more accountable to-if anyone-an unelected United
States Attorney. 377 Thus, current arrangements may not reflect
principled policymaking so much as the simple political clout of local
law enforcement agencies in lobbying Congress. 3 78 In this account,
local law enforcement is a special interest group, like any other,
seeking rents through legislative action.
In the end, the form of cooperative federalism in drug policy
likely results from a combination of considerations, both principled
and unprincipled. As will be shown in the next Part, the precise
nature of federal-state-local relations at present matters a great deal
when deciding how such relations ought to be reformed in the future.

376. See O'Hear, supra note 7, at 755-63 (discussing federal-state forum shopping by law
enforcement agents).
377. In this sense, drug enforcement embodies what has been referred to as the "picket
fence" model of cooperative federalism. The model has been described as follows:
Officials specializing in a single program area, such as public welfare, have closer
attachments to their functional (program) counterparts at all levels of government
that to various mayors, governors, and legislators. For example, welfare officials in
the federal Department of Health and Human Services share professional training,
education, goals, and values with state, county, and municipal social welfare
employees. They tend to be more responsive to these associates than to the president,
governor, mayor, county executive, or various legislative bodies. As a consequence,
coordination and implementation of social welfare policies are likely to be influenced
more by functional specialists than by elected officials.
ANN O'M. BOWMAN & RIcHARD C. KEARNEY, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 37, 38-39 (1990).
378. Professor Richman seems to have something of this view:
Viewed this way, the breadth of the delegation to federal enforcers in areas of
traditional state authority emerges not as an intrusion, but as a form of aid-in-kind to
state enforcers. [This] may well serve state enforcer interests better than would
direct grants ....
With direct grants comes the obligation to account for
expenditures ....
Coordinated operations with federal agencies bring assistance
without any such accountability. If any entities are indeed being "commandeered"
when politically rewarding "overfederalization" puts federal agents and prosecutors
into the battle against street crime, they are federal, not state and local.
Richman, supra note 152, at 786-87. Thus, Professor Richman observes, local law enforcement
rarely complains to Congress about the apparent intrusiveness of the federal enforcement role in
street-level crimes. Id. at 784.
The federal policies liberating local law enforcement from legislative control may also be
motivated by a belief that law enforcement agencies will, by their very nature, be more inclined
to support the enforcement-oriented federal drug policy preferences than would a legislative
body.
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THE "CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE"

Notwithstanding
the various
mechanisms
of federal
domination of drug policy, a number of states have developed
innovative legal reforms in recent years. While some innovations,
particularly the drug treatment courts, fit comfortably within the
parameters of federal policy preferences, others pose a more
fundamental challenge to federal preferences. Such developments
make it increasingly important for the federal government to adopt a
clear, coherent policy towards state innovation. At the most basic
level, the federal government must choose among three alternative
stances when states embark on new paths: (1) active support; (2)
neutrality; or (3) active discouragement.
Under current federal
practice, federal response to a particular state policy seems largely
determined by the extent to which the new policies conforms to the
legalist paradigm. Drug courts, for instance, receive active federal
support, while medical marijuana is subject to vigorous federal
opposition.
Disagreeing with this selective approach (support in some
instances, neutrality or discouragement in others), various
commentators have argued that the federal government should be
supportive, or at least neutral, to all state experimentation. Two
economists, Daniel K. Benjamin and Roger Leroy Miller, have offered
the most detailed and thoughtful proposal along these lines, which
they call the Constitutional Alternative. 379 This Part summarizes
Benjamin and Miller's proposal, places it into the context of the public
choice model of federalism that current drug policy reflects, and then
explains why the Constitutional Alternative should be rejected on
public choice grounds.
A. The Proposal
In essence, the Constitutional Alternative would regulate drugs
at the federal level in the same way that alcohol has been regulated
under the Twenty-First Amendment since the end of Prohibition.
Thus, under the Constitutional Alternative, "the power to control the
manufacture, distribution, and consumption of all psychoactives

379. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 194. Professor Carrington advocates a similar
position, Carrington, supra note 7, at 339-41, as does Judge Gray, JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR
DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 234 (2001).

Professors Rasmussen

and Benson also make a similar proposal, for similar reasons, with respect to the federal
marijuana prohibition. Rasmussen & Benson, supra note 7, at 728-29.
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[would] revert to the states."3 8 0 The federal government would repeal
its prohibition on psychoactive drugs, but would retain jurisdiction
over interstate drug distribution: "the transportation or importation of
any psychoactives in violation of state laws would also be a federal
crime."3'8 1 This residual drug jurisdiction parallels the residual alcohol
jurisdiction preserved for the federal government under the Twenty38 2
First Amendment.
The Constitutional Alternative is intended to provide states
with greater autonomy by "permit[ing] the states to choose drugcontrol strategies more in tune with the preferences and
circumstances of their citizens." 38 3 While critical of the war on drugs,
Benjamin and Miller emphasize that their purpose is not legalization
per se. 38 4 The Constitutional Alternative, for some states,
may (and probably will) mean a relaxation of legal strictures against some drugs. But
there is nothing in [the] proposal that would prevent states from adopting as state law
the current provisions of the [federal] Controlled Substances Act ....
Moreover, the
Constitutional Alternative will actually enhance political pressures for more stringent
drug laws in states in which antidrug sentiment is greatest, at the same that it permits
a relaxation of drug laws in states in which the prevailing sentiment favors such a
3 85
move.

In short, Benjamin and Miller envision a state-by-state patchwork of
drug laws, akin to the current patchwork of alcohol regulations among
38 6
the states.
Benjamin and Miller offer two chief arguments in support of
decentralized policymaking.3 8 7 First, decentralization helps to ensure
that each citizen has an opportunity to live under a set of laws that
corresponds to his or her policy preferences:
The founding fathers.., recognized the need to guard against the "tyranny of the
majority." Even in a democratic society, when the interests and circumstances of
different citizens differ markedly, it may be possible for one faction to obtain the support

380. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 194.
381. Id.
382. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. This may be one reason Benjamin and Miller have
selected the name "Constitutional Alternative"; their proposal would, in fact, be implemented by
statute, not constitutional amendment.
383. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 196.
384. Id. at 195.
385. Id. at 196.
386. Id. at 190, 196-98.
387. Benjamin and Miller also find support for their proposal in constitutional norms of
federalism, id. at 188-89, 194, but they do not go so far as to suggest that the Constitution
mandates a constriction of federal drug jurisdiction. In light of the Supreme Court's current
federalist leanings, there may be some basis to conclude that the Court would, in the right
circumstances, limit federal jurisdiction. Professor Klein suggests that the Court might be most
receptive to Commerce Clause challenges in cases involving marijuana growers who cultivate the
drug for personal use. Klein, supra note 362, at 1589-90.
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of "50 percent plus one" of the voters, and thereby impose its wishes upon the remaining
minority.

..[R]eserving powers to the states and the people.., helps ensure that people within
our nation will have the greatest choice of the majorities to which they must subject
themselves. If a resident of one state does not like the rules imposed by the majority
there, he is free to move to a state whose laws better suit his preferences or
388
circumstances.

Second, decentralization promotes policy innovation:
No government is all-knowing. Governments, like human beings, fail to recognize
problems when they develop, and fail to grasp the correct solutions to known problems.
Under a unitary system of government, the citizenry get only one shot at having the
government recognize and solve problems; and if the national government fails in either
endeavor, the people are stuck. Under our federal system of government, there are fifty
sets of eyes watching for problems, and just as many legislative bodies and executive
389
branches searching for solutions.

Benjamin and Miller trace current dissatisfaction with the war on
drugs to its character as a centrally mandated policy:
The crux of the current failure in the war on drugs lies in the fact that we have a policy
of uniformity imposed upon a nation of diversity. American is comprised of an
incredibly heterogeneous set of individuals who have radically different attitudes
toward the best policies for dealing with drugs .... Yet drug strategy in America is
fundamentally a policy of the federal government. It is a monopoly policy driven by
decisions made in Washington, D.C., rather than in the states and cities and
neighborhoods in which we live. As such, drug policy in America goes too far for many
of us and not far enough for the rest of us. Forged by the forces of compromise at the
national level, it is an ungainly and ineffective strategy that imposes tremendous costs
390
on all Americans, while accomplishing almost none of the goals we seek.

Benjamin and Miller contend that the nation's fourteen-year
experience with alcohol Prohibition provides an object lesson in the
"costly consequences" of centralized policymaking. 391 They further
argue that current drug policy has parallels to Prohibition that are
"simply too compelling to ignore. '392 Much as the Twenty-First
388. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 192-93.
389. Id. at 193.
390. Id. at 6. Benjamin and Miller also contend that national uniformity has facilitated
domination of the drug trade by large, well-organized criminal enterprises:
The nationwide uniformity in laws and enforcement methods is a dream come true for
the leaders of national drug gangs. It didn't take the Jamaican posses long to learn
that business practices that beat the law and the police in New York would beat them
in Fort Wayne and Richmond and Charleston.... Just as national safety and auto
pollution standards ... make it easier to mass-produce cars on a national scale, the
heavy federal involvement in drug enforcement makes it easier to mass-market illicit
drugs on a national scale.
Id. at 99.
391. Id. at 194.
392. Id. at 15.
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Amendment ended America's costly "liquor wars," Benjamin and
Miller propose the Constitutional Alternative as the solution to the
393
current failures of American drug policy.
B. The Public Choice Model of Federalism
The Constitutional Alternative falls neatly within the public
choice tradition of federalism theory. In its normative mode, public
choice theory uses assumptions and analytical methodologies
borrowed from economics in order to determine at which level of
394
government different sorts of policy decisions ought to be made.
Leading public choice models suggest, much like Benjamin and
Miller's analysis, a presumption in favor of decentralized
policymaking within a federal system for many types of government
395
services, including those related to public health and safety.

393. Id. at 186.
394. What I refer to as the normative strand of public choice theory embraces different
schools of thought sometimes referred to as public finance economics, fiscal federalism, public
economics, jurisdiction competition theory, and positive political theory. See Jenna Bednar &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1467 (1995); Bratton & McCahery, supra
note 344, at 213; McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 344, at 4. This normative strand of public
choice theory contrasts with the sorts of descriptive public choice models discussed above in Part
III.C. The normative strand seeks to ameliorate the deadweight social losses caused by the rentseeking behavior of interest groups that is predicted by the descriptive strand. Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 344, at 214-15.
The normative project, which has been pursued in a variety of forms by economists, political
scientists, and legal scholars, descends from the classic work of Charles Tiebout, who
hypothesized that under certain conditions citizen mobility between jurisdictions would result in
a Pareto efficient level of provision of public goods by local governments. See Charles Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956). While influential, Tiebout's
work has been criticized on many grounds. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 344, at
219-39 (summarizing theoretical and practical problems with Tiebout's assumptions); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 415-25
(1990) (criticizing Tiebout's reliance on mobility as tending to produce less efficient local
government and as biased in favor of business and the affluent). The model used here, reflecting
the more modest aims of public economics scholars following in Tiebout's wake, does not claim
Pareto optimality. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 344, at 261-62 (contrasting Tiebout
hypothesis with public economics' "decentralization theorem").
395. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS,
at xv-xvii (1990); PAUL E. PETERSON, BROOKINGS INST., THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-19 (1995)
(arguing for local responsibility for "developmental functions" of government, including providing
for public health and safety); HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 512 (2d ed. 1988); Hills, supra
note 343, at 869 (discussing theory that lower levels of government have comparative advantage
in delivery of 'labor-intensive services," while higher levels have advantage in "capital-intensive"
services); Wallace E. Oates, An Economist's Perspective on Fiscal Federalism, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 3 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to
the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation:A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535,
536-37, 547-49 (1997). Decentralization, though, does have its critics. Professor Briffault, for
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A simple example conveys the essence of the analysis. 396
Consider a nation containing one hundred people, sixty of whom
desire a policy of strict mandatory minimum sentences for all drug
offenders, and forty of whom prefer a policy of treating, rather than
incarcerating, first-time nonviolent drug offenders. Under majority
rule, the nation will enact the mandatory minimum, leaving sixty of
its citizens satisfied and forty dissatisfied. However, if the nation
were a federation of separate states, more of its citizens' preferences
would likely be satisfied. Assume, for example, that one state
contains fifty citizens desiring a mandatory minimum and ten citizens
preferring treatment, but the second state contains ten citizens
desiring a mandatory minimum and thirty citizens preferring
treatment. The policies adopted by each state would then satisfy the
preferences of eighty citizens, leaving only twenty citizens dissatisfied.
The satisfaction effects would grow even more if dissatisfied citizens
from each state moved to the state that better satisfied their
preferences. Ideally, twenty people would move, and everyone would
be satisfied. 397 Thus, the public choice model suggests that overall
citizen welfare generally will be enhanced when policy decisions are
left to smaller units of government. 398
This analysis assumes that citizens know their own
preferences, and that those preferences remain stable over time. In
reality, however, many citizens lack important information, or change
their minds based on new information. In these circumstances, state
decision making offers an additional advantage: the possibility of
experimentation. As Justice Brandeis observed, "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 399
Consider how this dynamic might work in the simple
hypothetical discussed above. 40 0 In time, the first state will gain

instance, notes that allocating power to local governments may exacerbate income inequalities
due to the concentration of wealth in some communities. Briffault, supra note 394, at 422-23.
396. This illustration, adapted from Bednar & Eskridge, supranote 394, at 1467-68, was also
used in O'Hear, supra note 7, at 757-58.
397. Bednar & Eskridge, supranote 394, at 1468.
398. Citizen satisfaction with criminal justice policies is good in and of itself. More
speculatively, citizen satisfaction may enhance the legitimacy of criminal law, and thereby
promote compliance with the law. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What
the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839,
1841 (2000).

399. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
400. Once again, here I closely follow the hypothetical discussed in Bednar & Eskridge,
supra note 394, at 1468.
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experience with mandatory minimum sentences.
If they are
successful, the second state may create its own mandatory minimum.
If the second state is unsuccessful, the first state might repeal the
policy. Moreover, under a federal system the first state has incentives
to monitor the efficacy of its policy, because citizens dissatisfied with it
might move to the second state.
The model here thus posits that decentralized decision making
in many instances provides better policy and greater citizen
satisfaction than federal decision making. This results from the
interplay of several factors: voice (the ability of citizens to influence
state policy through democratic decision making); exit (the ability of
dissatisfied citizens to vote with their feet); and state
40 1
experimentation.
While suggesting a presumption in favor of decentralization,
public choice models also indicate that the presumption may be
overcome in a variety of circumstances.
In particular, national
policymaking may be preferred when states individually confront
perverse incentives to adopt policies that are harmful from a collective
standpoint. 40 2 The most familiar of these perverse incentive scenarios
40 3
involve either spillover effects or "race to the bottom" pressures.
State policy choices have spillover effects, sometimes referred
to as negative and positive externalities, when they give rise either to

401. DYE, supra note 395, at 16-17, 20-21. The analysis makes assumptions, of course, that
are almost certainly not fully met in the real world. See, e.g., id. at 31 ("The model assumes that
consumer-taxpayers are mobile, that they have information about the policies and public services
of governments, and that they employ this information in their locational decisions."). In fact, as
noted above, there are good reasons to question the validity of these assumptions in regard to the
current forms of decentralization in drug policy. See supra Part III.C.2.b (discussing concerns
about accountability of local law enforcement due, for instance, to public invisibility of important
decisions). As Professor Dye notes, though, real-world deviations from the model do not
necessarily mean that the model should be discarded, but that attention should be focused on
ameliorating the real-world impediments to the model's efficient functioning. DYE, supra note
395, at 31. The Competitive Alternative described below in Part V is just such an effort to
address important flaws in the current decentralization scheme.
Other considerations may also support decentralization. For instance, Professor Peterson
argues that the delivery of public services seems to display important diseconomies of scale.
PETERSON, supra note 395, at 20-21. Others have argued that "bringing democracy closer to the
people" leads to greater participation and civic-mindedness by citizens. See Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a DemocraticDefense of City Power, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 2009, 2009 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999) and discussing the tradition of "democratic localism").
402. ROSEN, supra note 395, at 512; Oates, supra note 395, at 5-6; Stacy & Dayton, supra
note 147, at 288-89. Another important exception to decentralization is for welfare and other
redistributive programs. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 344, at 212. This exception, however,
does not appear relevant to the analysis of drug policy and so will not be discussed further.
403. See Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 394, at 1470; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 147, at
288-92.
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harms or benefits in other states. Because states do not themselves
experience these spillover effects, each state has an incentive to adopt
policies that overproduce negative externalities and underproduce
positive externalities. These incentives justify federal intervention in
order to implement policies that are more efficient from a collective
standpoint. The regulation of interstate air pollution provides a
classic example. When pollution originating in one state is carried by
natural forces into another, the state of origin has little incentive to
regulate because it receives the economic benefits of the polluting
activity without suffering any of the pollution costs. Thus, for
instance, in the early 1970s, many states permitted polluters to build
tall smokestacks, which dispersed pollutants high into the atmosphere
40 4
for eventual deposition onto downwind states and Canada.
Responding to the problem, Congress ultimately amended the Clean
Air Act in 1977 to subject tall smokestacks to more stringent federal
405
regulation.
The "race to the bottom" describes another form of systemic
failure in decentralized policymaking: in certain circumstances, states
tend to adopt weaker regulations than they really prefer because they
fear that otherwise businesses will gravitate towards other states with
more favorable regulations. 40 6 Competition for business and tax
dollars thus threatens to drive down regulation across the nation-a
fear that has been used to justify federal intervention in a variety of
40 7
contexts, perhaps most notably in the environmental field.
C. A Public Choice Critiqueof the ConstitutionalAlternative
Benjamin and Miller justify the Constitutional Alternative on
the basis of classic public choice reasoning. Yet, the Constitutional
Alternative suffers at least two major defects from the public choice
perspective: the proposal may reduce the degree of decentralization in
national drug policy by consolidating state control, and the proposal
may produce just the sort of perverse incentives that warrant federal
intervention.
404. Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting:Is There a "Race"and Is It to
the "Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 285 n.31 (1997).
405. Id.
406. Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 394, at 1470 & n.99; Stacy & Dayton, supra note 147, at
290-92.
407. This classic justification for federal environmental law has recently come under attack,
sparking a vigorous theoretical and empirical debate. For a review of the debate, see Revesz,
supra note 395, at 549-56; Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, "FactsAre Stubborn Things" An
Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State
Environmental Standard-Setting,8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55, 55-60 (1998).
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1. Consolidation of State Control
The public choice model does not favor state control per se, but,
rather, decentralization. Indeed, within our system of government,
state control stands not as an endpoint on the decentralization
spectrum, but as a midpoint between federal and local control. The
same sorts of arguments that might justify the devolution of authority
from the national government to state governments might equally
well justify devolution from state to local (say, to county or municipal
government). 408 Individual citizen voice grows as the size of the
electorate shrinks; exit opportunities are more realistic within a state
than across state lines; and, if fifty state-level "laboratories of
democracy" are good, then the tens of thousands of laboratories
provided by local government might be even better. 40 9 As to drug
policy, anyway, Benjamin and Miller offer no reason why state control
should be preferred to local control.
Quite the contrary, the
arguments they offer in favor of state control would seem to provide
even greater support for local control. Indeed, Benjamin and Miller
themselves write favorably of local alcohol regulation. 410
To provide a more concrete example, consider the state of
California. With a population of more than 34 million, 41 1 it would be
hard to characterize state-level decision making in California as being
any significantly "closer to the people" than federal decision making.
Indeed, with wide cultural gaps between north and south, coast and
interior, urban and suburban, California seems likely to experience
just the sort of "tyranny of the majority" that is of concern to Benjamin
408. See Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Futureof Democracy, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 953, 968
(1967) ("[W]henever we are compelled to choose between city and state, we should always keep in
mind, I think, that the city, not the state, is the better instrument of popular government.").
409. Local governments in the United States number more than 82,000. Briffault, supra
note 394, at 346.
410. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 190-91. One potential objection to local control,
not discussed by Benjamin and Miller, is the perception that local government officials are less
capable than state and federal officials. Of course, capabilities vary enormously; many cities and
counties are no doubt led by officials of considerable ability. At the same time, there may be
reason to believe that local officials in some jurisdictions (especially small, rural communities)
are systematically less likely to be capable of making and implementing effective public policy
than state and federal counterparts. For instance, officials in such communities are apt to be
part-time government employees and may lack any professional support staff. On the other
hand, such characteristics may offer as many advantages as disadvantages.
"Amateur"
politicians and administrators are uniquely close to the people, and so may be especially
responsive to public preferences. Moreover, in the absence of a sizeable local government
bureaucracy, new or experimental policies may be implemented more quickly. In short, despite
negative perceptions of small-time local government, it is far from clear that local government is
incapable of playing a leadership role in policymaking.
411. United States Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: California (2003),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html.

2004]

FEDERALISM AND DRUG CONTROL

and Miller. 412
For instance, while Proposition 36 received
overwhelming support in urban counties, like Los Angeles and San
Francisco, the measure was rejected by wide margins in many more
41 3
rural counties.
None of this is to suggest that drug policy necessarily ought to
be made locally; rather, the point is that decentralization alone does
not support the choice of state government as the unit with ultimate
control.
Other considerations, though, do suggest some state
superiority as against localities, particularly in the implementation of
enforcement-oriented policies. Local governments lack not only the
financial resources of states, 414 but also a criminal code and prison
system of their own. Furthermore, while drug sellers and purchasers
may easily crisscross municipal boundaries, the local enforcement
authorities are geographically limited to their municipality or county.
Finally, local police may lack the ability to use sophisticated law
enforcement technology and investigative tactics, and have
insufficient economies of scale to justify developing such
41 5
capabilities.
In short, while decentralization values might favor local over
state policymaking, local governments will often lack the resources
necessary for implementing policy choices. 41 6 Does this lead us back in

412. This is not to suggest that the existence of California should necessarily dominate
discussions of federal-state relations; California is admittedly unique in its size and, perhaps,
also in its heterogeneity. But nor should federal-state relations be driven by the existence of tiny
states like New Hampshire and Montana that better adhere to the model of close-to-the-people
state government. Indeed, the great variation among states is itself an important reason to be
skeptical of proposals like the Constitutional Alternative that diminish flexibility in
intergovernmental relations.
413. For instance, the measure received less than 45 percent of the vote in Colusa, Glenn,
Modoc, Sutter, and Tulare Counties. Drug Policy Alliance, County-by-County Breakdowns of the
2000 Initiative Votes (2001), available at http://www.prop36.org/county-results.html.
414. Indeed, local units of government typically depend on the state for the bulk of their
income, and may face various state law constraints on their ability to increase taxes. BOWMAN &
KEARNEY, supra note 377, at 418, 422. Moreover, because local fiscal resources are tied to local
taxing capacity, handing policy responsibility over to local governments may particularly
disadvantage the poorest communities. See Briffault, supra note 394, at 422-23 ("[T]he quantity
and quality of... local services ... vary directly with local fiscal capacity.").

415. Treatment-oriented responses might also suffer. To be sure, large urban jurisdictions
have a long history of developing innovative drug treatment programs on their own, from the
maintenance clinics in the early years of the Harrison Act to the drug treatment courts in the
early 1990s.
See supra Parts II.A, III.B.2.a.
But, lacking economies of scale, smaller
communities may face insurmountable financial obstacles in developing a comprehensive
treatment infrastructure on their own, including in-patient and out-patient programs, regular
testing, counseling services, and appropriate supervision.
416. Based on such considerations, Professor Briffault argues that, in general, states ought
to exercise their power more fully and "take a state-centered approach in policy making."
Briffault, supra note 394, at 447-51.
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a circle to state control and the Constitutional Alternative? Not
necessarily. A distinction should be made between which level of
government makes policy, and which level of government funds
implementation.
There is no reason, for instance, why a state
government could not allow each county within the state to choose
among three alternative drug policies: long prison terms for drug
offenders, mandatory treatment, or decriminalization. To counties
choosing the first, the state might offer ample prison space, in-kind
law enforcement assistance, and favorable sentencing laws.
To
counties choosing the second, the state might offer space in statefunded treatment programs and appropriate guidance to prosecutors
and judges that ensure both the diversion of drug offenders from
prison and proper supervision while in treatment. Finally, to counties
choosing the third, the state might simply keep its hands off, or
perhaps offer other forms of grant aid (say, for education) to
compensate for the lack of state financial support for enforcement. In
this way, while policy choices remain local, state financial resources
and economies of scale are available to support the implementation of
those choices.
The Constitutional Alternative, of course, might permit just
this outcome: handed policymaking authority by the federal
government, states might simply pass that authority on to local
government, while providing the necessary resources for local
implementation. But the Constitutional Alternative does not require
that outcome. States might instead monopolize drug policy to the
exclusion of localities.
Indeed, the Constitutional Alternative might very well provide
less local autonomy than is available under the present system. That
(perhaps surprising) conclusion stems from the fact that many forms
of federal support for drug control efforts go directly to localities, and
do not pass through the state's hands. Through a variety of means of
support, from monetary grants to referral for federal prosecution, the
federal government empowers local officials who are so inclined to
implement tougher drug policies than would be possible under state
auspices alone.
New York City's "Federal Day" program in the 1980s provides
a good case in point. Under this program, local law enforcement in
New York City referred all drug arrests for one day each week for
federal prosecution. 417 The program, which was intended to increase
deterrence of drug crimes, allowed local law enforcement to opt out of

417. O'Hear, supra note 7, at 733.
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Such
state sentencing laws in favor of stricter federal laws. 418
initiatives free local prosecutorial, judicial, and correctional resources
for other purposes, thereby providing the functional equivalent of a
grant in support of the locality's enforcement-oriented drug policies.
In short, current federal policy is of great benefit to get-tough
localities that happen to be situated in more lenient states. Such
localities would, if anything, likely lose autonomy under the
Constitutional Alternative. Moreover, if get-tough localities would
lose under the Constitutional Alternative, lenient localities would not
As discussed above, federal law enforcement
necessarily gain.
resources are quite limited, particularly on the street level. 419 Federal
agents count on the local police acting as their eyes and ears. Without
420
local cooperation, tough federal policies have more bark than bite.
Assuming that local law enforcement agencies in lenient jurisdictions
are responsive to local policy preferences (and, hence, do not
cooperate), one would expect little dissatisfaction with current
arrangements.
The Constitutional Alternative could, to some extent, preserve
some of the current local autonomy by allowing the federal
government to make direct grants to local governments in order to
facilitate the implementation of policies that run counter to state
preferences. But it is not clear that Benjamin and Miller would
condone the resulting constriction of state autonomy. Moreover,
federal money cannot fully substitute for some of the opportunities
offered to localities by the current system. Under the Constitutional
Alternative, for instance, get-tough local law enforcement would
clearly lose access to strict federal sentencing laws and could not "buy"
a reasonable substitute. No city could implement anything like
Federal Day.
Thus far, in arguing that the current system advances
decentralization values at least as well as the Constitutional
Alternative, the analysis has made a critical-and admittedly
unsupported-assumption: that local law enforcement is responsive to
local policy preferences. If it is not, then the local autonomy under the
current system only works to the benefit of the local law enforcement
agenda, and does not necessarily enhance overall citizen satisfaction.

418. Cf. Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off
Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al.
419. See supraPart III.A.2.b.
420. Thus, for instance, local police in Whitefish Bay, Wisconsin, have effectively
decriminalized marijuana by issuing municipal citations for possession, instead of referring cases
to prosecutors. Thomas-Lynn, supra note 207.
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On the other hand, local autonomy-whether or not responsive-may
421
advance the cause of policy innovation.
There are a number of good reasons to doubt police
responsiveness to citizen preferences on the local level. 422
As
discussed above, many features of the current system signal federal
leadership on drug policy, which diminishes local accountability and
discourages real deliberation about alternatives to federal
preferences. 423 Additionally, federal grants and equitable sharing
insulate local drug enforcement units from normal budgetary politics
and offer material rewards for localities to adopt enforcement-oriented
policies without regard to local preferences. Finally, a great deal of
drug enforcement occurs behind a veil of secrecy: few members of the
public know-or have any way of gaining information-about the
operation of MJDTFs; the establishment of, and relationship between,
federal, state, and local drug enforcement priorities; local policies
governing referral of cases to federal prosecutors; federal policies
governing which cases will be taken; sentencing practices in state and
federal courts; the availability and quality of drug treatment programs
for state and federal defendants; and so forth.
On the other hand, considerable anecdotal evidence supports
the view that local police are responsive to local political pressures.424
Moreover, it is important to note that responsiveness may occur not
only on the local side, but also on the federal side. While much of
421. Professor Klein, for instance, responds to criticisms of burgeoning federal criminal
jurisdiction by noting that local experimentation has nonetheless "flourished," citing, as
examples, boot camps, drug courts, shaming devices, community policing, and civil commitment
for sexually violent predators. Klein, supra note 362, at 1556-57. Indeed, the Office of National
Drug Control Policy recently launched a "25-Cities Initiative" intended, among other things, to
help identify and replicate innovative local-level drug control strategies. United States Office of
National Drug Control Policy, 25-Cities Initiative Fact Sheet (2003), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/metroindicator.
422. This lack of responsiveness may be reflected in the curious disconnect observed by
Professor Wright between public perceptions of the drug problem and the number of drug
charges filed. Ronald F. Wright, Are the Drug Wars De-escalating, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP.
141, 145 (2001-2002). While indicators of popular opinion suggest that the public views drugs as
a lower priority today than in the early and mid-1990s, id. at 141, drug charges have gone up or
stayed the same, id. at 143. Professor Wright suggests that the explanation may have something
to do with bureaucratic inertia. Id. at 145.
Related questions have been raised in the literature on community policing. In particular, a
number of scholars have investigated the nature and importance of "value conflicts" between
police institutions and community preferences, with some suggesting that value conflicts are
intractable. For a summary of the literature, see David Thatcher, Conflicting Values in
Community Policing,35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 765, 768-69 (2001).
423. See supra Parts III.A.2.a-b.
424. See, e.g., MASSING, supra note 45, at 57-58 (describing success of community activist
and Congressman Charles Rangel in inducing New York City police to devote resources to
eliminating drug trade on one particular block).
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federal drug policy is made centrally by the ONDCP and other
Washington-based agencies, criminal enforcement is ultimately the
responsibility of the ninety-four different United States Attorneys
spread across the country. While not elected, the United States
Attorneys are subject to political pressures. 425 They may, in fact,
harbor political ambitions of their own, 426 a possibility nicely
illustrated by Rudolph Giuliani's rise from United States Attorney to
Mayor of New York City. Moreover, as Professor Richman has
observed, United States Attorneys are typically beholden to elected
legislative patrons, and legislators are not shy about demanding that
federal prosecutors act to address local needs. 427 Thus, in a get-tough
locale, we would expect that federal prosecutors would be more likely
to emphasize drug enforcement and to provide the sorts of in-kind
drug enforcement assistance described above. 428 In a more lenient
locale, federal prosecutors might be more likely to focus resources
elsewhere, lessening incentives and opportunities for local law
enforcement to adopt get-tough policies. Either way, the decentralized
and politically sensitive federal prosecutorial function helps to make
the current system more locally accountable than might otherwise
429
appear to be the case.
425. For a discussion of the mechanisms by which federal prosecutors are made accountable
to legislators, see Richman, supra note 152, at 789-93.
426. Glaeser et al., supra note 157, at 279.
427. Richman, supranote 152, at 785.
428. Federal Day, instigated by Giuliani while still a federal prosecutor, may be a case in
point. Indeed, Giuliani as candidate and mayor, continued his emphasis on drug enforcement.
For an account of the drug policies of the Giuliani Administration, see MASSING, supra note 45,
at 246-57.
Another example outside the drug area may be the federal Project Exile program in
Richmond, Virginia, in which federal prosecutors responded to a spike in the city's homicide rate
by taking as many gun prosecutions as possible. See Richman, supra note 154, at 370, 398. The
Virginia legislature eventually increased sentences and adopted other get-tough reforms, but
only after Project Exile was acclaimed a success, suggesting that the local federal prosecutors
had been more responsive to local preferences than the state legislature. Id.
429. The sensitivity of federal prosecutors to local drug policy preferences may be reflected in
district-to-district drug sentencing variations. Even taking into account variables such as the
different mix of drug types in different districts, Professors Bowman and Heise have found a
significant downward trend in drug sentence lengths in most districts since 1992, but also a
substantial minority in which sentence lengths have held steady or increased. Bowman & Heise,
supra note 5, at 554-56. They suggest that downward trends indicate that "front-line actors in
the sentencing system [including prosecutors] employed their discretion to an ever-increasing
degree to lower drug sentence length." Id. at 554.
It should be noted, however, that, under Attorney General Ashcroft, "main Justice" has
recently sought to curtail the charging and plea-bargaining discretion of the United States
Attorneys. See, e.g., Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft, United States Department
of Justice, to All United States Attorneys 2 (Sept. 22, 2003) (stating general policy that "federal
prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that
are supported by the facts of the case").
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In the end, it is difficult to say with any confidence whether the
Constitutional Alternative would do a better job of advancing
decentralization objectives than the current system. This uncertainty
greatly diminishes the appeal of the Constitutional Alternative, for
decentralization is its chief selling point. In any event, what is certain
is that both the Constitutional Alternative and the current system
could do a better job of ensuring local accountability and decentralized
policymaking. Part V below offers suggestions for improvement.
2. Perverse Incentives
Notwithstanding the benefits of decentralization, federal
control may still be justified on the basis of "race to the bottom"
pressures or spillover effects. 430 As detailed below, the interstate
effects of the Constitutional Alternative are difficult to project, but
there is some basis to conclude that spillover effects, at least, will be
much more significant than Benjamin and Miller suggest.
a. Race to the Bottom
Under the Constitutional Alternative, interstate competition
may influence the state-level drug policy debate in at least two
important ways. First, states will no doubt be attracted to the tax
revenue potential of the drug trade, which might amount to billions of
dollars a year. 431 If a state were to legalize and tax popular illicit
drugs, the state might be able to use the revenue to reduce other tax
burdens, enhance government services, or make other changes that
would help the state compete more effectively in the interstate market
for business location. Faced with interstate competitive pressures,
states might "succumb" one-by-one to drug legalization, much as
states have increasingly liberalized restrictions on gambling in order
432
to capture a share of the profits from that vice.
A countervailing competitive pressure, though, may diminish
or even overwhelm the appeal of legalization and taxation. Whatever
the fiscal and other benefits, legalization would almost certainly
increase overall drug use and make the legalizing state a magnet for
430. See supra Part IV.B.
431. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 231-32.

432. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 250 (2001). Indeed, as
Courtwright documents, from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the dominant
regulatory strategy of governments across the world towards psychoactive drugs was taxation (or
the functional equivalent, a government-run monopoly). COURTWRIGHT, supra note 124, at 15265.
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addicts from across the country. 43 3 As legalization critics often note,
per capita alcohol consumption more than doubled in the decade after
Prohibition. 43 4 Because of the stigma attached to intoxication and
addiction, states will be wary about becoming havens for open and
Association with drugs may hurt a state's
notorious drug use.
reputation and impair the state's ability to attract and retain
business. Indeed, one of the principal arguments raised against the
Nevada legalization initiative was the possibility of adverse effects on
the state's tourism industry. 4 35 Thus, under state control, drug use
might not necessarily be broadly legalized (like alcohol use) or
partially legalized (like gambling), but might instead be regulated like
a different vice: prostitution. Although it is, like drugs, potentially a
major revenue-generator, the sex-for-hire business remains illegal in
436
every state save one.
The interstate competition effects of the Constitutional
The Constitutional
Alternative therefore defy clear projection.
Alternative may prompt a race to legalization (the "bottom"?) if states
tend to believe that the expected tax revenues will outweigh any of the
disadvantages. Or the Constitutional Alternative may prompt a race
to increasingly punitive policies (the "top"?) if states tend to fear the
stigma associated with drugs. Or the two countervailing pressures
437
may largely cancel each other out, or otherwise prove insignificant.

433. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 233, 236. Thus, for instance, Zurich and
Amsterdam, with relatively quite liberal drug laws, have been magnets for drug users in Europe.
Stanley Neustadter, Legalization Legislation: Confronting the Details of Policy Choices, in HOW
To LEGALIZE DRUGS 388, 393 (Jefferson M. Fish ed., 1998).
An analogous argument has been used in support of federal, as opposed to state,
determination of welfare benefits. According to the so-called "welfare magnet" theory, each
state, in the absence of federal intervention, would adopt less generous welfare policies than it
would otherwise prefer in order to avoid attracting welfare recipients from other states. For the
leading statement of this theory, see PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, BROOKINGS INST.,
WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD (1990). The empirical evidence,
however, casts some doubt on a race to the bottom in welfare policy. Craig Volden, Entrusting
the States with Welfare Reform, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 65, 73-

75 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1997).
434. MASSING, supra note 45, at 10.

435. Nevada Ballot Pamphlet, supra note 305, at 2.
436. Nevada is the only state to legalize prostitution. Kathy J. Steinman, Sex Tourism and
the Child: Latin America's and the United States'Failureto Prosecute Sex Tourists, 13 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 74 (2002). And Nevada has not done so merely because of tax revenue benefits:
the state has not traditionally taxed the sex trade (although a budget crisis may be changing
that policy). Charlie LeDuff, Nevada Turns to Brothels as a Budget Fix, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2003, at A7.
437. Thus, for instance, the interstate competition pressures may be swamped in public
policy debates by any of a number of other considerations, such as the legalist inflexibility or
rights-based libertarianism. Additional empirical work in this area would be helpful. For
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While the effects are uncertain, interstate competition does at least
represent a potential pitfall for the Constitutional Alternative.
b. Spillover Effects
Under the Constitutional Alternative, states that adopt less
punitive or enforcement-oriented drug policies may cause adverse
spillover effects in neighboring get-tough states. 438 At present, drug
prices reflect risk premiums charged at each stage of the
manufacturing and distribution process: drug traffickers demand
greater compensation to offset the risks of apprehension and
incarceration. 439 As a result, street prices are much greater than the
actual costs of production. 440 If a state liberalizes its drug laws,
however, the risk premiums will be reduced and street prices will
fall. 441 By one estimate, for instance, legalization would cause the
price of cocaine to drop by more than 85 percent, marijuana by more
442
than 90 percent, and heroin by more than 98 percent.
The lower prices and lower risks in a liberalizing state may
become quite attractive to users in nearby get-tough states. Drugs
would be easily purchased in a liberalizing state and carried back
home across our open interstate borders. 443 Thus, liberalizing the laws
in one state may make drugs cheaper and more readily available to
the residents of other states, thus undermining the ability of get-tough
states to achieve their preferences to be drug-free. 444 This effect might
instance, it may be helpful to study the international effects of the current round of liberalization
in Canada and Western Europe. These recent reforms are discussed above in Part III.B.3.
438. State-to-state variation already exists, see supra Part III.B, so the new spillover effects
created by the Constitutional Alternative might be more a matter of a change in the degree of
the problem than a change in kind.
439. See RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 103, at 68; STALEY, supra note 78, at 164. One
expects that these risk premiums would be greater for drugs that pass through more complicated
international distribution networks than for those drugs that are readily produced domestically
close to the end users, such as marijuana and methamphetamine.
440. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 231 ("It costs less than $1 to
manufacture an amount of cocaine that carries a street price of $50.")
441. Id. at 233.
442. RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 103, at 185.
443. The mobility and resourcefulness of drug trafficker operations have been well
documented. See, e.g., STALEY, supra note 78, at 156-57 (describing changing patterns of
distribution in response to law enforcement efforts). For instance, Mexican drug gangs are now
increasingly moving their manufacturing and distribution centers from border towns to
suburban communities in the nation's interior, where they are closer to the ultimate consumer.
Tim Golden, Mexican Drug Dealers Turning U.S. Towns into Major Depots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2002, at Al.
444. This dynamic may already be emerging on an international scale between Canada and
the United States. It is estimated that about 95 percent of the marijuana grown in British
Columbia, valued at $4 billion to $6 billion annually, is shipped to the United States. Clifford
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be exacerbated to the extent that price competition from suppliers in
445
liberalizing states caused a price drop within the get-tough state.
Such spillover problems plagued state drug enforcement before
the Harrison Act, 446 and may be observed today in a variety of
For instance, many
analogous contexts, such as gun control.
jurisdictions have banned handgun commerce and possession. 447 Yet,
banned weapons may still be purchased with ease in other
jurisdictions and, like drugs, are easily transported across state lines.
As a result, handguns are readily available even in cities with
stringent gun control laws, and citizen preferences to live in handgun448
free communities are thwarted.
Benjamin and Miller acknowledge the potential for interstate
drug shipments, but suggest two reasons why the spillover effects will
not be large. 449 First, they contend that refocused federal enforcement
resources will contain interstate trafficking:
Instead of being spread thinly across all fifty states and all conceivable forms of
activities, federal resources will be targeted on one function-illegal interstate drug
shipments-and on only a subset of the fifty states-those that decide to get tough. This
targeting of federal resources, in conjunction with the added law enforcement resources

Krauss, Canada Parts with U.S. on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at A9.
Decrimininalization in Canada may increase such exports, leading the United States to threaten
tightened border security. Id.
445. These spillover effects may be mitigated, however, by the permanent relocation of some
users (and perhaps some dealers) to liberalizing states. One imagines that some addicts, for
instance, will find it less costly and risky to move to a liberalizing state than to make frequent
trips across the border. See supra note 433 (discussing movement of drug users in Europe).
Dealers may be less likely to move. Research suggests that drug dealers are very territorial;
movement into another dealer's territory is apt to produce a violent confrontation. RASMUSSEN &
BENSON, supra note 103, at 102-03. Thus, instead of moving, many dealers in the get.tough
state will likely either (1) remain and try to compete with the out-of-state suppliers on price or
quality (to the detriment of the get-tough state); or (2) get out of the business entirely (to the
benefit of the get-tough state, assuming that the ex-dealer does not then take up an even more
dangerous criminal activity as an alternative livelihood). In short, the full magnitude of the
spillover effects would be a function of many complex variables, and hence quite difficult to
predict.
Interestingly, the permanent relocation of users and dealers may itself be characterized as a
spillover effect of the policy choices of the get-tough state. To the extent that the get-tough
policies of one state impose additional drug-related costs on other states (e.g., treatment costs for
relocated addicts), federal control of drug policy may be appropriately justified: federal control
reduces the risk that one state will adopt get-tough policies with the intent of exporting its social
undesirables (users and dealers) to other states.
446. See, e.g., MUSTO, supra note 48, at 9 ("New York State reformers bitterly criticized New
Jersey's lax narcotic regulations, which vitiated enforcement of New York's carefully framed
legislation.").
447. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Illegal Supply of Firearms,29 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 319, 323 (2002).

448. See id. at 330-33.
449. BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 231.
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utilized in get-tough states, will be a formidable barrier to illegal interstate drug
45 0
shipments.

Yet, several considerations suggest that this federal effort may be
somewhat less than "formidable."
Interstate gun trafficking
demonstrates the difficulty of preventing portable contraband from
crossing state lines in this country. 451 Indeed, the illicit interstate
gun trade proceeds notwithstanding the fact that the federal
government has jurisdiction over gun trafficking in violation of state
and local gun laws. 452
The ineffectiveness of this enforcement
authority does not bode well for the comparable federal jurisdiction
offered by the Constitutional Alternative.
Quite apart from this precedent, it is apparent that the
Constitutional Alternative would impair federal drug enforcement in a
number of respects. Federal convictions would be harder to obtain
because federal jurisdiction would be limited to interstate drug
trafficking in violation of a state law. Thus, while federal prosecutors
at present need only prove mere possession of a controlled substance
in order to gain a conviction, under the Constitutional Alternative
they would need to prove several additional elements, and they would
need to do so beyond a reasonable doubt. 453 If a trafficker were
apprehended with drugs in a liberalizing state, federal prosecutors
would have to prove intent to transport the drugs into a get-tough
state.
If a trafficker were apprehended in a get-tough state,
prosecutors would have to prove that the trafficker imported the drugs
from another state. More stringent evidentiary burdens at trial
diminish the prosecutor's leverage in plea bargaining, and hence
reduce the ability of the prosecutor to extract a defendant's
450. Id.
451. See also Gross & Barnes, supra note 2, at 751 (arguing that "highway drug interdiction
is doomed to fail").
452. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(2) (2000), it is unlawful "to sell or deliver any firearm to any
person in any State where the purchase or possession by such person of such firearm would be in
violation of any State law or any published ordinance applicable at the place of sale, delivery or
other disposition." To be sure, gun control is more controversial in Washington than drug
control, which may help to explain some of the federal ineffectiveness in stopping illicit gun
trafficking. See JACOBS, supra note 336, at ix ("Guns present a tougher regulatory challenge
than drugs because they are more widely used and are more politically and socially acceptable.").
453. The concerns here would be somewhat mitigated if the evidentiary burdens were
restructured. For instance, the interstate transportation elements might be converted into an
affirmative defense. While lessening the burden on prosecutors, however, this sort of approach
would raise difficult logistical and fairness issues in the conduct of trials in drug cases. In order
to show an absence of intent to transport drugs across state lines, a defendant might effectively
have to concede the underlying drug violations. Otherwise, the defendant would be in the
difficult position of asserting, "I did not have any drugs ... and I was only going to use them instate." Trial bifurcation might alleviate the fairness concerns, but at the cost of making trials
harder to manage.
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Indeed, federal law
cooperation in convicting coconspirators. 454
enforcement officials may redirect their limited resources from drug
455
cases to other sorts of cases that offer a better chance of success.
These tendencies may be exacerbated by changes in asset
forfeiture practices under the Constitutional Alternative. Federal
jurisdiction over drug-related property would presumably be
constricted in the same manner as federal criminal jurisdiction:
property would be immune from federal forfeiture without proof of a
connection to illicit interstate transportation. 456 Federal officials
would thereby find it much more difficult to wield an important tool in
their enforcement arsenal, and would also lose a significant source of
financial support for their drug enforcement efforts. Gone, too, would
be a critical inducement for cooperation from state and local law
enforcement. In short, while Benjamin and Miller assume that the
scale and effectiveness of federal enforcement would remain constant
under the Constitutional Alternative, there are good reasons to expect
457
just the contrary.
In addition to federal enforcement, Benjamin and Miller would
rely on taxation as an impediment to spillover effects. 458 More
specifically, they argue that liberalizing states will impose taxes on
drug transactions that will offset the loss of the risk premium and
thereby keep street prices at high levels everywhere. 45 9
This
argument, though, rests on two dubious assumptions: that liberalizing
states will legalize the drug trade and that legalizing states will
impose weighty taxes on drugs. As the blossoming of state reform in
454. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment,and Atonement,
56 VAND. L. REv. 1, 15-21 (2003) (describing relationship between cooperation and plea
bargaining); Stuntz, supra note 315, at 537 ("If crimes are defined in ways that make guilt hard
to prove, the threat of trial will be less serious to many defendants, and the inducements to plead
will be accordingly less substantial.").
455. See Stuntz, supra note 315, at 534, 543 (discussing prosecutorial objectives of winning
cases and advancing professional reputation and noting unique power of federal prosecutors "to
set their own agendas, to decide what cases they wish to spend time on and what cases they wish
to ignore").
456. Benjamin and Miller do not address this point directly, but it would be odd to have a
system in which federal agents could seize property based on its connection to an activity that is
legal under federal law and possibly under state law. Federal drug forfeiture jurisdiction is
currently triggered by the violation of a federal drug law. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2000).
457. Their argument might have more appeal if current federal efforts were wholly
ineffective; in that case, the impairment of federal capabilities under the Constitutional
Alternative would not amount to any real loss for get-tough states.
However, federal
enforcement efforts are, in fact, substantial in their own right, and also do facilitate state and
local enforcement. See supra Parts III.A.2.b & d. Put differently, there is something meaningful
to be lost by impairing federal capabilities.
458. See BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 233.
459. See id.
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the past decade demonstrates, states may adopt any of a broad range
of reforms short of full legalization. Indeed, the failure of recent
marijuana legalization efforts in Alaska, Nevada, and South
461
Dakota, 460 coupled with the drug stigma effects discussed above,
suggest that legalization might be quite uncommon under the
Constitutional Alternative. Instead, liberalizing states might opt for
other sorts of reform, such as decriminalization and asset forfeiture
reform, which would diminish the scale or effectiveness of drug
enforcement efforts without offering taxation opportunities. 462
Even in states that choose legalization and taxation, it is far
from clear that tax rates will be uniformly high enough to offset the
loss of the risk premium. Tax rates for substances that are already
463
legal, like alcohol and tobacco, vary enormously from state to state.
While some legalizing states might very well wish to wring maximum
tax revenue from the drug trade, others might reject high taxes on any
number of grounds. From a public-health perspective, high drug
prices make it difficult for addicts to live as law-abiding citizens and
impair the effectiveness of maintenance programs. From a rightsbased perspective, high taxes may look like an unjustifiable penalty
imposed on a perfectly lawful activity. From a tax policy perspective,
high drug taxes may operate regressively; that is, their burden may
fall disproportionately onto lower-income citizens. From a libertarian
perspective, high taxes may be objectionable per se.
In sum, neither federal enforcement nor taxation are
satisfactory responses to the threat of spillover effects.
If the
preferences of states with strong anti-drug feelings are to be taken
seriously, reformers should look for alternatives to the Constitutional
Alternative.

460. See supra Part III.B.2.b.iv.
461. See supraPart IV.C.2.a.
462. Even medical marijuana laws may undercut the effectiveness of drug enforcement, as
marijuana prosecutions may become bogged down in litigation over whether the drug was being
produced or used for medical purposes. See LeDuff & Liptak, supra note 322 (quoting DEA
official as saying, "It's hard to tell the difference between a so-called club [for distribution of
medical marijuana] and an operation that cultivates and traffics in marijuana.").
463. See, e.g., BENJAMIN & MILLER, supra note 7, at 232 (noting 33-cent tax on pack of
cigarettes in New York, in comparison with 2-cent tax in North Carolina). Additionally, Nevada,
the only state to legalize prostitution, has not traditionally taxed the sex business. LeDuff,
supra note 436.
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V. A DIFFERENT DECENTRALIZATION AGENDA: THE COMPETITIVE
ALTERNATIVE

If not the Constitutional Alternative or the status quo, then
what? In the tangled web of federal-state-local relations, what sorts of
changes (if any) would represent sensible improvements over the
existing arrangements? This Part offers preliminary suggestions for
an alternative reform agenda. Like the Constitutional Alternative,
the agenda here is built on a presumption in favor of decentralized
decision making.
The case for a decentralized drug policy is strong, provided that
spillover effects may be held to acceptable levels. 46 4 Opinions as to
critical questions, such as whether drug addiction is better
characterized as a disease or a vice, remain as divided today as they
were a century ago. 465 With such fundamental questions in doubt,
communities may choose from among a range of distinct policy
paradigms that are each reasonably coherent and defensible. Given
this diversity of options and the localized nature of the harms flowing
from drug use, there seems to be little reason to deny different
communities the opportunity to select their own policy responses.
Decentralized policymaking, moreover, carries the ancillary benefit of
promoting the sort of policy innovation and real-world testing that
may contribute to resolving some of the longstanding theoretical and
empirical disputes in the field.
The Constitutional Alternative has been proposed as a
decentralizing reform, but, as discussed above, suffers potential
spillover problems and (in light of its emphasis on states to the
possible detriment of localities) does not clearly advance the goals of
decentralization. Accordingly, this Part suggests a different reform
agenda, the Competitive Alternative. The Competitive Alternative is
also intended to enhance the decentralization of drug policy, but with
greater attention to the objectives of respecting local-level preferences
and of preserving an effective federal enforcement role against cross-

464. In addition to Benjamin and Miller, several other commentators have touted the
benefits of decentralization in national drug policy. See, e.g., RASMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note
103, at 183 (advocating federal decriminalization of marijuana possession "because it [would]
provide[ ] an environment for effective local experimentation"); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note
7, at 174 ("[Tlhe case for uniformity of policy seems weak.., not only because different places
have different types of problems but also because there is little support for a single orthodox set
of drug control strategies and priorities."); Haaga & Reuter, supra note 7, at 72 ("State and local
decisionmakers should be given latitude to make and implement drug control policy."). But see
Neustadter, supra note 433, at 394 (arguing that, in light of spillover effects, "the country's core
drug policy would be determined at the national level").
465. See supra note 51 (discussing division of opinion in 1918).
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jurisdictional drug transportation. Broadly speaking, this reform
agenda has three components: (1) reducing the federal distortion of
drug policy debates at the state and local level; (2) subjecting federal
drug enforcement decisions to a greater degree of local political
control; and (3) increasing the accountability of local law enforcement
to local political institutions.
A. Overview
The problem with existing federal-state-local arrangements is
not one of monopolistic domination by the center, but rather a pattern
of decentralization that is fragmentary, incoherent, and opaque.
Current arrangements seem to do a reasonably good job of
empowering communities that wish to emphasize enforcement and
legalism. Similar support, however, is not available to communities
that wish to develop alternative approaches to drug control. Quite the
contrary, the federal government sometimes actively seeks to
undermine such efforts (as it is currently doing with medical
marijuana in California).
The reform agenda described below aims to create a more level
playing field for the competing approaches to drug control. More
specifically, the goals are to encourage local communities to deliberate
in new ways about drug control policy, and to give more room for
communities to deviate from the federal model. At the same time,
reforms should also attempt to minimize the burdens on federal drug
466
enforcement in communities where it is welcome.
B. Reducing FederalDistortion of the Policy Debate
As discussed above, federal policies and practices discourage
innovation that deviates from the legalist paradigm and induce higher
levels of enforcement than many states and localities would otherwise
choose. 467 The federal role distorts policy debates along at least three
dimensions.
First, federal assertions of leadership blur lines of

466. As suggested by the analysis of the previous Part, the need for an ongoing federal
enforcement presence stems from two considerations. First, federal enforcement represents an
irreplaceable form of in-kind aid to get-tough communities located within liberalizing states.
Second, the federal government has a unique capability, through its specialized law enforcement
resources and ability to operate on a national or international scale, to enforce against multistate and multinational drug trafficking enterprises. Whether or not located in liberalizing
states, get-tough communities may have difficulty defending themselves against such enterprises
without a robust federal enforcement presence.
467. See supra Part III.B.3. For a summary of the evidence on the distorting effects of
federal aid generally, see DYE, supra note 395, at 107-12.
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accountability and relieve pressures on state and local officials to
develop different or more effective drug policies. 468 Second, nonstop
federal marketing of the starkly Manichean legalist message not only
drowns out alternative approaches to the drug problem, but actually
stigmatizes the advocates of these alternative approaches. 469 Third,
asset forfeiture and other financial incentives have given law
enforcement agencies a compelling interest in lobbying in support of
470
drug enforcement.
In order to advance the objectives of decentralization, state and
local governments ought to be able to deliberate about drug policy in
ways that are less systematically tilted towards federal preferences.
Distorting the debate likely results in missed opportunities for policy
471
innovation and for better satisfying overall citizen preferences.
Moreover, these distortions do not, in any clear or focused manner,
serve to advance federal interests in controlling spillover effects.
Any of a number of specific reforms might lend more balance to
the federal role. For instance, the federal government might turn over
the entirety of its anti-drug advertising budget to the states, leaving
each state to determine the content of the anti-drug message within
its borders. 472 In turning one of the most visible elements of the
government anti-drug campaign over to the states, public perceptions
of federal hegemony would be diminished. At the same time, message
content might grow more diverse. While states could continue to
emphasize legalism, some states might not. To the extent that states

468. For example, opponents of the Nevada marijuana initiative successfully argued that the
initiative could not be implemented due to federal opposition. See supra Part III.B.2.b.iv.
Perceptions of federal dominance may lead the public to believe that state-level reform is futile.
469. For instance, in recent years, the federal government has often castigated the diverse
state-level reform efforts as a concealed legalization campaign. See supra Part III.B.2.b.vi.
470. The success of these efforts may be indicated by the consistent opposition of law
enforcement officials (federal, state, and local) to the drug reform ballot initiatives. See supra
Part III.B.2.b.
471. The analysis here assumes that state and local governments, left to their own devices,
will be more or less responsive to constituent preferences. A great body of public choice
scholarship casts doubt on the strong form of this proposition. See, e.g., DYE, supra note 395, at
61 (summarizing criticisms of "median voter model"); McKinnon & Nechyba, supra note 344, at
28-30 (discussing likelihood of "unhealthy" collusion among lower-tier governments). Yet,
despite shortcomings in the theoretical model, considerable empirical evidence suggests that
state and local governments are not wholly unresponsive to voter preferences. DYE, supra note
395, at 61-62.
472. Advertising funds might also be turned over to local government, which would provide
even greater decentralization. On the other hand, in light of the possibilities of economies of
scale and the regional organization of media markets, creating and implementing an advertising
campaign might be the sort of activity best handled at the state level. To the extent that local
governments could utilize the funds effectively, however, there seems no good reason to
disqualify them from receiving federal grants for their own anti-drug campaigns.
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chose to base their advertising on, for instance, the public-health
paradigm (characterizing drug addiction as a disease, rather than as a
moral failure), public debates on drug policy might grow richer and
more productive.
Likewise, Washington should restructure its anti-drug grants
so as to achieve greater neutrality among policy approaches, and
thereby promote greater innovation and diversity.
The Byrne
Program, drug court grants, and similar federal programs should be
folded together into a single Substance Abuse Prevention Grant
Program.
Grants should be awarded without bias among
enforcement,
treatment, and education initiatives.
Police
departments should have to compete for grants with drug treatment
agencies, school districts, prisons, and other agencies that are capable
of using federal funds in innovative and effective ways to control
substance abuse. Moreover, grants should be available not only for
proposals addressing illicit substances, but also for programs
addressing alcohol and other licit substances, thereby allowing
communities to adopt and implement a coherent public-health
47 3
approach (if they wish) in lieu of legalism.
In order to enhance the neutrality of the Program, it should be
administered by an agency outside of the law enforcement
bureaucracy. Thus, for instance, the ONDCP would be preferable to
the DEA for this purpose. In all events, federal "strings" should be
minimized, although evaluation and reporting requirements should be
rigorous so as to discourage waste and facilitate the dissemination of
474
successful policy innovations.
473. One difficult question for the redesigned grant program would be the relative roles of
state and local governments. Professor Hills has offered a thoughtful account of the advantages
and disadvantages of "state supremacy" in the administration of federal grant programs (i.e.,
state control over how local recipients use federal funds, even as against countervailing federal
policies). Hills, supra note 369, at 1216-30. On the one hand, state supremacy creates, in effect,
a state monopoly, whereas robust intergovernmental competition for federal funds would tend to
promote a more efficient use of the funds. Id. at 1228-30. On the other hand, there may be
advantages to preserving a role for state legislatures between Congress and local agencies,
because state legislatures are better qualified than Congress to oversee matters of local selfgovernance. Id. at 1223-25. In any event, Professors Zimring and Hawkins suggest that the
answer to the question may be predetermined: "Until cities elect senators, the likely recipients of
bloc grants will be state governments." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 176.
474. Professors Rasmussen and Benson argue that federal anti-drug block grants should be
discontinued:
Political processes inevitably cause such [block grant] funds to be widely distributed
among jurisdictions, guaranteeing that the funding formula will assure that places
without a serious drug problem will "find" a problem in order to receive funds. Since
marijuana is the illicit drug that is most widely used, such assistance provides local
law enforcement officials with an incentive to conduct their drug war against this
relatively benign drug because to do otherwise is to forfeit federal grants for law
enforcement.
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C. Enhancing Local PoliticalControl over FederalEnforcement
Federal prosecutors have considerable power to override local
drug policy preferences, with the Rosenthal case providing a telling
illustration. This power, of course, is not without its constraints:
federal enforcement resources are limited, local United States
Attorneys have reasons to be sensitive to local political
considerations, 475 and convictions may be difficult to get from juries
when prosecutions transgress community values. Yet, the risks of
federal preemption of local preferences are sufficiently real that a
genuine decentralization program ought to establish more systematic
checks on federal enforcement discretion. At the same time, federal
enforcement capacity should be preserved in communities that
welcome such enforcement, particularly with respect to drug
476
trafficking that crosses jurisdictional boundaries.
One reform that might strike a suitable balance would be to
require, as a condition of federal prosecution in drug cases, written
approval from an appropriate, politically accountable local official.
The local District Attorney, who is typically a county-level official,
would probably fit the bill in most jurisdictions. 477 In enforcementminded locales, the DA's approval would probably be granted as a
matter of course, imposing no significant burden on federal
enforcement authority. In locales with different policy preferences,
the approval process would likely function as a more substantial
barrier. One imagines, for instance, that the Rosenthal prosecution
would have been difficult to bring if local approval had been
necessary. 478 Over time, in most jurisdictions, the required regular
Rasmussen & Benson, supra note 7, at 728. In light of these concerns, it may indeed be
preferable to end, rather than reorganize, the federal anti-drug grants. However, these
considerations should be balanced against the dependence of many local jurisdictions on federal
funds in order to make and implement their own preferred drug policies. Not only are many of
the communities that are most damaged by substance abuse among the poorest in nation, but
the wealth inequalities are also exacerbated in many states by state control over local revenueraising. BOWMAN & KEARNEY, supra note 377, at 422.
475. See supra Part IV.C.1.
476. See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
477. This sort of certification requirement has been considered previously in other contexts.
For instance, in a 1983 bill authorizing federal prosecution of "armed career criminals," Congress
required that federal prosecutors get the approval of a District Attorney before prosecuting a
typically local case. GEST, supra note 75, at 49. While enacted by Congress, the bill was
ultimately vetoed by the President and did not become law. Id.
478. One difficulty in implementing this reform would be to determine which DA's approval
would be necessary. Federal districts typically encompass many counties. On the one hand,
there should be some constraint on the ability of federal prosecutors to select the friendliest DA
in each case without regard to the actual geographical locus of the offense. On the other hand,
many drug offenses involve some travel of people or drugs across county lines; federal
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communication between the DA and the United States Attorney's
Office over drug enforcement would likely lead to efficient working
relationships with minimal transaction costs. Indeed, both sides
would likely find it to their advantage to negotiate clear, written
guidelines in advance as to the scope of federal enforcement authority.
Moreover, such guidelines would not only promote effective working
relationships, but also facilitate public review and debate.
If formulated in a rational, public-spirited manner, negotiated
guidelines would presumably leave the federal government with a free
hand to prosecute interstate trafficking cases. In these cases, the
federal enforcement interests seem most compelling, while the risks of
spillover effects resulting from lax local enforcement seem most
worrisome.
Yet, based on politics, ideology, turf-protection
sensitivities, or personal enmity, a DA might refuse to approve federal
prosecution of some truly interstate cases. Or a DA might require
such a strong showing of interstate dimensions that the approval
process would become a burdensome weight on federal enforcement
capacity.
Accordingly, to counter these possibilities, there should be a
"safety valve," permitting federal prosecution even in the absence of
DA approval when federal prosecution is justified by substantial
spillover concerns. This might operate as a new jurisdictional element
for federal drug prosecutions lacking DA approval. The government
would be required to prove something to the effect that the defendant
transported, attempted to transport, or caused to be transported drugs
across state lines. The government might be relieved of this burden in
cases in which circumstances strongly suggest interstate trafficking,
such as cases in which especially high quantities of drugs were
involved, or cases in which the defendant was apprehended on an
interstate highway or at a national border crossing.
In any event, the safety valve would have close to the same
effect as the Constitutional Alternative insofar as it would impose new
evidentiary burdens on the government. The proposal here, though, is
far less burdensome on federal enforcement as a whole because the
new burdens could be avoided altogether by obtaining DA approval.
Based on the high levels of federal-local law enforcement cooperation
that are currently observed in many jurisdictions, DA approval would
likely impose no significant obstacle across much of the nation.
prosecutions should not be unduly bogged down by metaphysical inquiries into the "location" of
such offenses. Venue doctrines might supply a pragmatic compromise based on legal principles
already familiar to judges and prosecutors: DA approval might be sought from any county in
which venue would be proper for a federal prosecution if the county were a federal district unto
itself. See FED. R. CRIM, P. 18 (setting forth venue rule).
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D. Increasingthe Accountability of Local Law Enforcement to the
Local Community
As discussed above, federal policies, particularly those related
to forfeiture and MJDTFs, tend to co-opt local law enforcement in the
war on drugs. 479 These policies likely result in local law enforcement
agencies devoting more resources than they would otherwise to drug
enforcement, and raise concerns that such agencies are contravening
the actual drug policy preferences of the communities they nominally
serve. Normal political controls over local police departments may
malfunction for any of a variety of reasons: the police may participate
in MJDTFs that are beyond formal local control; police activities may
be funded outside the normal budget-making process through
equitable sharing and federal grants; or the role of local police may be
masked if cases are prosecuted federally.
The presumption in favor of decentralization is premised on the
assumption that local decision makers will be responsive to local
preferences; when it comes to drug enforcement, however, federal
policies may significantly diminish responsiveness. A decentralizing
reform agenda should thus seek to enhance the accountability of local
48 0
law enforcement to the local community.
Forfeiture reform ought to be a particular point of focus. One
possibility might be to eliminate equitable sharing altogether.
However, this would leave all local communities at the mercy of state
forfeiture laws; get-tough communities that view easy forfeiture as an
appropriate law enforcement tool might see their preferences
thwarted under such a sweeping reform.
Federal enforcement
capacity might also be impaired in such communities by the loss of an
important tool for promoting multi-jurisdictional cooperation.
Rather than ending equitable sharing altogether, sharing
payments should be redirected. Instead of law enforcement agencies
directly, the immediate beneficiaries of equitable sharing should be
the most appropriate governmental units of general jurisdiction. The
"share" of state police should go to the state general fund. The share

479. See supra Part III.A.2.d.
480. The critique here mirrors the critique of other instances of "picket fence federalism."
See supra note 377. As Professor Hills observes: "It became a clich6 in the late 1960s and early
1970s to denounce such arrangements as immune from democratic control, inefficient,
uncoordinated, chaotic, and generally unaccountable." Hills, supra note 369, at 1216. While he
contends that some of these criticisms were overblown, he nonetheless concludes, "[W]hatever
their advantages for the pursuit of national goals, there is little doubt that the structures
imposed by the federal government were not well-suited for local self-governance." Id. at 1218.
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of the county sheriff should go to the county general fund. The share
48
of city police should go to the city general fund. '
In many jurisdictions, this formal reallocation of funds will not
make a difference to the enforcement effort. The general budgetmaking authority (e.g., the city council) will have an incentive to
return much or all of the share to the police agency whose work
generated the money; otherwise, the agency may not pursue
forfeitures aggressively in the future. Assuming that the police
continue to have a financial stake in drug enforcement and forfeiture,
a steady stream of dollars would likely be channeled through the
budget-making authority. By returning the money to police, budget
makers will at least be able to claim political credit for increasing drug
enforcement expenditures without raising taxes.
While formally diverting equitable sharing proceeds will not
make much practical difference in many jurisdictions, the reform
would provide an opportunity for change in other jurisdictions that
would prefer to deemphasize drug enforcement. Resource allocation
decisions would be moved from within the police agency into a more
open budget-making process. Where drug enforcement is unpopular,
budget makers would be reluctant to return equitable sharing funds to
the police for that purpose; increased enforcement (even without cost
to the taxpayer) might be more of a political liability than an asset in
such jurisdictions. Thus, budget makers might sometimes be willing
to constrict or even shut down the equitable sharing pipeline.
In short, in order to retain access to forfeiture proceeds, local
police would become answerable not only to federal law enforcement
authorities, but also to local leaders who stand outside the law
enforcement establishment. The diversion of proceeds would thus
enhance the accountability of local drug enforcement efforts to local
political institutions.
MJDTFs should be subject to the same regime. Rather than
giving forfeiture proceeds directly to an MJDTF, funds should be
divided equitably among the different jurisdictions contributing
personnel to the MJDTF. Once again, in many cases, one expects that
the money would be returned to the MJDTF, but it need not be.
481. Professors Rasmussen and Benson make a similar proposal. Rasmussen & Benson,
supra note 7, at 731-32. Many states already have laws that direct forfeiture proceeds to the
general fund or some specified nonpolice purpose. GURULE & GUERRA, supra note 177, §§ 171(d), 17-2(g)(1) However, such laws are easily evaded at present because local law enforcement
can simply turn seized assets over to the federal government for adoption and equitable sharing.
Robyn E. Blumner, Police Too Addicted to Lure of Easy Money, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 17,
2003, at 7D. Thus, federal law would have to be reformed before the state laws could become
effective. While earlier reform efforts have had some success in Congress, durable changes in the
law have proven elusive. See supra note 191.
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Financially self-sufficient MJDTFs, standing outside any established
structure of political accountability, would be a thing of the past.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has addressed two questions of drug policy, which
can now be seen as closely related. First, in answer to the empirical
question (what is the federal role), the recent blossoming of state and
local innovation casts considerable doubt on the federal monopoly
theory. At the most basic level, the federal monopoly theory misses
the reliance of the federal government on the cooperation of local law
enforcement in order to advance the federal objectives of legalism and
enforcement. This reliance diminishes federal control in at least two
ways. First, federal enforcement is in some respect constrained by the
local political forces that shape the priorities and capabilities of local
police. These decentralizing tendencies, in turn, may be exacerbated
by the decentralized nature of the federal prosecutorial function.
Second, federal reliance on local law enforcement requires that each
state have its own drug-related penal laws, because it is state law that
empowers local law enforcement to address
drug issues.
Consequently, there must necessarily be at least some state autonomy
in drug policy. Put differently, without federal preemption, there will
always be the possibility that, no matter the degree of federal
discouragement, some states will choose to deviate from federal norms.
The federal government could counteract such deviations by devoting
more federal resources to drug enforcement, either increasing the
financial incentives for state conformity or increasing direct
enforcement capabilities in liberalizing states. However, Washington
has not indicated a willingness to undertake such measures, which, if
pushed to the extreme, would violate the whole premise of the
cooperative federalism "deal" (shared costs/shared credit).
In considering the second, normative question (what should the
federal role be), the federal-local relationship again takes center stage.
Even granting the desirability of decentralization,
current
arrangements may be perfectly satisfactory inasmuch as they liberate
local law enforcement from the constraints of state policy through a
combination of federal financial and in-kind assistance. Local law
enforcement has the freedom to choose between state and federal
policy preferences, allowing the development of a locally tailored
response to drug problems. The attractiveness of this scenario will
depend in no small part on one's views of the trustworthiness of local
law enforcement. On the one hand, the local police might be seen as
reliable agents of the public will, uniquely close to the people and well
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positioned to discern community needs and preferences. On the other
hand, the local police might be viewed as hopelessly co-opted by
federal policies, with compelling financial interests in drug
enforcement and little real accountability. Anecdotal evidence may be
cited in favor of either position. Here lies an empirical question
worthy of further scholarly investigation.
Even taking the more sanguine view, though, there may still be
good reason to wish reform of current arrangements. Lines of public
accountability are blurred by federal assertions of leadership and by
the complex and largely invisible day-to-day interactions of federal,
state, and local enforcers. Clarifying lines of accountability may
promote even greater responsiveness and innovation in policymaking.
The challenge is how to accomplish this, while at the same time
preserving the effectiveness of necessary federal protections for the
get-tough communities.
With an eye to these competing objectives, the Article has
proposed a preliminary, three-part reform agenda (the Competitive
Alternative), intended to: (1) reduce the federal distortion of drug
policy debates at the state and local level; (2) subject federal drug
enforcement decisions to a greater degree of local political control; and
(3) increase the accountability of local law enforcement to local
political institutions.
Among other things, the analysis here seeks to highlight the
importance of local governmental institutions in a cooperative
federalism scheme. Local institutions often play a crucial role in
implementing federal and state policy choices, not just in drug and
crime policy, but also in other areas ranging from education to welfare
to housing to the environment. Adding local institutions to the mix
may dramatically change the way that federalism problems are
viewed. Policies that appear quite centralized from a federal-state
perspective alone may seem much less so from a federal-state-local
point of view.
At the same time, the local role may considerably complicate
the normative structural issues. Not only do local governments differ
dramatically in size and wealth, but they are ultimately institutions of
state law, with limited and idiosyncratic legal powers of their own.
Thus, where the federal government does not wish to assume
exclusive responsibility, tripartite divisions of authority seem
inevitable. How to structure these federal-state-local relationships so
as to maximize local autonomy and accountability, while at the same
time making available necessary state and federal support, emerges
as a question of great importance and difficulty.

